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arXiv:2111.14108 · PRX Quantum

Stream Privacy Amplification for Quantum Cryptography

Yizhi Huang, Xingjian Zhang, Xiongfeng Ma

Published Jun 10, 2022• 11 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

Privacy amplification is the key step to guarantee the security of quantum communication.The existing security proofs require the accumulation of a large number of raw key bits for privacy amplification.This is similar to block ciphers in classical cryptography that would delay the final key generation since an entire block must be accumulated ahead of privacy amplification.Moreover, any leftover errors after information reconciliation would corrupt the entire block.By modifying the security proof based on quantum error correction, we develop a stream privacy-amplification scheme, which resembles the classical stream cipher.This scheme can output the final key in a stream way, prevent error from spreading, and hence can put privacy amplification ahead of information reconciliation.The stream scheme can also help to enhance the security of trusted-relay quantum networks and improve the practicality of randomness extraction for quantum random number generators.

DOI
10.1103/prxquantum.3.020353

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Privacy amplification is the key step to guarantee the security of quantum communication.The existing security proofs require the accumulation of a large number of raw key bits for privacy amplification.This is similar to block ciphers in classical cryptography that would delay the final key generation since an entire block must be accumulated ahead of privacy amplification.Moreover, any leftover errors after information reconciliation would corrupt the entire block.By modifying the security proof based on quantum error correction, we develop a stream privacy-amplification scheme, which resembles the classical stream cipher.This scheme can output the final key in a stream way, prevent error from spreading, and hence can put privacy amplification ahead of information reconciliation.The stream scheme can also help to enhance the security of trusted-relay quantum networks and improve the practicality of randomness extraction for quantum random number generators.
We study the practical effectiveness of privacy amplification for classical key distribution schemes. We find that in contrast to quantum key distribution schemes, the high fidelity of the raw key generated in classical systems allow the users to always sift a secure shorter key if they have an upper bound on the eavesdropper probability to correctly guess the exchanged key bits. The number of privacy amplification iterations needed to achieve information leak of 10−8 in existing classical communicators is 2 or 3 resulting in a corresponding slowdown 4 to 8. We analyze the inherent tradeoff between the number of iterations and the security of the raw key. This property which is unique to classical key distribution systems render them highly useful for practical, especially for noisy channels where sufficiently low quantum bit error ratios are difficult to achieve.
We study the practical effectiveness of privacy amplification for classical key distribution schemes. We find that in contrast to quantum key distribution schemes, the high fidelity of the raw key generated in classical systems allow the users to always sift a secure shorter key if they have an upper bound on the eavesdropper probability to correctly guess the exchanged key bits. The number of privacy amplification iterations needed to achieve information leak of 10 −8 in existing classical communicators is 2 or 3 resulting in a corresponding slowdown 4 to 8. We analyze the inherent tradeoff between the number of iterations and the security of the raw key. This property which is unique to classical key distribution systems render them highly useful for practical, especially for noisy channels where sufficiently low quantum bit error ratios are difficult to achieve.
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) protocols typically involve two separate steps of error-verification and privacy amplification. Both steps involve the application of a hash function sampled from a suitable hash family to classical data. A potentially simpler alternative is to implement a single-step hashing procedure, announce and compare a fixed number of bits of its output for error-verification, and retain the remaining bits as the final output key. This reduces the complexity of classical postprocessing, the amount of classical communication, and the amount of randomness needed in the protocol. While this construction has appeared in the literature, a suitable mathematical justification is lacking. In this work, we show that the security of such protocols, under certain simple conditions, follows from a slightly modified notion of secrecy of the protocol without the final error-verification step. In particular, we show that for most entropy-based proofs, the combined protocol can be implemented with no change to the key rate, and a minor change to the security parameter.
Privacy amplification (PA) is an essential postprocessing step in quantum key distribution (QKD) for removing any information an eavesdropper may have on the final secret key. In this paper, we consider delaying PA of the final key after its use in one-time pad encryption and prove its security. We prove that the security and the key generation rate are not affected by delaying PA. Delaying PA has two applications: it serves as a tool for significantly simplifying the security proof of QKD with a two-way quantum channel, and also it is useful in QKD networks with trusted relays. To illustrate the power of the delayed PA idea, we use it to prove the security of a qubit-based two-way deterministic QKD protocol which uses four states and four encoding operations.
[Shortened abstract:] This thesis investigates the importance of quantum memory in quantum cryptography, concentrating on quantum key distribution schemes. In the hands of an eavesdropper -- a quantum memory is a powerful tool, putting in question the security of quantum cryptography; Classical privacy amplification techniques, used to prove security against less powerful eavesdroppers, might not be effective when the eavesdropper can keep quantum states for a long time. In this work we suggest a possible direction for approaching this problem. We define strong attacks of this type, and show security against them, suggesting that quantum cryptography is secure. We start with a complete analysis regarding the information about a parity bit (since parity bits are used for privacy amplification). We use the results regarding the information on parity bits to prove security against very strong eavesdropping attacks, which uses quantum memories and all classical data (including error correction codes) to attack the final key directly. In the hands of the legitimate users, a quantum memory is also a useful tool. We suggest a new type of quantum key distribution scheme where quantum memories are used instead of quantum channels. This scheme is especially adequate for networks of many users. The use of quantum memory also allows reducing the error rate to improve large scale quantum cryptography, and to enable the legitimate users to work with reasonable error rate.
The amount of secret key that can be obtained from a quantum key distribution run depends on both the physically observed error rates and the mathematical bounds used to certify security. For finite datasets, conservative bounds force users to discard a substantial fraction of the potentially available key. Here we further refine and extend the privacy amplification bounds achievable through the recent leftover hash lemma of Regula and Tomamichel [arXiv:2603.04493] and incorporate them into the security analysis of quantum key distribution based on entropic uncertainty relations. This improves on state-of-the-art key rates in finite-block regimes, certifying more secret key from the same experimental data without changes to the protocol, and outperforming techniques based on entropy accumulation. The results illustrate how sharper mathematical estimates can directly increase the usable output of a quantum communication system.