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WORLD SCIENTIFIC eBooks

Measurement and Ontology: What Kind of Evidence Can We Have for Quantum Fields?

Brigitte Falkenburg

Published Nov 1, 2002• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

In the following, I deal with the ontology of quantum field theory (QFT) from a Kantian point of view, in terms of parts of empirical reality and their relations. In contradistinction to a formal ontology of QFT that is based primarily on the formal structure of the theory, I focus on the ways in which quantum fields can be measured, and on the structural features of empirical reality to which these measurements give rise. To approach the ontology of quantum fields in terms of measurement results in two paradoxes. First, ontology is about the structure of independent entities which belong to the furniture of the world, but measurements rely on interaction. Second, experimental evidence for quantum field theories is mainly based on particle tracks and other local phenomena. Thus, what kind of evidence can we have for the field structure of quantum fields? My paper attempts to unravel these paradoxes in the following steps. First, I give a rough sketch of the appearances of particle physics, the kinds of experimental evidence which count as tests of quantum electrodynamcs (QED) and the standard model of particle physics (1). In an intermezzo on Kant's view of scientific experience, I explain in which terms we might conceive of empirical reality beyond the claims of strict empiricism (2). Finally, I apply these ideas to the appearances of particle physics and suggest that they commit us to a relational ontology of QFT (3).

DOI
10.1142/9789812776440_0012

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•Mar 12, 2026•2 citations
In the following, I deal with the ontology of quantum field theory (QFT) from a Kantian point of view, in terms of parts of empirical reality and their relations. In contradistinction to a formal ontology of QFT that is based primarily on the formal structure of the theory, I focus on the ways in which quantum fields can be measured, and on the structural features of empirical reality to which these measurements give rise. To approach the ontology of quantum fields in terms of measurement results in two paradoxes. First, ontology is about the structure of independent entities which belong to the furniture of the world, but measurements rely on interaction. Second, experimental evidence for quantum field theories is mainly based on particle tracks and other local phenomena. Thus, what kind of evidence can we have for the field structure of quantum fields? My paper attempts to unravel these paradoxes in the following steps. First, I give a rough sketch of the appearances of particle physics, the kinds of experimental evidence which count as tests of quantum electrodynamcs (QED) and the standard model of particle physics (1). In an intermezzo on Kant's view of scientific experience, I explain in which terms we might conceive of empirical reality beyond the claims of strict empiricism (2). Finally, I apply these ideas to the appearances of particle physics and suggest that they commit us to a relational ontology of QFT (3).
Quantum field theory (QFT) can be analyzed in terms of its mathematical structure, its conceptual system for physical descriptions, or its basic ontology. The analysis can be done logically or historically. In this chapter, only the genesis of the conceptual foundations of QFT relevant to its basic ontology will be treated; no discussion of its mathematical structures or its epistemological underpinnings will be given. Some conceptual problems, such as those related to probability and measurement, will be discussed, but only because of their relevance to the basic ontology of QFT, rather than their intrinsic philosophical interest. Here, by basic ontology I mean the irreducible entities that QFT is invented to describe. The often mentioned candidates for the basic ontology of QFT, in fact of the physical world, are the discrete particle and the continuous field. Another possible candidate (the spacetime point) has also been suggested recently (Redhead, 1983). Since the aim of this chapter is to analyze the historical process in which the conceptual foundations of QFT were laid down, rather than the logical structure of QFT which philosophers of the present day treat, no discussion of the last possibility will be given. The content of this chapter involves the formation and interpretation, in a roughly chronological order, of the concepts of the wave function, quantization, quantization of the field, the vacuum, interactions between fields, and renormalization. The first two topics will be discussed in relation to the quantization of the field, with their role being taken as the starting point of the conceptual development of QFT.
Approaches to Ontology: Candidate General Ontologies for Situating Quantum Field (P Simons) 'Quanta', Tropes, or Processes: Ontologies for QFT Beyond the Myth of Substance (J Seibt) Analytical Ontologists in Action: A Comment on Seibt and Simons (M Kuhlmann) How Do Field Theories Refer to Entities in a Field? (S Y Auyang) Field Ontologies for QFT: A Naive View of the Quantum Field (A Wayne) Comments on Paul Teller's Book, An Interpretive Introduction to Quantum Field Theory (G Fleming) So What Is the Quantum Field? (P Teller) Relativity, Measurement and Renormalization: On the Nature of Measurement Records in Relativistic Quantum Field (J A Barrett) No Place for Particles in Relativistic Quantum Theories? (H Halvorson & R Clifton) Events and Covariance in the Interpretation of Quantum Field (D Dieks) Measurement and Ontology: What Kind of Evidence Can We Have for Quantum Fields? (B Falkenburg) Renormalization and the Disunity of Science (N Huggett) Gauge Symmetries and the Vacuum: The Interpretation of Gauge Symmetry (M Redhead) Comment on Redhead: The Interpretation of Gauge Symmetry (M Drieschner et al.) Is the Zero-Point Energy Real? (S Saunders) Two Comments on the Vacuum in Algebraic Quantum Field (M Redei).
One of the foundational challenges in both Quantum Field Theory and the philosophy of physics lies in the traditional binary classification of entities as either real or unreal. The classical view posits that material entities are real, while mental constructs or theoretical entities are unreal. However, quantum phenomena such as virtual particles challenge this simplistic dichotomy. These unobservable entities, by influencing measurable phenomena, raise profound questions about the nature and modes of existence. To address this, we propose a four-level ontological hierarchy that spans from the quantum vacuum and the virtual level to the quantum level and phenomenal reality, providing a coherent continuum from potentiality to actualization. This framework not only clarifies the interpretation of quantum theory but also offers a unified perspective linking the unobservable with the observable. In QFT, virtual particles play a crucial role in mediating forces and in correcting the measurable properties of real particles. They arise within the mathematical structure of Feynman diagrams and, despite being unobservable, produce real, measurable effects such as the Lamb shift and the Casimir effect. Philosophically, this raises deep ontological questions: if unobservable entities affect measurable phenomena, can they truly be dismissed as unreal? Conversely, if they are real, what mode of existence do they possess? The traditional dichotomy of real versus unreal is thus insufficient for interpreting the ontological implications of quantum processes. To overcome these limitations, we propose a four-level ontological hierarchy.
As far as classical physics is concerned, it is possible to trace causal relations between physical objects (i.e. particles in this case) back to intrinsic properties of these objects (such as their mass and charge). On this view, causal relations turn out to be internal instead of external relations, supervening on intrinsic properties of the relata (as proposed by Heil and Lowe). However, one can raise doubts about this view already in Newtonian mechanics. The decisive blow to this view comes from quantum physics, with Bell’s theorem proving that no dynamics based on local, intrinsic properties of quantum objects can yield the empirical predictions of quantum mechanics. Nonetheless, quantum entanglement by no means implies that we have to abandon an ontology of objects (i.e. substances such as particles) in favour of an ontology of structures (as claimed by French and Ladyman). Any of the known proposals for a quantum ontology of matter in space-time is committed to objects. However, on any of these proposals, what determines the dynamics of these objects are not local, intrinsic properties, but a global or holistic property instantiated by all the objects together – that is, a structure that takes all the objects in the universe as its relata. The view set out in this paper thus amounts to combining ontic structural realism with an ontology of objects that can be conceived as substances. This suggestion is illustrated by drawing on the ontology of quantum physics worked out by Bohm and Bell. 1.
The core of my doctoral thesis consists in the establishment and evaluation of different ontological interpretations of quantum field theory. I thus seek for an ontological picture of the most fundamental level of the physical world, under the assumption that quantum field theory provides a true description. I defend the view that algebraic quantum field theory is the most important formulation when ontological questions are concerned. Some of my more extensive studies deal with different substance ontologies as well as with process-ontological approaches. Eventually, I propose a dispositional trope ontology, according to which particularized properties and not substances are the most basic entities, in terms of which all other entities are to be analysed.
Operatoric Research CorpusStudies in World-Formation Section I Ontology and Physics Volume 2 The Ontological Limits of Physical ExplanationMeasurement, Collapse and Boundary Phenomena in Quantum Physics This volume brings together a series of contributions on the ontology of fundamental problems in physics, in particular the measurement problem of quantum mechanics, the collapse of the wave function, the relationship between quantum mechanics and relativity theory, as well as boundary phenomena such as black holes, renormalization, and vacuum energy. The point of departure of these investigations is the thesis that numerous paradoxes of modern physics do not primarily result from insufficient physical theories, but from a categorical misaddressing. Transitions that concern the very conditions of world stability—especially the transition from possibility to facticity—are often interpreted as dynamical processes within an already stabilized world. This gives rise to explanatory programs that attempt to bridge this boundary by means of additional mechanisms, ontologies, or informational structures. The texts collected in this volume pursue an alternative strategy. They understand the so-called collapse of the wave function not as a physical process, but as an irreversible constriction of a space of possibility through which objectivity and the direction of time first emerge at all. The concept of indimergence designates the boundary act in which possibility passes into facticity without itself being describable as an event within the world. On the basis of this determination, central approaches in the foundations of quantum mechanics—particularly dynamical collapse models, Many-Worlds interpretations, and information-theoretic ontologies—are comparatively analyzed. It becomes evident that, despite their differences, they share a common presupposition: the assumption that the transition from possibility to facticity must itself be explicable within physical description. The contributions in this volume instead propose to read the measurement problem and related paradoxes as indications of structural limits of physical description. From this perspective, other fundamental problems—such as the tension between quantum mechanics and relativity theory, the information paradoxes of black holes, or divergences in field theory—no longer appear primarily as unsolved technical puzzles, but as boundary phenomena of world formation itself. The volume therefore does not present itself as an alternative physical theory, but as an ontological clarification of the conditions under which physical theories are able to describe a world at all.