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arXiv:2609.38306

Making the most of leftovers: Improved privacy amplification for quantum key distribution

Matthew Simon Tan, Bartosz Regula, Marco Tomamichel

quant-phSubmitted Sep 29, 2026• Announced Oct 1, 2026• 1 citation
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Abstract

The amount of secret key that can be obtained from a quantum key distribution run depends on both the physically observed error rates and the mathematical bounds used to certify security. For finite datasets, conservative bounds force users to discard a substantial fraction of the potentially available key. Here we further refine and extend the privacy amplification bounds achievable through the recent leftover hash lemma of Regula and Tomamichel [arXiv:2603.04493] and incorporate them into the security analysis of quantum key distribution based on entropic uncertainty relations. This improves on state-of-the-art key rates in finite-block regimes, certifying more secret key from the same experimental data without changes to the protocol, and outperforming techniques based on entropy accumulation. The results illustrate how sharper mathematical estimates can directly increase the usable output of a quantum communication system.

AI Summary

The paper asks how much finite-key QKD performance improves when privacy amplification uses sharper bounds compatible with conventional smooth min-entropy security proofs. It refines a recent measured-smooth-entropy leftover hash lemma and incorporates it into an entropic-uncertainty-relation analysis of ideal BB84. For exact-collision $2^*$-universal hashing, it proves $\Delta\leq\varepsilon^2+\tfrac12\sqrt{(|\mathcal Z|-1)\kappa(\varepsilon)2^{-H_{\min}^{\varepsilon}(X|E)}}$, with $1\leq\kappa\leq4/3$ and $\kappa\to1$ as $\varepsilon\to0$. Relative to the conventional lemma, smoothing costs $\varepsilon^2$ rather than $2\varepsilon$; relative to the recent precursor, the entropy-dependent term improves from a cube root to a square root. Ordinary 2-universal hashing incurs at most one additional bit of key-length loss. The proof constructs a Hermitian approximation from purified-distance smoothing and bounds its Bures norm, establishing a sharper comparison with measured smooth collision divergence. For QKD, the analysis combines this bound with exact hypergeometric parameter-estimation probabilities and binomial completeness tails, then optimises protocol parameters. At security $10^{-10}$, completeness error $0.01$, QBER $1\%$, and $10^4$ retained rounds, certified bits per round increase from $0.385$ with the old lemma to $0.456$; the compared Rényi entropy-accumulation calculation gives $0.433$. At $10^6$ rounds, these rates are $0.747$, $0.761$, and $0.756$. The numerical results assume ideal BB84 and fitted reconciliation leakage; some short-block calculations extrapolate those fits beyond their calibration conditions. The entropy-accumulation comparison uses a different sampling protocol. Authentication costs are excluded, so positive output does not establish net key expansion.

Little sign of AI-generated text

Error found: The abstract's broad claim of outperforming entropy-accumulation techniques is supported only for the particular refined REAT implementation and performance models studied. The tabulated EUR improvements use separately optimised protocol parameters and therefore do not quantify gains for one fixed protocol and experimental dataset, although the theorem supports fixed-protocol improvements. The EUR–REAT benchmark also differs in sampling, completeness accounting, and reconciliation assumptions, so the reported advantage cannot be attributed exclusively to the improved privacy-amplification bound.

Written by gpt-6.1-sol from the paper's full text. Automated: it can be wrong.

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The amount of secret key that can be obtained from a quantum key distribution run depends on both the physically observed error rates and the mathematical bounds used to certify security. For finite datasets, conservative bounds force users to discard a substantial fraction of the potentially available key. Here we further refine and extend the privacy amplification bounds achievable through the recent leftover hash lemma of Regula and Tomamichel [arXiv:2603.04493] and incorporate them into the security analysis of quantum key distribution based on entropic uncertainty relations. This improves on state-of-the-art key rates in finite-block regimes, certifying more secret key from the same experimental data without changes to the protocol, and outperforming techniques based on entropy accumulation. The results illustrate how sharper mathematical estimates can directly increase the usable output of a quantum communication system.
The paper asks how much finite-key QKD performance improves when privacy amplification uses sharper bounds compatible with conventional smooth min-entropy security proofs. It refines a recent measured-smooth-entropy leftover hash lemma and incorporates it into an entropic-uncertainty-relation analysis of ideal BB84.
For exact-collision 2∗2^*2∗-universal hashing, it proves Δ≤ε2+12(∣Z∣−1)κ(ε)2−Hmin⁡ε(X∣E)\Delta\leq\varepsilon^2+\tfrac12\sqrt{(|\mathcal Z|-1)\kappa(\varepsilon)2^{-H_{\min}^{\varepsilon}(X|E)}}Δ≤ε2+21​(∣Z∣−1)κ(ε)2−Hminε​(X∣E)​, with 1≤κ≤4/31\leq\kappa\leq4/31≤κ≤4/3 and κ→1\kappa\to1κ→1 as ε→0\varepsilon\to0ε→0. Relative to the conventional lemma, smoothing costs ε2\varepsilon^2ε2 rather than 2ε2\varepsilon2ε; relative to the recent precursor, the entropy-dependent term improves from a cube root to a square root. Ordinary 2-universal hashing incurs at most one additional bit of key-length loss. The proof constructs a Hermitian approximation from purified-distance smoothing and bounds its Bures norm, establishing a sharper comparison with measured smooth collision divergence.
For QKD, the analysis combines this bound with exact hypergeometric parameter-estimation probabilities and binomial completeness tails, then optimises protocol parameters. At security 10−1010^{-10}10−10, completeness error 0.010.010.01, QBER 1%1\%1%, and 10410^4104 retained rounds, certified bits per round increase from 0.3850.3850.385 with the old lemma to 0.4560.4560.456; the compared Rényi entropy-accumulation calculation gives 0.4330.4330.433. At 10610^6106 rounds, these rates are 0.7470.7470.747, 0.7610.7610.761, and 0.7560.7560.756.
The numerical results assume ideal BB84 and fitted reconciliation leakage; some short-block calculations extrapolate those fits beyond their calibration conditions. The entropy-accumulation comparison uses a different sampling protocol. Authentication costs are excluded, so positive output does not establish net key expansion.
We introduce list privacy amplification (LPA), a relaxation of the final step of quantum key distribution (QKD) in which Alice and Bob extract a list of LLL candidate keys from a raw string correlated with an eavesdropper Eve, with the guarantee that at least one key is perfectly secret while Eve cannot identify which. This parallels list decoding in error-correcting codes: relaxing unique decoding to list decoding increases the decoding radius; analogously, list extraction increases achievable key length beyond the standard quantum leftover hash lemma (QLHL). Within the abstract cryptography framework, we formalise LPA and prove the \emph{Quantum List Leftover Hash Lemma} (QLLHL): an LLL-list of ℓ\ellℓ-bit keys can be extracted from an nnn-bit source with smooth min-entropy kkk iff ℓ≤k+log⁡L−2log⁡(1/ε)−3, \ell \le k + \log L - 2\log(1/ε) - 3, ℓ≤k+logL−2log(1/ε)−3, yielding a tight additive log⁡L\log LlogL gain over QLHL. This gain arises because the index of the secure key is chosen after hashing and hidden from Eve, effectively contributing log⁡L\log LlogL bits of entropy. Applying QLLHL to BB84-type QKD, a list size L=2αn′L = 2^{αn'}L=2αn′ increases the tolerable phase-error threshold from h−1(1−h(eb))h^{-1}(1 - h(e_b))h−1(1−h(eb​)) to h−1(1−h(eb)+α)h^{-1}(1 - h(e_b) + α)h−1(1−h(eb​)+α), exceeding the standard ≈11%\approx 11\%≈11% bound for any α>0α> 0α>0. We prove tightness via a matching intercept-resend attack, establish composability with Wegman--Carter authentication, and present two constructions: a polynomial inner-product hash over F2m\mathbb{F}_{2^m}F2m​ and a Toeplitz-based variant, running in O(nL)O(nL)O(nL) and O(nLlog⁡n)O(nL \log n)O(nLlogn) time.
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) protocols typically involve two separate steps of error-verification and privacy amplification. Both steps involve the application of a hash function sampled from a suitable hash family to classical data. A potentially simpler alternative is to implement a single-step hashing procedure, announce and compare a fixed number of bits of its output for error-verification, and retain the remaining bits as the final output key. This reduces the complexity of classical postprocessing, the amount of classical communication, and the amount of randomness needed in the protocol. While this construction has appeared in the literature, a suitable mathematical justification is lacking. In this work, we show that the security of such protocols, under certain simple conditions, follows from a slightly modified notion of secrecy of the protocol without the final error-verification step. In particular, we show that for most entropy-based proofs, the combined protocol can be implemented with no change to the key rate, and a minor change to the security parameter.
We introduce an improved one-shot characterisation of randomness extraction against quantum side information (privacy amplification), strengthening known one-shot bounds and providing a unified derivation of the tightest known asymptotic constraints. Our main tool is a new class of smooth conditional entropies defined by lifting classical smooth divergences through measurements. A key role is played by the measured smooth Rényi relative entropy of order 2, which we show to admit an equivalent variational form: it can be understood as allowing for smoothing over not only states, but also non-positive Hermitian operators. Building on this, we establish a tightened leftover hash lemma, significantly improving over all known smooth min-entropy bounds on extractable randomness and recovering the sharpest classical achievability results. We extend these methods to decoupling, the coherent analogue of privacy amplification, obtaining a corresponding improved one-shot bound. Relaxing our smooth entropy bounds leads to one-shot achievability results in terms of measured Rényi divergences, tightening the bounds of [Dupuis, arXiv:2105.05342] and recovering state-of-the-art asymptotic i.i.d. error exponents. We show an approximate optimality of our results by giving a matching one-shot converse bound up to additive logarithmic terms. This yields an optimal second-order asymptotic expansion of privacy amplification under trace distance, establishing a significantly tighter one-shot achievability result than previously shown in [Shen et al., arXiv:2202.11590] and proving its optimality for all hash functions.
We show that the Mayers-Shor-Preskill approach and Renner's approach to proving the security of quantum key distribution (QKD) are essentially the same. We begin our analysis by considering a special case of QKD called privacy amplification (PA). PA itself is an important building block of cryptography, both classical and quantum. The standard theoretical tool used for its security proof is called the leftover hashing lemma (LHL). We present a direct connection between the LHL and the coding theorem of a certain quantum error correction code. Then we apply this result to proving the equivalence between the two approaches to proving the security of QKD.
By applying the framework of entropic uncertainty relation (EUR) and the Quantum Leftover Hash Lemma (QLHL), we introduce a security-proof method for variable-length side-channel-secure (SCS) quantum key distribution (QKD) against coherent attacks. This method reframes composable security as a statistical fluctuation problem of phase errors, enabling direct proofs against coherent attacks through observables and virtual observables. It yields tight key rates for the SCS protocol and reduces pulse requirements by over two orders of magnitude compared to prior works that employ the post-selection technique. {Utilizing the characteristic of the SCS protocol that it has no untagged-bit bit-flip errors, we prove that the secure key length for the SCS protocol can be determined after Cascade error correction, using its actual parity disclosures. We also explain how the same argument extends to protocols with compatible bit-error-pattern and phase-error measurements.} We further identify sufficient conditions under which the final key length may be determined after error correction in a broader class of QKD protocols. Under the framework of EUR and QLHL, we clarify the applicability of several commonly used concentration bounds to variable-length QKD and the appropriate manner of their implementation. This work enhances the practical value of the SCS protocol and clarifies the security justification of key-rate formulas used in practical variable-length QKD implementations.
Privacy amplification is the key step to guarantee the security of quantum communication.The existing security proofs require the accumulation of a large number of raw key bits for privacy amplification.This is similar to block ciphers in classical cryptography that would delay the final key generation since an entire block must be accumulated ahead of privacy amplification.Moreover, any leftover errors after information reconciliation would corrupt the entire block.By modifying the security proof based on quantum error correction, we develop a stream privacy-amplification scheme, which resembles the classical stream cipher.This scheme can output the final key in a stream way, prevent error from spreading, and hence can put privacy amplification ahead of information reconciliation.The stream scheme can also help to enhance the security of trusted-relay quantum networks and improve the practicality of randomness extraction for quantum random number generators.