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Toward Quantum-Safe 6G Authentication: Formal Verification and Testbed Evaluation of a Multi-Mode Service

Togu Novriansyah Turnip, Birger Andersen, Cesar Vargas‐Rosales

Published Jan 1, 2026• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

The migration of mobile-network primary authentication to post-quantum cryptography is a service-management problem as well as a cryptographic one, because operators must serve heterogeneous subscribers through a transition lasting many years without creating negotiation paths through which an adversary can force weaker protection. This paper presents a multi-mode authentication and key agreement protocol for 6G that exposes three negotiable profiles through the 3GPP Service-Based Architecture, an AKA-Enhanced profile with X25519, a Hybrid-PQC profile combining X25519 and ML-KEM-768, and a PQC-Only profile with ML-KEM-768. The symmetric function set is specified over Ascon-CXOF128 with the negotiated mode bound into its customisation string, and the key schedule binds a length-prefixed transcript of the negotiation into the anchor key. In the classical computational model, CryptoVerif proves all 36 queries associated with nine stated requirements, with concrete bounds covering the symmetric core and the transcript binding, and protocol-level downgrade resistance is stated as a lemma with an explicit scope. Post-quantum security rests on the ML-KEM-768 assumption against classical-oracle adversaries, and no quantum-oracle proof is claimed. The network (free5GC) and device (UERANSIM) sides were implemented and validated against official test vectors. Authentication-vector generation costs 74 to 153 μs at the network function, and the post-quantum profiles shift cost to the device. Across 3,500 interleaved registrations, the six configurations and the 5G-AKA baseline share a median latency of 52.0 ms, and under up to 64 concurrent registrations the three modes and the baseline remain indistinguishable in latency and errors, with no MAC or synchronisation failure in 10,160 registrations.

DOI
10.1109/access.2026.3753287

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The migration of mobile-network primary authentication to post-quantum cryptography is a service-management problem as well as a cryptographic one, because operators must serve heterogeneous subscribers through a transition lasting many years without creating negotiation paths through which an adversary can force weaker protection. This paper presents a multi-mode authentication and key agreement protocol for 6G that exposes three negotiable profiles through the 3GPP Service-Based Architecture, an AKA-Enhanced profile with X25519, a Hybrid-PQC profile combining X25519 and ML-KEM-768, and a PQC-Only profile with ML-KEM-768. The symmetric function set is specified over Ascon-CXOF128 with the negotiated mode bound into its customisation string, and the key schedule binds a length-prefixed transcript of the negotiation into the anchor key. In the classical computational model, CryptoVerif proves all 36 queries associated with nine stated requirements, with concrete bounds covering the symmetric core and the transcript binding, and protocol-level downgrade resistance is stated as a lemma with an explicit scope. Post-quantum security rests on the ML-KEM-768 assumption against classical-oracle adversaries, and no quantum-oracle proof is claimed. The network (free5GC) and device (UERANSIM) sides were implemented and validated against official test vectors. Authentication-vector generation costs 74 to 153 μs at the network function, and the post-quantum profiles shift cost to the device. Across 3,500 interleaved registrations, the six configurations and the 5G-AKA baseline share a median latency of 52.0 ms, and under up to 64 concurrent registrations the three modes and the baseline remain indistinguishable in latency and errors, with no MAC or synchronisation failure in 10,160 registrations.
To bridge the gap between emerging quantum threats and next-generation mobile network (6G) design, this paper introduces 10 concrete suggestions that must be considered in both standardization trends and practical feasibility. As a foundation, we surveyed the most standardization-ready proposals currently available, namely EAP-AKA’ and its extensions: EAP-AKA’ FS, EAP-AKA’ PQ-KEM, and EAP-AKA’ HPQC (i.e. EAP-AKA’ family). Although these protocols are designed to support forward secrecy and quantum resistance, comprehensive evaluations of their security and performance remain insufficient. Accordingly, we conducted a formal security analysis on EAP-AKA’ family using ProVerif and evaluated their performance through actual implementation on a 5G testbed built with UERANSIM and free5GC. Through these analysis, we verified that the current drafts still lack of full forward secrecy support and confirmed that persistent issues such as replay attacks still remain unresolved. Additionally, through the performance evaluation, it is demonstrated that computation and communication overheads increase the error rate of the environment up to 2.14x and affect authentication latency to increase up to 2.88x in the Post Quantum Cryptography (PQC) enhanced protocols. To mitigate such increase, we have experimented distributing network functions such as gNB (Next Generation NodeB) and AMF (Access and Mobility Management Function) and have shown 93.6% decrease in authentication latency could be achieved. Based on these research results, we identified structural limitations in the current protocol designs and proposed 10 suggestions, including standard-level modifications, mobile-network-level enhancements for PQC integration, and technical strategies to enable seamless quantum-safe mobile 6G networks.
5G serves as a catalyst for transformative digital innovation by enabling convergence with various services in our daily lives. The success of this paradigm shift undeniably hinges on robust security measures, with primary authentication— securing access to the 5G network—being paramount. Two protocols, 5G Authentication and Key Agreement (5G-AKA) and the Extensible Authentication Protocol for Authentication and Key Agreement Prime (EAP-AKA’), have been standardized for this purpose, with the former designed for 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) devices and the latter for non-3GPP devices. However, recent studies have exposed vulnerabilities in the 5G-AKA protocol, rendering it susceptible to security breaches, including linkability attacks. Furthermore, the advent of quantum computing poses significant quantum threats, underscoring the urgent need for the adoption of quantum-resistant cryptographic mechanisms. Although post-quantum cryptography (PQC) is being standardized, the lack of real-world deployment limits its proven robustness. In contrast, conventional cryptographic schemes have demonstrated reliability over decades of practical application. To address this gap, the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) has initiated the standardization of hybrid PQC algorithms (HPQC), combining classical and quantum-resistant techniques. Consequently, ensuring forward secrecy and resilience to quantum threats in the 5G-AKA protocol is critical. To address these security challenges, we propose the 5G-AKA-HPQC protocol. Our protocol is designed to maintain compatibility with existing standards while enhancing security by combining keys negotiated via the Elliptic Curve Integrated Encryption Scheme (ECIES) with those derived from a PQC-Key Encapsulation Mechanism (KEM). To rigorously and comprehensively validate the security of 5G-AKA-HPQC, we employ formal verification tools such as SVO Logic and ProVerif. The results confirm the protocol’s security and correctness. Furthermore, performance evaluations highlight the computational and communication overheads inherent to 5G-AKA-HPQC. With only average of 56.5 millisecond(+112.32%) on a total authentication time, proposed protocol provides its advantages. Also, on a environment of multiple UE registration, compared to single UE registration, the difference of increased rate of average authentication time is only 0.01%. The negligible difference 0.01% indicates that the addition of PQC does not lead to increased overhead in multi-UE registration environments, demonstrating its scalability and practical feasibility. In conclusion, our research provides significant insights into the design of secure, quantum-safe authentication protocols and lays the groundwork for the future standardization of secure authentication and key agreement protocols for mobile telecommunications.
The evolution of 6G networks necessitates robust authentication and key agreement (AKA) protocols to counter emerging security challenges, particularly the threat posed by quantum computing. Existing 5G-AKA protocols remain vulnerable to user tracking, replay attacks, and false base station impersonation, while Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) and RSA-based key exchanges face imminent obsolescence due to quantum attacks. This study examines the vulnerabilities of 5G-AKA and explores hybrid post-quantum cryptography (PQC) as a transitional security solution for 6G networks. We evaluate NIST-standardized PQC algorithms, focusing on their computational overhead, key size efficiency, and adaptability to heterogeneous network environments, including IoT and ultra-low latency applications. A comparative analysis of hybrid cryptographic schemes demonstrates that lattice-based (Kyber, Dilithium), hash-based (SPHINCS+), and code-based (BIKE, Classic McEliece) PQC techniques provide varying trade-offs between security, efficiency, and deployment feasibility. Furthermore, we propose a quantum-resistant 6G-AKA framework, integrating hybrid PQC, AI-driven trust mechanisms, and decentralized authentication to ensure scalability and interoperability. Experimental benchmarks highlight potential performance constraints, including latency in PQC-based key exchange and resource limitations in edge computing. Addressing these challenges requires the optimization of lightweight PQC implementations, formal security validation, and global standardization efforts. Our findings provide a roadmap for the secure transition to 6G authentication protocols, ensuring resilience against both classical and quantum threats.
The imminent maturity of large-scale quantum computing threatens the confidentiality and authenticity guarantees of the public-key primitives-RSA and elliptic-curve cryptography that currently secure next-generation communication networks, including 5G/6G core and radio-access segments, software-defined edge infrastructures, and massive Internet-of-Things (IoT) deployments. “Harvest-now, decrypt-later” adversaries put long-lived network traffic at risk much before cryptographically relevant quantum machines come into existence. This paper presents QR-SecNet, a Quantum-Resistant Security Framework that combines a lattice-based key-encapsulation mechanism (ML-KEM), a stateless hash-based signature scheme (SLH-DSA) and a classical elliptic-curve exchange within a single hybrid handshake so that the security of a session depends on the hardness of at least one of two mathematically unrelated problems. The framework also includes a crypto-agility controller, which is able to negotiate cipher suites based on device capabilities and network conditions, mitigates downgrade attacks, and supports incremental migration, maintaining interoperability with legacy endpoints. QR-SecNet was evaluated on an emulated 5G/6G network testbed against five representative baselines-RSA-3072, ECDHE-P256, a standalone ML-KEM exchange, a standalone ML-DSA signature scheme, and Classic McEliece using latency, throughput, computational cost, and estimated post-quantum security margin as metrics. Results show that QR-SecNet completes a hybrid handshake in 11.8 ms on average, sustains a throughput of 1,740 connections per second, and preserves at least 128 bits of classical and 192 bits of post-quantum security margin, outperforming standalone post-quantum baselines in latency by 17-46% while remaining within 2.1 ms of the fastest single-primitive scheme.
5G Core networks are entering a decisive phase of post-quantum (PQ) migration: operators and vendors are beginning to advertise PQ-TLS 1.3, PQ-IPsec, and hybrid KEM support across the Service-Based Interface (SBI) and N2, N3, N4 reference points, in line with 3GPP TS 33.501, emerging IETF drafts, and NIST FIPS 203, 204, 205. Yet deploying PQ primitives does not guarantee PQ security. A Network Function may advertise ML-KEM-768 and silently fall back to X25519; negotiate a hybrid KEM but authenticate with ECDSA-P256; present an ML-DSA leaf on a classical chain; or skip mutual TLS altogether. These failures are silent on the wire, and today scanners (testssl.sh, sslyze, Qualys) together with 5G-specific fuzzers are PQ-unaware and telecom-blind. We present PQC Validator, a layered PQC assurance framework purpose-built for the cloud-native 5G Core, comprising a PQ Crypto Engine (L1), a PQ Conformance Prober (L2), a PQ Robustness Tester (L3), a PQ Overhead Meter (L4), and an eBPF Attestation Plane for wire-level ground truth. Its scope spans the full control-plane cryptographic surface: an independent PQ-TLS 1.3 client and server, a strongSwan-driven PQ-IPsec harness for N2/N3/N4, an eBPF/XDP/TC monitoring plane that extracts wire-level ground truth on negotiated groups and signatures, and a Kubernetes-native UI that auto-discovers NFs and emits structured PQ evidence classifying every endpoint as classical, hybrid-pq, or full-pq. A compliance suite spans TLS, PQC, 3GPP SBI, NRF OpenAPI, and security hardening, while a protocol fuzzer exercises CVE-class regressions and downgrade paths.
Sixth Generation (6 G) networks will support critical, latency-sensitive, and large-scale services, making them attractive targets for quantum-capable adversaries. To address this, the paper proposes a conceptual Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) framework for high-level security protocols in 6G, including Transport Layer Security (TLS) 1.3, Internet Key Exchange version 2 (IKEv2), Secure Shell (SSH), Message Queuing Telemetry Transport (MQTT), and Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP), using security-by-design principles, hybrid classical-post-quantum migration, and optimization for resourceconstrained and heterogeneous environments. The framework defines key metrics such as handshake latency, computational and memory overhead, energy consumption, interoperability, and resistance to quantum and classical attacks, and analyzes risks introduced by hybrid protocol complexity, side channels, and implementation flaws. The framework is illustrated via a reference hybrid TLS 1.3 design using National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)-standardized Module-LatticeBased Key-Encapsulation Mechanism (ML-KEM) and Module-Lattice-Based Digital Signature Algorithm (ML-DSA) and an evaluation methodology based on Open Secure Sockets Layer (OpenSSL)/liboqs, outlining how future prototypes can measure latency, bandwidth, and computational overhead under UltraReliable Low-Latency Communication (URLLC) and Massive Machine-Type Communications (mMTC) constraints. By combining requirements analysis, design patterns, and evaluation methodology, this work supports quantum-safe 6 G infrastructure with scalable, reliable, and long-term secure deployment, providing a blueprint for future empirical validation rather than reporting completed measurements.