This essay is a two-step reflection on the question 'Which events (can be said to) occur in quantum phenomena?' The first step regiments the ontological category of "statistical phenomena" and studies the adequacy of "probabilistic event models" as descriptions thereof. Guided by the conviction that quantum phenomena are to be circumscribed within this same ontological category, the second step highlights the peculiarities of probabilistic event models of some non-relativistic quantum phenomena, and thereby of what appear to be some plausible answers to our initial question. The reflection ends in an aporetic state, as it is by now usual in encounters between ontology and the quantum.
This essay is a two-step reflection on the question 'Which events (can be said to) occur in quantum phenomena?' The first step regiments the ontological category of "statistical phenomena" and studies the adequacy of "probabilistic event models" as descriptions thereof. Guided by the conviction that quantum phenomena are to be circumscribed within this same ontological category, the second step highlights the peculiarities of probabilistic event models of some non-relativistic quantum phenomena, and thereby of what appear to be some plausible answers to our initial question. The reflection ends in an aporetic state, as it is by now usual in encounters between ontology and the quantum.
In the following, I deal with the ontology of quantum field theory (QFT) from a Kantian point of view, in terms of parts of empirical reality and their relations. In contradistinction to a formal ontology of QFT that is based primarily on the formal structure of the theory, I focus on the ways in which quantum fields can be measured, and on the structural features of empirical reality to which these measurements give rise. To approach the ontology of quantum fields in terms of measurement results in two paradoxes. First, ontology is about the structure of independent entities which belong to the furniture of the world, but measurements rely on interaction. Second, experimental evidence for quantum field theories is mainly based on particle tracks and other local phenomena. Thus, what kind of evidence can we have for the field structure of quantum fields? My paper attempts to unravel these paradoxes in the following steps. First, I give a rough sketch of the appearances of particle physics, the kinds of experimental evidence which count as tests of quantum electrodynamcs (QED) and the standard model of particle physics (1). In an intermezzo on Kant's view of scientific experience, I explain in which terms we might conceive of empirical reality beyond the claims of strict empiricism (2). Finally, I apply these ideas to the appearances of particle physics and suggest that they commit us to a relational ontology of QFT (3).
Abstract Many theories and models from physics are probabilistic. This observation raises several philosophical questions: What are probabilities in physics? Do they reflect objective chances which exist independently of the human mind? Or do they only express subjective credences and thus capture our own uncertainty about the world? Finally, which metaphysical lessons, if at all, can one draw from the largely probabilistic character of physics? The chapters collected in this volume address these questions and provide a detailed philosophical appraisal of the status of probabilities in all of physics. Particular emphasis is laid upon statistical physics and quantum mechanics. Many chapters reflect a desire to understand probabilities from physics as objective chances. These chances are characterized, e.g., as time-averages, as probabilities from a best system in the terms of David Lewis, or using the Boltzmannian typicality approach. Other chapters are sympathetic to a Bayesian view of probabilities in physics. The chapters about quantum mechanics elucidate the peculiar characteristics of quantum correlations and discuss strategies to justify the Born Rule. Finally, the chapters of this volume demonstrate how closely interpretive issues about probabilities are entangled with other foundational problems of physics such as the Reversibility Paradox, the ontology of the quantum world and the question whether the world is deterministic.
Three more substantive challenges that the quantum Bayesian faces are presented: 1) Can a sensible ontology be found for the approach? 2) Can requisite sense of quantum explanations be made? and 3) Are subjective probabilities in quantum theory really adequate? The first question is answered positively: a suitable ontological picture is provided by making use of components of Nancy Cartwright’s philosophy of science, with its emphasis on the causal powers of objects. The second two questions are shown to be more problematic, however: quantum Bayesianism would rob quantum theory of explanatory power which it nonetheless seems to possess; and trouble arises for subjective probabilities in two ways. First, quantum Bayesianism is committed to an objectionable class of statements – quantum analogues of Moore’s Paradoxes; second, it renders mysterious how the means of enquiry about the world could deliver the intended ends: coping better with the world.
The so-called measurement problem of quantum mechanics is usually formulated as an epistemic problem: how does a determinate measurement outcome arise from a formally open state description? The prevailing answers either operate with additional entities (collapse, many worlds, consciousness, information) or with perspectival relativizations, without categorially clarifying the status of measurement itself.The present text proposes a different reading. Building on the MNO model of ontological recurrence and the determination of the observer as a spatial category, it is argued that the measurement problem is not a problem of knowledge, but a spatial–ontological boundary phenomenon. Measurement does not denote the access of an observer to a system, but an enforced stabilization of determinacy at the point where open physical dynamics are structurally no longer integrable.Within this framework, determinacy does not appear as the result of cognition, but as the minimal form of world under conditions of ontological overload. The measurement problem thus does not disappear through a new interpretation, but through the abandonment of a false categorial presupposition: the assumption that observation is primarily an epistemic event. This paper functions as an interface text within a larger operator-based research corpus. Core concepts are applied here, not re-derived. The underlying research operates in a non-linear, rhythmically recursive epistemic mode grounded in an autistic form of structural perception; the present text provides an interface translation for academic contexts.
We introduce an ontology of objects and events that is particularly well suited for several interpretations of quantum mechanics. It leads to an important revision of the notion of matter and its implications. Within this context one can show that systems in entangled states present emergent new properties and downward causation where certain behavior of parts of the system are only determined by the state of the whole. Interpretations of quantum mechanics that admit such an event ontology solve the problem of emergence.