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arXiv:2308.10696 · Asilomar Conference on Signals, Systems and Computers (ACSSC)

SCC5G: A PQC-Based Architecture for Highly Secure Critical Communication Over Cellular Network in Zero-Trust Environment

M. Gharib, Fatemeh Afghah

Published Oct 29, 2023• 7 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

5G made a significant jump in cellular network security by offering enhanced subscriber identity protection and a user-network mutual authentication implementation. However, it still does not fully follow the zero-trust (ZT) requirements, as users need to trust the network, 5G network is not necessarily authenticated in each communication instance, and there is no mutual authentication between end users. When critical communications need to use commercial networks, but the environment is ZT, specific security architecture is needed to provide security services that do not rely on any 5G network trusted authority. In this paper, we propose SCC5G Secure Critical-mission Communication over a 5G network in ZT setting. SCC5G is a post-quantum cryptography (PQC) security solution that loads an embedded hardware root of authentication (HRA), such as physically unclonable functions (PUF), into the users' devices, to achieve tamper-resistant and unclonability features for authentication and key agreement. We evaluate the performance of the proposed architecture through an exhaustive simulation of a 5G network in an ns-3 network simulator. Results verify the scalability and efficiency of SCC5G by showing that it poses only a few kilobytes of traffic overhead and adds only an order of O(0.1) second of latency under the normal traffic load.

DOI
10.1109/ieeeconf59524.2023.10477078

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5G made a significant jump in cellular network security by offering enhanced subscriber identity protection and a user-network mutual authentication implementation. However, it still does not fully follow the zero-trust (ZT) requirements, as users need to trust the network, 5G network is not necessarily authenticated in each communication instance, and there is no mutual authentication between end users. When critical communications need to use commercial networks, but the environment is ZT, specific security architecture is needed to provide security services that do not rely on any 5G network trusted authority. In this paper, we propose SCC5G Secure Critical-mission Communication over a 5G network in ZT setting. SCC5G is a post-quantum cryptography (PQC) security solution that loads an embedded hardware root of authentication (HRA), such as physically unclonable functions (PUF), into the users' devices, to achieve tamper-resistant and unclonability features for authentication and key agreement. We evaluate the performance of the proposed architecture through an exhaustive simulation of a 5G network in an ns-3 network simulator. Results verify the scalability and efficiency of SCC5G by showing that it poses only a few kilobytes of traffic overhead and adds only an order of O(0.1) second of latency under the normal traffic load.
Fifth Generation (5G) cellular networks have been adopted worldwide since the rollout began around 2019. It brought with it many innovations and new services, such as Enhanced Mobile Broadband (eMBB), Ultra Reliable and Low-Latency Communications (URLLC), and Massive Internet of Things (mIoT). Furthermore, 5G introduced a more scalable approach to network operations using fully software-based Virtualized Network Functions (VNF) in Core Networks (CN) rather than the prior hardware-based approach. However, while this shift towards a fully software-based system design provides numerous significant benefits, such as increased interoperability, scalability, and cost-effectiveness, it also brings with it an increased cybersecurity risk. Security is crucial to maintaining trust between vendors, operators, and consumers. Cyberattacks are rapidly increasing in number and sophistication, and we are seeing a shift towards zero-trust approaches. This means that even communications between VNFs inside a 5G core must be scrutinized and hardened against attacks, especially with the advent of quantum computers. The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), over the past 10 years, has led efforts to standardize post-quantum cryptography (PQC) to protect against quantum attacks. This paper covers a custom implementation of the open-source free5GC CN, to expand its HTTPS capabilities for VNFs by introducing PQC Key Encapsulation Methods (KEM) for Transport Layer Security (TLS) v1.3. This paper provides the details of this integration with a focus on the latency of different PQC KEMs in initial handshakes between VNFs, on packet size, and the implications in a 5G environment. This work also conducts a security comparison between the PQC-equipped free5GC and other open-source 5G CNs. The presented results indicate a negligible increase in UE connection setup duration and a small increase in connection setup data requirements, strongly indicating that PQC KEM’s benefits far outweigh any downsides when integrated into 5G and 6G core services. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work incorporating PQC into an open-source 5G core. Furthermore, the results from this effort demonstrate that employing PQC ciphers for securing VNF communications results in only a negligible impact on latency and bandwidth usage, thus demonstrating significant benefits to 5G cybersecurity.
The rapid growth of 5G wireless technology has transformed connectivity, offering exceptional bandwidth, ultralow latency, and massive IoT device connectivity.However, as quantum computers are progressing, resistance against attacks from such computers becomes a mandatory requirement for all critical infrastructure, necessitating efficient post-quantum cryptography (PQC) implementations for 5G-based IoT devices with limited resources.For instance, User Equipment (UE) reauthentication due to frequent handovers and mobility events is a daily operation that already comes with some overhead, which is not attractive to be used for IoT UE devices.Incorporating heavier PQ solutions into these re-authentications will lead to even more additional communication and computation overhead that may hinder PQ deployment in next generation networks.As such, this paper introduces a novel, lightweight approach for integrating PQC in 5G IoT authentication by proposing a custom identity-based session resumption mechanism without compromising interoperability with existing protocols.This approach prevents replay attacks and ensures perfect forward secrecy (PFS) by utilizing customized identities that are dynamically generated based on device-specific parameters, combined with intelligent server-side caching of quantum-resistant cryptographic materials that eliminate the need for full PQC computations during subsequent re-authentications.We demonstrate through realistic 5G experimentation that the proposed solution significantly lowers authentication overhead while providing quantumresistant security.
The Service-Based Architecture (SBA) of the fifth generation (5G) of cellular networks introduced great advancements in flexibility, efficiency, and performance of modern networks, thanks to the distribution and softwarization of core network entities called Network Functions (NFs). Due to the distributed nature of 5G systems, these NFs are usually located in different sites to provide better Quality of Service (QoS) or specific services, which poses a great challenge regarding security. However, even though the 3GPP standard identifies security requirements by leveraging Transport Layer Security (TLS) authentication and OAuth2.0 authorization, current experimental and commercial deployments often disregard these aspects for the sake of simplicity and performance. In fact, even though data and communication protection is crucial, the implementation of security protocols and mechanisms complicates the deployments and may reduce the efficiency of 5G systems. This paper presents a novel solution that implements TLS for authentication and encryption leveraging entanglement-based Quantum Key Distribution (QKD), ensuring that all the communications between NFs in the 5G core network are secured by QKD keys, and are therefore quantum-safe. Additionally, this paper presents a QKD key repository using the Network Repository Function (NRF), which stores and relays TLS session keys to authenticated consumer NFs to access producer NFs in a fast but quantum-safe process. The solution was validated in a real hardware environment, and obtained results demonstrate that the proposed solution enhances the security of the SBA communications in an efficient way, reducing an 85% the service request time compared to the traditional TLS-based procedure, as well as 29.96% fewer bytes transmitted throughout the process.
The rise of quantum computing poses a critical threat to current cryptographic protocols, particularly RSA and Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC), which are vulnerable to attacks such as Shor’s algorithm. As 5G networks rely heavily on public key infrastructure, the risk of compromise in the quantum era is significant. Transitioning to post-quantum cryptographic (PQC) primitives is therefore an urgent priority. This paper presents a practical framework for integrating PQC into 5G control plane communication, specifically over Service-Based Interfaces (SBIs). Using the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) finalist algorithm Dilithium3, we implement PQC-enabled Transport Layer Security (TLS) handshakes via a modular proxy built in Python. The proxy intercepts inter-service traffic and offloads cryptographic operations to a containerized environment using liboqs. Importantly, this integration does not require altering existing 5G functions. System-level metrics, including CPU (Central Processing Unit) usage, memory, latency, and jitter, were benchmarked before and after PQC integration. Results show performance overhead remains within acceptable bounds, confirming deployment viability. This work proposes a hybrid migration strategy that enables backward compatibility and cryptographic agility. It provides a scalable and testable foundation for securing 5G networks in the quantum era while aligning with emerging European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) and NIST guidelines for post-quantum transition.
The advent of quantum computing threatens the security of classical public-key cryptographic systems, prompting the transition to post-quantum cryptography (PQC). While PQC has been analyzed in theory, its performance in practical wireless communication environments remains underexplored. This paper presents a detailed implementation and performance evaluation of NIST-selected PQC algorithms in user equipment (UE) to UE communications over 5G networks. Using a full 5G emulation stack (Open5GS and UERANSIM) and PQC-enabled TLS 1.3 via BoringSSL and liboqs, we examine key encapsulation mechanisms and digital signature schemes across realistic network conditions. We evaluate performance based on handshake latency, CPU and memory usage, bandwidth, and retransmission rates, under varying cryptographic configurations and client loads. Our findings show that ML-KEM with ML-DSA offers the best efficiency for latency-sensitive applications, while SPHINCS+ and HQC combinations incur higher computational and transmission overheads, making them unsuitable for security-critical but time-sensitive 5G scenarios.
The fifth-generation (5G) core network adopts a Service-Based Architecture (SBA), in which Network Functions (NFs) communicate over Service-Based Interfaces (SBIs) using HTTP/2 secured with TLS 1.3. Current deployments rely on classical cryptography, which is vulnerable to quantum attacks, particularly under the Harvest-Now, Decrypt-Later (HNDL) threat model. To address this, we propose Quantum-Safe Service-Based Architecture (Q-SBA), a hybrid post-quantum TLS framework that secures SBI communication by integrating Module Lattice-based Key Encapsulation Mechanism (ML-KEM-768) and Module Lattice-based Digital Signature Algorithm (ML-DSA-65) with classical primitives within a TLS 1.3 handshake with mutual authentication. The framework is implemented on a containerized OpenAirInterface (OAI) 5G core and evaluated across N11, N12, N8, and N10 interfaces. Results show that hybrid PQC introduces a controlled performance trade-off: handshake latency reaches 14–15 ms (≈2× classical TLS), while throughput sustains 273–289 connections per second, both within 5G control-plane requirements. Packet-level analysis confirms successful negotiation of hybrid cryptographic groups across all interfaces, demonstrating that quantum-resilient security can be integrated into 5G core networks without affecting protocol correctness or interoperability.