Three more substantive challenges that the quantum Bayesian faces are presented: 1) Can a sensible ontology be found for the approach? 2) Can requisite sense of quantum explanations be made? and 3) Are subjective probabilities in quantum theory really adequate? The first question is answered positively: a suitable ontological picture is provided by making use of components of Nancy Cartwright’s philosophy of science, with its emphasis on the causal powers of objects. The second two questions are shown to be more problematic, however: quantum Bayesianism would rob quantum theory of explanatory power which it nonetheless seems to possess; and trouble arises for subjective probabilities in two ways. First, quantum Bayesianism is committed to an objectionable class of statements – quantum analogues of Moore’s Paradoxes; second, it renders mysterious how the means of enquiry about the world could deliver the intended ends: coping better with the world.
Three more substantive challenges that the quantum Bayesian faces are presented: 1) Can a sensible ontology be found for the approach? 2) Can requisite sense of quantum explanations be made? and 3) Are subjective probabilities in quantum theory really adequate? The first question is answered positively: a suitable ontological picture is provided by making use of components of Nancy Cartwright’s philosophy of science, with its emphasis on the causal powers of objects. The second two questions are shown to be more problematic, however: quantum Bayesianism would rob quantum theory of explanatory power which it nonetheless seems to possess; and trouble arises for subjective probabilities in two ways. First, quantum Bayesianism is committed to an objectionable class of statements – quantum analogues of Moore’s Paradoxes; second, it renders mysterious how the means of enquiry about the world could deliver the intended ends: coping better with the world.
Abstract Many theories and models from physics are probabilistic. This observation raises several philosophical questions: What are probabilities in physics? Do they reflect objective chances which exist independently of the human mind? Or do they only express subjective credences and thus capture our own uncertainty about the world? Finally, which metaphysical lessons, if at all, can one draw from the largely probabilistic character of physics? The chapters collected in this volume address these questions and provide a detailed philosophical appraisal of the status of probabilities in all of physics. Particular emphasis is laid upon statistical physics and quantum mechanics. Many chapters reflect a desire to understand probabilities from physics as objective chances. These chances are characterized, e.g., as time-averages, as probabilities from a best system in the terms of David Lewis, or using the Boltzmannian typicality approach. Other chapters are sympathetic to a Bayesian view of probabilities in physics. The chapters about quantum mechanics elucidate the peculiar characteristics of quantum correlations and discuss strategies to justify the Born Rule. Finally, the chapters of this volume demonstrate how closely interpretive issues about probabilities are entangled with other foundational problems of physics such as the Reversibility Paradox, the ontology of the quantum world and the question whether the world is deterministic.
I focus here on a specific aspect of the “problem of probabilities” in the Everett interpretation of quantum mechanics, namely the problem of understanding probabilities. Such a task would imply to answer three questions: “What are subjective probabilities?”, “What are objective probabilities?”, and “Why should a rational agent match her subjective probabilities with her estimation of the values of the objective probabilities?” I show how a conception of subjective probabilities as degrees of care (inspired by Hilary Greaves) would answer the first question; and how interpreting quantum weights as proportions of worlds would answer the second question and help answering the third one.
The Quantum Bayesian view of Caves, Fuchs and Schack is presented, this being a view according to which quantum state assignments are purely personal and subjective, just as probability assignments are for subjective Bayesians. It is noted that the rationale for the approach derives from an interesting conjunction of a general realism about physics, combined with anti-realism about much of the structure of quantum mechanics. More detail of the position is then provided and the important question of how the approach handles the shifty divide between system and apparatus explained. Finally, the view is defended from three common objections: that it is tacitly solipsistic; that it is overly instrumentalist; and last, that it cannot adequately deal with the data that would be experimentally available in a Wigner’s Friend scenario.
The Quantum-Bayesian interpretation of quantum theory claims to eliminate the question of quantum nonlocality. This claim is not justified, because the question of non-locality does not arise due to any interpretation of quantum theory, but due to objective experimental facts. We define the notion "objective paradox" and explain, comparing QBism and the Copenhagen interpretation, how avoidance of any paradox results into poor explanatory power of an interpretation, if there actually exists an objective paradox.
At the intersection of the foundations of statistics and the foundations of quantum theory, one comes across a hotly-debated question: what are the probabilities in quantum theories? Do they all reflect the subjective opinions of various agents, or do some of them reflect objective features of the world? One answer—Lewisian dualism, a view that takes some quantum probabilities to be subjective and others to be objective—has gained near-consensus among philosophers of science. However, our most sophisticated defense of this view (due to Deutsch, Wallace, Saunders, Myrvold, Greaves, and others) has two significant problems. First, it requires a very particular approach to the measurement problem (namely, the Everett interpretation). Second, it relies on the pragmatic goals of scientists (e.g., their aim to avoid losses in bets) rather than their epistemic goals (e.g., their aim to accurately describe the world). I give a new defense of dualism that rectifies both of these problems. I generalize the Deutsch-Wallace argument to defend the objective probabilities in a host of realist approaches to measurement, and I modify the accuracy-dominance argument for probabilism to defend the subjective probabilities in these approaches. I also critically examine several previous attempts to interpret all quantum probabilities subjectively.
Abstract Metaphysicians should pay attention to quantum mechanics, but not because it provides definitive answers to many metaphysical questions. The theory itself is remarkably silent on the nature of the physical world, and the various interpretations of the theory on offer present conflicting ontological pictures. Rather, quantum mechanics is essential to the metaphysician because it reshapes standard metaphysical debates and opens up unforeseen new metaphysical possibilities. Even if quantum mechanics provides few clear answers, there are good reasons to think that any adequate understanding of the quantum world will result in a radical reshaping of our classical worldview in some way or other. Whatever the world is like at the atomic scale, it is almost certainly not the swarm of particles pushed around by forces that is often presupposed. This book guides readers through the theory of quantum mechanics and its implications for metaphysics in a clear and accessible way. The theory and its various interpretations are presented with a minimum of technicality. The consequences of these interpretations for metaphysical debates concerning realism, indeterminacy, causation, determinism, holism, and individuality (among other topics) are explored in detail, stressing the novel form that the debates take given the empirical facts in the quantum domain. While quantum mechanics may not deliver unconditional pronouncements on these issues, the range of possibilities consistent with our knowledge of the empirical world is relatively small—and each possibility is metaphysically revisionary in some way.