5G Core networks are entering a decisive phase of post-quantum (PQ) migration: operators and vendors are beginning to advertise PQ-TLS 1.3, PQ-IPsec, and hybrid KEM support across the Service-Based Interface (SBI) and N2, N3, N4 reference points, in line with 3GPP TS 33.501, emerging IETF drafts, and NIST FIPS 203, 204, 205. Yet deploying PQ primitives does not guarantee PQ security. A Network Function may advertise ML-KEM-768 and silently fall back to X25519; negotiate a hybrid KEM but authenticate with ECDSA-P256; present an ML-DSA leaf on a classical chain; or skip mutual TLS altogether. These failures are silent on the wire, and today scanners (testssl.sh, sslyze, Qualys) together with 5G-specific fuzzers are PQ-unaware and telecom-blind. We present PQC Validator, a layered PQC assurance framework purpose-built for the cloud-native 5G Core, comprising a PQ Crypto Engine (L1), a PQ Conformance Prober (L2), a PQ Robustness Tester (L3), a PQ Overhead Meter (L4), and an eBPF Attestation Plane for wire-level ground truth. Its scope spans the full control-plane cryptographic surface: an independent PQ-TLS 1.3 client and server, a strongSwan-driven PQ-IPsec harness for N2/N3/N4, an eBPF/XDP/TC monitoring plane that extracts wire-level ground truth on negotiated groups and signatures, and a Kubernetes-native UI that auto-discovers NFs and emits structured PQ evidence classifying every endpoint as classical, hybrid-pq, or full-pq. A compliance suite spans TLS, PQC, 3GPP SBI, NRF OpenAPI, and security hardening, while a protocol fuzzer exercises CVE-class regressions and downgrade paths.
5G Core networks are entering a decisive phase of post-quantum (PQ) migration: operators and vendors are beginning to advertise PQ-TLS 1.3, PQ-IPsec, and hybrid KEM support across the Service-Based Interface (SBI) and N2, N3, N4 reference points, in line with 3GPP TS 33.501, emerging IETF drafts, and NIST FIPS 203, 204, 205. Yet deploying PQ primitives does not guarantee PQ security. A Network Function may advertise ML-KEM-768 and silently fall back to X25519; negotiate a hybrid KEM but authenticate with ECDSA-P256; present an ML-DSA leaf on a classical chain; or skip mutual TLS altogether. These failures are silent on the wire, and today scanners (testssl.sh, sslyze, Qualys) together with 5G-specific fuzzers are PQ-unaware and telecom-blind. We present PQC Validator, a layered PQC assurance framework purpose-built for the cloud-native 5G Core, comprising a PQ Crypto Engine (L1), a PQ Conformance Prober (L2), a PQ Robustness Tester (L3), a PQ Overhead Meter (L4), and an eBPF Attestation Plane for wire-level ground truth. Its scope spans the full control-plane cryptographic surface: an independent PQ-TLS 1.3 client and server, a strongSwan-driven PQ-IPsec harness for N2/N3/N4, an eBPF/XDP/TC monitoring plane that extracts wire-level ground truth on negotiated groups and signatures, and a Kubernetes-native UI that auto-discovers NFs and emits structured PQ evidence classifying every endpoint as classical, hybrid-pq, or full-pq. A compliance suite spans TLS, PQC, 3GPP SBI, NRF OpenAPI, and security hardening, while a protocol fuzzer exercises CVE-class regressions and downgrade paths.
The rise of quantum computing poses a critical threat to current cryptographic protocols, particularly RSA and Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC), which are vulnerable to attacks such as Shor’s algorithm. As 5G networks rely heavily on public key infrastructure, the risk of compromise in the quantum era is significant. Transitioning to post-quantum cryptographic (PQC) primitives is therefore an urgent priority. This paper presents a practical framework for integrating PQC into 5G control plane communication, specifically over Service-Based Interfaces (SBIs). Using the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) finalist algorithm Dilithium3, we implement PQC-enabled Transport Layer Security (TLS) handshakes via a modular proxy built in Python. The proxy intercepts inter-service traffic and offloads cryptographic operations to a containerized environment using liboqs. Importantly, this integration does not require altering existing 5G functions. System-level metrics, including CPU (Central Processing Unit) usage, memory, latency, and jitter, were benchmarked before and after PQC integration. Results show performance overhead remains within acceptable bounds, confirming deployment viability. This work proposes a hybrid migration strategy that enables backward compatibility and cryptographic agility. It provides a scalable and testable foundation for securing 5G networks in the quantum era while aligning with emerging European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) and NIST guidelines for post-quantum transition.
Quantum computing is reshaping the security landscape of modern telecommunications. The cryptographic foundations that secure todays 5G systems, including RSA, Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC), and Diffie-Hellman (DH), are all susceptible to attacks enabled by Shors algorithm. Protecting 5G networks against future quantum adversaries has therefore become an urgent engineering and research priority. In this paper we introduce QORE, a quantum-secure 5G and Beyond 5G (B5G) Core framework that provides a clear pathway for transitioning both the 5G Core Network Functions and User Equipment (UE) to Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC). The framework uses the NIST-standardized lattice-based algorithms Module-Lattice Key Encapsulation Mechanism (ML-KEM) and Module-Lattice Digital Signature Algorithm (ML-DSA) and applies them across the 5G Service-Based Architecture (SBA). A Hybrid PQC (HPQC) configuration is also proposed, combining classical and quantum-safe primitives to maintain interoperability during migration. Experimental validation shows that ML-KEM achieves quantum security with minor performance overhead, meeting the low-latency and high-throughput requirements of carrier-grade 5G systems. The proposed roadmap aligns with ongoing 3GPP SA3 and SA5 study activities on the security and management of post-quantum networks as well as with NIST PQC standardization efforts, providing practical guidance for mitigating quantum-era risks while safeguarding long-term confidentiality and integrity of network data.
The prospect of a cryptographically relevant quantum computer (CRQC) undermines the public-key primitives that secure virtually every layer of modern communication networks, from subscriber authentication in cellular cores to transport-layer key exchange. Adversaries already following a harvest-now, decrypt-later (HNDL) strategy make this threat actionable today for any traffic whose confidentiality must outlast a decade. Following NIST’s finalisation of the first post-quantum cryptography (PQC) standards, ML-KEM (FIPS 203), ML-DSA (FIPS 204), and SLH-DSA (FIPS 205) in August 2024, and the selection of HQC as a fourth key-encapsulation candidate in March 2025, research has shifted from algorithm design to network-level integration. This paper reports a PRISMA-2020-compliant systematic literature review of PQC migration in communication networks, structured around five research questions covering protocol and scenario coverage, quantitative performance impact, hybrid cryptography strategies, transition barriers, and open research gaps. Six databases (IEEE Xplore, Scopus, Web of Science, ACM Digital Library, SpringerLink, and MDPI) were searched (3229 records identified); after deduplication, title-keyword screening, full-text eligibility assessment, and a pre-specified quality appraisal (Q1–Q6, threshold ≥3/6) applied to 310 eligible studies, a final synthesis corpus of 141 studies (68 journal articles, 68 conference papers, 4 conference-derived book chapters, 1 workshop paper) was screened, quality-appraised, and synthesised narratively with supporting evidence tables. The review finds that transport-layer protocols (TLS 1.3, QUIC, DTLS 1.3) dominate the literature, that lattice-based ML-KEM/ML-DSA offer the most favourable latency–bandwidth–energy trade-off among standardised families, and that classical–PQC hybrid schemes are the de facto transition strategy across 5G/6G, IoT, VPN, and automotive scenarios, at the cost of 10–100× larger keys/signatures and 8–40% handshake latency overhead. Persistent barriers include constrained-device resource limits, immature hardware acceleration, incomplete IETF/3GPP standardisation, and public-key-infrastructure scaling. We propose a five-level PQC transition-readiness maturity model and identify large-scale field validation, PQC–QKD integration, and lightweight signature schemes as priority directions for future work.
The transition to a cloud-native 5G Service-Based Architecture (SBA) improves scalability but exposes control-plane signaling to emerging quantum threats, including Harvest-Now, Decrypt-Later (HNDL) attacks. While NIST has standardized post-quantum cryptography (PQC), practical, deployable integration in operational 5 G cores remains underexplored. This work experimentally integrates NIST-standardized ML-KEM-768 and ML-DSA into an open-source 5G core (free5GC) using a sidecar proxy pattern, preserving unmodified network functions (NFs). Implemented on free 5 GC, we compare three deployments: (i) native HTTPS/TLS, (ii) TLS sidecar, and (iii) PQC-enabled sidecar. Measurements at the HTTP/2 request-response boundary over repeated independent runs show that PQC increases end-toend Service-Based Interface (SBI) latency to∼54ms, adding a deterministic48−49msoverhead relative to the classical baseline, while maintaining tightly bounded variance(IQR≤0.2ms,CV<0.4%). We also quantify the impact of Certification Authority (CA) security levels, identifying certificate validation as a tunable contributor to overall delay. Overall, the results demonstrate that sidecar-based PQC insertion enables a nondisruptive and operationally predictable migration path for quantum-resilient5Gsignaling.
The fifth-generation (5G) core network adopts a Service-Based Architecture (SBA), in which Network Functions (NFs) communicate over Service-Based Interfaces (SBIs) using HTTP/2 secured with TLS 1.3. Current deployments rely on classical cryptography, which is vulnerable to quantum attacks, particularly under the Harvest-Now, Decrypt-Later (HNDL) threat model. To address this, we propose Quantum-Safe Service-Based Architecture (Q-SBA), a hybrid post-quantum TLS framework that secures SBI communication by integrating Module Lattice-based Key Encapsulation Mechanism (ML-KEM-768) and Module Lattice-based Digital Signature Algorithm (ML-DSA-65) with classical primitives within a TLS 1.3 handshake with mutual authentication. The framework is implemented on a containerized OpenAirInterface (OAI) 5G core and evaluated across N11, N12, N8, and N10 interfaces. Results show that hybrid PQC introduces a controlled performance trade-off: handshake latency reaches 14–15 ms (≈2× classical TLS), while throughput sustains 273–289 connections per second, both within 5G control-plane requirements. Packet-level analysis confirms successful negotiation of hybrid cryptographic groups across all interfaces, demonstrating that quantum-resilient security can be integrated into 5G core networks without affecting protocol correctness or interoperability.
The migration of mobile-network primary authentication to post-quantum cryptography is a service-management problem as well as a cryptographic one, because operators must serve heterogeneous subscribers through a transition lasting many years without creating negotiation paths through which an adversary can force weaker protection. This paper presents a multi-mode authentication and key agreement protocol for 6G that exposes three negotiable profiles through the 3GPP Service-Based Architecture, an AKA-Enhanced profile with X25519, a Hybrid-PQC profile combining X25519 and ML-KEM-768, and a PQC-Only profile with ML-KEM-768. The symmetric function set is specified over Ascon-CXOF128 with the negotiated mode bound into its customisation string, and the key schedule binds a length-prefixed transcript of the negotiation into the anchor key. In the classical computational model, CryptoVerif proves all 36 queries associated with nine stated requirements, with concrete bounds covering the symmetric core and the transcript binding, and protocol-level downgrade resistance is stated as a lemma with an explicit scope. Post-quantum security rests on the ML-KEM-768 assumption against classical-oracle adversaries, and no quantum-oracle proof is claimed. The network (free5GC) and device (UERANSIM) sides were implemented and validated against official test vectors. Authentication-vector generation costs 74 to 153 μs at the network function, and the post-quantum profiles shift cost to the device. Across 3,500 interleaved registrations, the six configurations and the 5G-AKA baseline share a median latency of 52.0 ms, and under up to 64 concurrent registrations the three modes and the baseline remain indistinguishable in latency and errors, with no MAC or synchronisation failure in 10,160 registrations.