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arXiv:2502.08823

Notes on a future quantum event-ontology

Sebastian Horvat

Published Feb 12, 2025• 1 citation
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

This essay is a two-step reflection on the question 'Which events (can be said to) occur in quantum phenomena?' The first step regiments the ontological category of "statistical phenomena" and studies the adequacy of "probabilistic event models" as descriptions thereof. Guided by the conviction that quantum phenomena are to be circumscribed within this same ontological category, the second step highlights the peculiarities of probabilistic event models of some non-relativistic quantum phenomena, and thereby of what appear to be some plausible answers to our initial question. The reflection ends in an aporetic state, as it is by now usual in encounters between ontology and the quantum.

DOI
10.48550/arxiv.2502.08823

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This essay is a two-step reflection on the question 'Which events (can be said to) occur in quantum phenomena?' The first step regiments the ontological category of "statistical phenomena" and studies the adequacy of "probabilistic event models" as descriptions thereof. Guided by the conviction that quantum phenomena are to be circumscribed within this same ontological category, the second step highlights the peculiarities of probabilistic event models of some non-relativistic quantum phenomena, and thereby of what appear to be some plausible answers to our initial question. The reflection ends in an aporetic state, as it is by now usual in encounters between ontology and the quantum.
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Abstract Many theories and models from physics are probabilistic. This observation raises several philosophical questions: What are probabilities in physics? Do they reflect objective chances which exist independently of the human mind? Or do they only express subjective credences and thus capture our own uncertainty about the world? Finally, which metaphysical lessons, if at all, can one draw from the largely probabilistic character of physics? The chapters collected in this volume address these questions and provide a detailed philosophical appraisal of the status of probabilities in all of physics. Particular emphasis is laid upon statistical physics and quantum mechanics. Many chapters reflect a desire to understand probabilities from physics as objective chances. These chances are characterized, e.g., as time-averages, as probabilities from a best system in the terms of David Lewis, or using the Boltzmannian typicality approach. Other chapters are sympathetic to a Bayesian view of probabilities in physics. The chapters about quantum mechanics elucidate the peculiar characteristics of quantum correlations and discuss strategies to justify the Born Rule. Finally, the chapters of this volume demonstrate how closely interpretive issues about probabilities are entangled with other foundational problems of physics such as the Reversibility Paradox, the ontology of the quantum world and the question whether the world is deterministic.
Three more substantive challenges that the quantum Bayesian faces are presented: 1) Can a sensible ontology be found for the approach? 2) Can requisite sense of quantum explanations be made? and 3) Are subjective probabilities in quantum theory really adequate? The first question is answered positively: a suitable ontological picture is provided by making use of components of Nancy Cartwright’s philosophy of science, with its emphasis on the causal powers of objects. The second two questions are shown to be more problematic, however: quantum Bayesianism would rob quantum theory of explanatory power which it nonetheless seems to possess; and trouble arises for subjective probabilities in two ways. First, quantum Bayesianism is committed to an objectionable class of statements – quantum analogues of Moore’s Paradoxes; second, it renders mysterious how the means of enquiry about the world could deliver the intended ends: coping better with the world.
The theme of phenomenology and quantum physics is here tackled by examining some basic interpretational issues in quantum physics. One key issue in quantum theory from the very beginning has been whether it is possible to provide a quantum ontology of particles in motion in the same way as in classical physics, or whether we are restricted to stay within a more limited view of quantum systems, in terms of complementary but mutually exclusive phenomena. In phenomenological terms we could describe the situation by saying that according to the usual interpretation of quantum theory (especially Niels Bohr's), quantum phenomena require a kind of epoch! (i.e. a suspension of assumptions about reality at the quantum level). However, there are other interpretations (especially David Bohm's) that seem to re-establish the possibility of a mind-independent ontology at the quantum level. We will show that even such ontological interpretations contain novel, non-classical features, which require them to give a special role to “phenomena” or “appearances”, a role not encountered in classical physics. We will conclude that while ontological interpretations of quantum theory are possible, quantum theory implies the need of a certain kind of epoch! even for this type of interpretations. While different from the epoch! connected to phenomenological description, the “quantum epoch!e” nevertheless points to a potentially interesting parallel between phenomenology and quantum philosophy. © 2015 Published by Elsevier Ltd.
The so-called measurement problem of quantum mechanics is usually formulated as an epistemic problem: how does a determinate measurement outcome arise from a formally open state description? The prevailing answers either operate with additional entities (collapse, many worlds, consciousness, information) or with perspectival relativizations, without categorially clarifying the status of measurement itself.The present text proposes a different reading. Building on the MNO model of ontological recurrence and the determination of the observer as a spatial category, it is argued that the measurement problem is not a problem of knowledge, but a spatial–ontological boundary phenomenon. Measurement does not denote the access of an observer to a system, but an enforced stabilization of determinacy at the point where open physical dynamics are structurally no longer integrable.Within this framework, determinacy does not appear as the result of cognition, but as the minimal form of world under conditions of ontological overload. The measurement problem thus does not disappear through a new interpretation, but through the abandonment of a false categorial presupposition: the assumption that observation is primarily an epistemic event. This paper functions as an interface text within a larger operator-based research corpus. Core concepts are applied here, not re-derived. The underlying research operates in a non-linear, rhythmically recursive epistemic mode grounded in an autistic form of structural perception; the present text provides an interface translation for academic contexts.
We introduce an ontology of objects and events that is particularly well suited for several interpretations of quantum mechanics. It leads to an important revision of the notion of matter and its implications. Within this context one can show that systems in entangled states present emergent new properties and downward causation where certain behavior of parts of the system are only determined by the state of the whole. Interpretations of quantum mechanics that admit such an event ontology solve the problem of emergence.