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arXiv:2604.20756

Comment on 'The axiom of choice and the no-signalling principle'

Martti Karvonen

quant-phSubmitted Apr 22, 2026• Announced Apr 23, 2026• 1 citation• Revised Aug 8, 2026 (v2)
v1 · Apr 22, 2026v2 · Aug 8, 2026
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Abstract

The main claim of Baumeler et al. (Proc. R. Soc. A 481, 20240601; arXiv:2206.08467) is that "functional (deterministic) no-signalling resources can be stronger than probabilistic ones" in a certain nonlocal game on a Bell scenario with countably many parties. We disagree and argue that (i) under standard definitions, deterministic no-signalling resources are always probabilistic no-signalling resources; (ii) the deterministic strategy considered in Baumeler et al. can be promoted to a genuinely probabilistic strategy with similar properties; and (iii) a key step in a derivation in Baumeler et al., claimed to hold for all no-signalling strategies, implicitly assumes measurability, leaving a gap in the argument. We propose measurability assumptions which we conjecture would make this derivation rigorous. Taken together, the phenomenon highlighted by Baumeler et al. is best understood as a difference between measurable and non-measurable no-signalling resources.

Comments
Accepted for publication in Proc. R. Soc. A

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Reply to the Comment on "The Axiom of Choice and the No-Signalling Principle"

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We clarify the meaning of a probabilistic no-signalling strategy in Ref [Proc. R. Soc. A 481, 20240601]. For every fixed input, the deterministic strategy constructed using the Axiom of Choice can indeed be represented by a Dirac probability distribution over the outputs. The relevant distinction arises when one considers the complete process from input to output, with the input itself sampled according to a probability distribution. In this case, the input and output spaces must be measurable and the dependence of the conditional output distribution on the input must also be measurable. Equivalently, the conditional distributions must form a Markov kernel. The Axiom-of-Choice strategy fails precisely this measurability requirement.

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The main claim of Baumeler et al. (Proc. R. Soc. A 481, 20240601; arXiv:2206.08467) is that "functional (deterministic) no-signalling resources can be stronger than probabilistic ones" in a certain nonlocal game on a Bell scenario with countably many parties. We disagree and argue that (i) under standard definitions, deterministic no-signalling resources are always probabilistic no-signalling resources; (ii) the deterministic strategy considered in Baumeler et al. can be promoted to a genuinely probabilistic strategy with similar properties; and (iii) a key step in a derivation in Baumeler et al., claimed to hold for all no-signalling strategies, implicitly assumes measurability, leaving a gap in the argument. We propose measurability assumptions which we conjecture would make this derivation rigorous. Taken together, the phenomenon highlighted by Baumeler et al. is best understood as a difference between measurable and non-measurable no-signalling resources.
We show that the axiom of choice , a basic yet controversial postulate of set theory, together with one of the pillars of our best physical theories, namely the no-signalling principle , may point to a limitation in modelling physical problems using standard mathematics. While it is well known that probabilistic no-signalling resources (such as quantum non-locality) are stronger than deterministic ones, we show—by invoking the axiom of choice—the opposite: functional (deterministic) no-signalling resources can be stronger than probabilistic ones (e.g. stronger than quantum entanglement or non-locality in general). To prove this, we devise a Bell-like game that shows a systematic advantage of functional no-signalling with respect to any probabilistic no-signalling resource.
We clarify the meaning of a probabilistic no-signalling strategy in Ref [Proc. R. Soc. A 481, 20240601]. For every fixed input, the deterministic strategy constructed using the Axiom of Choice can indeed be represented by a Dirac probability distribution over the outputs. The relevant distinction arises when one considers the complete process from input to output, with the input itself sampled according to a probability distribution. In this case, the input and output spaces must be measurable and the dependence of the conditional output distribution on the input must also be measurable. Equivalently, the conditional distributions must form a Markov kernel. The Axiom-of-Choice strategy fails precisely this measurability requirement.
Does "epistemic non-signalling" ensure the peaceful coexistence of special relativity and quantum nonlocality? The possibility of an affirmative answer is of great importance to deterministic approaches to quantum mechanics given recent developments towards generalizations of Bell's theorem. By generalizations of Bell's theorem we here mean efforts that seek to demonstrate the impossibility of any deterministic theories to obey the predictions of Bell's theorem, including not only local hidden-variables theories (LHVTs) but, critically, of nonlocal hidden-variables theories (NHVTs) also, such as de Broglie-Bohm theory. Naturally, in light of the well-established experimental findings from quantum physics, whether or not a deterministic approach to quantum mechanics, including an emergent quantum mechanics, is logically possible, depends on compatibility with the predictions of Bell's theorem. With respect to deterministic NHVTs, recent attempts to generalize Bell's theorem have claimed the impossibility of any such approaches to quantum mechanics. The present work offers arguments showing why such efforts towards generalization may fall short of their stated goal. In particular, we challenge the validity of the use of the non-signalling theorem as a conclusive argument in favor of the existence of free randomness, and therefore reject the use of the non-signalling theorem as an argument against the logical possibility of deterministic approaches. We here offer two distinct counter-arguments in support of the possibility of deterministic NHVTs: one argument exposes the circularity of the reasoning which is employed in recent claims, and a second argument is based on the inconclusive metaphysical status of the non-signalling theorem itself. We proceed by presenting an entirely informal treatment of key physical and metaphysical assumptions, and of their interrelationship, in attempts seeking to generalize Bell's theorem on the basis of an ontic, foundational interpretation of the non-signalling theorem. We here argue that the non-signalling theorem must instead be viewed as an epistemic, operational theorem i.e. one that refers exclusively to what epistemic agents can, or rather cannot, do. That is, we emphasize that the non-signalling theorem is a theorem about the operational inability of epistemic agents to signal information. In other words, as a proper principle, the non-signalling theorem may only be employed as an epistemic, phenomenological, or operational principle. Critically, our argument emphasizes that the non-signalling principle must not be used as an ontic principle about physical reality as such, i.e. as a theorem about the nature of physical reality independently of epistemic agents e.g. human observers. One major reason in favor of our conclusion is that any definition of signalling or of non-signalling invariably requires a reference to epistemic agents, and what these agents can actually measure and report. Otherwise, the non-signalling theorem would equal a general "no-influence" theorem. In conclusion, under the assumption that the non-signalling theorem is epistemic (i.e. "epistemic non-signalling"), the search for deterministic approaches to quantum mechanics, including NHVTs and an emergent quantum mechanics, continues to be a viable research program towards disclosing the foundations of physical reality at its smallest dimensions.
In a world described by quantum mechanics, one cannot have determinism, no-signaling and free will all together. Under validation of all these three assumptions, together, the set of statistical correlations are bounded to the set of Bell local correlations. In standard Bell scenario any non-local correlation has a deterministic explanation if one either sacrifices free will or allows signaling. Recently in [Phys. Rev. Lett. 108, 200401 (2012)] F. Buscemi generalizes the standard Bell scenario into `semi-quantum' Bell scenario. Interestingly, in this article, we show that in `semi-quantum' Bell game one can get correlations that cannot be obtained by giving up no signaling, alone; whereas such correlations can be obtained by sacrificing free will.
Besides well-known conditions of locality or factorisability, deriving the Bell inequalities requires assuming that the distribution of hidden variables and Alice's and Bob's measurement settings be independent of each other. We show that (analogously to violations of locality due to action at a distance) certain violations of this Measurement Independence assumption can be associated with a notion of signalling in principle, thus making them also testable in principle, and spell out the appropriate conditions. Accordingly, we show that by imposing no-signalling one can prove a version of Bell's theorem that does not require the assumption of Measurement Independence. We discuss the "Schulman model" as an example, as well as lessons for "experimental metaphysics".
Bell's theorem is 50 years old. Still there is a controversy about its implications. Much of it has its roots in confusion regarding the premises from which the theorem can be derived. Some claim that a derivation of Bell's inequalities requires just locality assumption, and nothing more. Violations of the inequalities are then interpreted as ``nonlocality'' or ``quantum nonlocality''. We show that such claims are unfounded and that every derivation of Bell's inequalities requires a premise -- in addition to locality and freedom of choice -- which is either assumed tacitly, or unconsciously, or is embedded in a single compound condition (like Bell's ``local causality''). The premise is equivalent to the assumption of existence of additional variables which do not appear in the quantum formalism (in form of determinism, or joint probability for outcomes of all conceivable measurements, or ``additional causes`'', or ``hidden variables'', ``complete description of the state'' or counterfactual definiteness, etc.). A certain irony is that perhaps the main message of violation of Bell's inequalities is that our notion of locality should be based on an operationally well-defined no-signalling condition, rather than on local causality.