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arXiv:2211.02877 · Physical Review A

Macroscopic Wigner's friend paradoxes: Consistency with weak macroscopic realism

Ria Rushin Joseph, Manushan Thenabadu, Channa Hatharasinghe, Jesse Fulton, Run Yan Teh, P. D. Drummond, M. D. Reid

Published Aug 13, 2024• 8 citations
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Abstract

Wigner's friend paradoxes highlight contradictions between measurements made by friends inside a laboratory and superobservers outside the laboratory, who have access to an entangled state of the measurement apparatus. Where there are two separated laboratories, the contradictions lead to no-go theorems for observer-independent facts, thus challenging concepts of objectivity. Here, we examine the paradoxes from the perspective of establishing consistency with macroscopic realism. We present versions of the Brukner-Wigner's-friend and Frauchiger-Renner paradoxes in which the spin-$1/2$ systems measured by the friends correspond to two macroscopically distinct states. The local unitary operations ${U}_{{\ensuremath{\theta}}_{j}}$ that determine the measurement settings ${\ensuremath{\theta}}_{j}$ at each laboratory are carried out using nonlinear interactions, which are tailored to ensure that measurements need only distinguish between the macroscopically distinct states. The macroscopic paradoxes are perplexing, seemingly suggesting there is no objectivity in a macroscopic limit. However, we demonstrate consistency with a contextual weak form of macroscopic realism (wMR): The premise wMR asserts that each system $j$ can be considered to have a definite spin outcome ${\ensuremath{\lambda}}_{{\ensuremath{\theta}}_{j}}$, at the time after the system has undergone the local unitary rotation ${U}_{{\ensuremath{\theta}}_{j}}$ to prepare it in a suitable measurement basis. We further show that the paradoxical outcomes imply failure of deterministic macroscopic local realism and arise when there are unitary interactions ${U}_{{\ensuremath{\theta}}_{j}}$ occurring due to a change of measurement setting at both laboratories, with respect to the state prepared by each friend. In models which validate wMR, there is a breakdown of a subset of the assumptions that constitute the Bell-locality premise. A similar interpretation involving a contextual weak form of local realism exists for the original paradoxes.

DOI
10.1103/physreva.110.022219

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The Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) paradox gives an argument for the incompleteness of quantum mechanics based on a plausible criterion for reality, as well as the assumption of locality. A general view is that the argument is compromised, because EPR's premises are falsified by Greenberger-Horne-Zeilinger (GHZ) and Bell experiments. In this paper, we present an EPR argument based on premises not falsified by these experiments. First, we consider macroscopic EPR-Bohm, Bell, and GHZ experiments using spins ${\stackrel{\ifmmode \hat{}\else \^{}\fi{}}{S}}_{\ensuremath{\theta}}$ defined by two macroscopically distinct states. The analyzers that realize the unitary operations ${U}_{\ensuremath{\theta}}$ determining the measurement settings $\ensuremath{\theta}$ are nonlinear devices creating macroscopic superposition states. We note two definitions of macroscopic realism (MR). For a system with two macroscopically distinct states available to it, MR posits a predetermined outcome for the measurement ${\stackrel{\ifmmode \hat{}\else \^{}\fi{}}{S}}_{\ensuremath{\theta}}$ distinguishing between the states. Deterministic macroscopic realism assumes MR for the system defined prior to the interaction ${U}_{\ensuremath{\theta}}$ being carried out but is falsifiable by the macroscopic Bell and GHZ proposals. Motivated by arguments to uphold MR (without resorting to decoherence), as well as no-signaling and the properties of a meter, we define a set of premises referred to as weak macroscopic realism (wMR). Weak macroscopic realism (wMR) posits MR for the system after ${U}_{\ensuremath{\theta}}$, at the time tf{t}_{f}tf​---when the system is prepared with respect to the measurement basis, ready for a ``pointer'' measurement and readout. For this system, wMR posits that the outcome of ${\stackrel{\ifmmode \hat{}\else \^{}\fi{}}{S}}_{\ensuremath{\theta}}$ is determined and not changed by interactions that might subsequently occur at a remote system BBB. The premise wMR also posits a weaker version of EPR's criterion for reality. Importantly, we show that the GHZ and Bell predictions are consistent with wMR. Yet, an EPR paradox arises for a macroscopic EPR-Bohm state, based on wMR. As considered by Schr\"odinger, it is possible to measure two complementary spins of system AAA simultaneously, ``one by direct, the other by indirect measurement'': If we assume wMR, then once both settings are fixed, the outcomes of the two spins are both determined. We revisit the original EPR paradox and find a similar result: An EPR argument can be based on a set of premises, weak local realism, which we show are not falsifiable by GHZ or Bell experiments.
This paper offers a comprehensive analysis of Wigner’s Friend paradox (1961), a foundational thought experiment in quantum mechanics that highlights the tension between the internal perspective of a measuring observer (who experiences a definite outcome) and the external perspective of a super-observer who treats the entire laboratory as a quantum system in superposition. It traces the historical lineage from Schrödinger’s cat and von Neumann’s measurement theory, provides a formal mathematical description of the state evolution and logical structure of the paradox, examines implications for major interpretations of quantum mechanics (Copenhagen, Everettian many-worlds, QBism, relational quantum mechanics, and objective collapse theories), and discusses modern extensions such as the Frauchiger–Renner paradox. The work explores profound philosophical and epistemological consequences for the nature of observation, objectivity, intersubjectivity, and the role of consciousness in quantum theory (2026).
Recent arguments, involving entangled systems shared by sets of Wigner's friend arrangements, allegedly show that the assumption that the experiments performed by the friends yield definite outcomes, is incompatible with quantum predictions. From this, it is concluded that the results of measurements cannot be thought of as being actual or objective. Here, I show that these arguments depend upon a mistaken assumption, regarding the ("mixed") correlations between the results of the friends and those of "the Wigners", which leads to invalid predictions. It is not, then, that the assumption of definite outcomes leads to trouble, but that the results derived with such an assumption are contrasted with faulty predictions. Next, I explore the more famous no-go theorems by Frauchiger and Renner and by Brukner, on which these recent arguments are motivated. Regarding the first, I show that, although it is cast in a different form, it also rests on the mistaken assumption regarding "mixed" correlations--rendering it invalid. Regarding Brukner's theorem, I point out that it depends on the quite unattractive assumption of locality, a fact that fully diminishes its force. Throughout, I illustrate my claims with explicit calculations within pilot-wave theory.
The violation of a Leggett–Garg inequality confirms the incompatibility between quantum mechanics and the combined premises (called macro-realism) of macroscopic realism (MR) and noninvasive measurability (NIM). Arguments can be given that the incompatibility arises because MR fails for systems in a superposition of macroscopically distinct states—or else, that NIM fails. In this paper, we consider a strong negation of macro-realism, involving superpositions of coherent states, where the NIM premise is replaced by Bell’s locality premise. We follow recent work and propose the validity of a subset of Einstein–Podolsky–Rosen (EPR) and Leggett–Garg premises, referred to as weak macroscopic realism (wMR). In finding consistency with wMR, we identify that the Leggett–Garg inequalities are violated because of failure of both MR and NIM, but also that both are valid in a weaker (less restrictive) sense. Weak MR is distinguished from deterministic macroscopic realism (dMR) by recognizing that a measurement involves a reversible unitary interaction that establishes the measurement setting. Weak MR posits that a predetermined value for the outcome of a measurement can be attributed to the system after the interaction, when the measurement setting is experimentally specified. An extended definition of wMR considers the “element of reality” defined by EPR for system A, where one can predict with certainty the outcome of a measurement on A by performing a measurement on system B. Weak MR posits that this element of reality exists once the unitary interaction determining the measurement setting at B has occurred. We demonstrate compatibility of systems violating Leggett–Garg inequalities with wMR but point out that dMR has been shown to be falsifiable. Other tests of wMR are proposed, the predictions of wMR agreeing with quantum mechanics. Finally, we compare wMR with macro-realism models discussed elsewhere. An argument in favour of wMR is presented: wMR resolves a potential contradiction pointed out by Leggett and Garg between failure of macro-realism and assumptions intrinsic to quantum measurement theory.
Wigner's friend scenarios expose a tension in quantum mechanics: an observer inside a laboratory obtains a definite measurement outcome, while an observer outside describes the laboratory as being in a superposition. The Frauchiger-Renner (2018) extension produces logical contradictions when agents use quantum theory to reason about each other. We show that the recursion-consistency functional K resolves these contradictions without modifying quantum mechanics. The resolution rests on a single physical fact: the friend's measurement creates ~10^20 environmental records inside the laboratory, driving K_rec to its minimum in ~10^-30 seconds. Wigner's description of the laboratory as a superposition is not wrong but incomplete: it omits the internal records that have already selected a definite outcome. The superposition description is operationally correct for Wigner (he cannot access the internal records) but ontologically incorrect (the records exist whether he accesses them or not). This distinction dissolves the Frauchiger-Renner contradiction, resolves the quantum eraser and delayed choice experiments as corollaries, and commits the framework to an ontic interpretation of the quantum state consistent with the PBR theorem.
The famous Wigner's friend experiment considers an observer-the friend-and a superobserver-Wigner-who treats the friend as a quantum system and her interaction with other quantum systems as unitary dynamics. This is at odds with the friend describing this interaction via collapse dynamics, if she interacts with the quantum system in a way that she would consider a measurement. These different descriptions constitute the Wigner's friend paradox. Extended Wigner's friend experiments combine the original thought experiment with non-locality setups. This allows for deriving local friendliness inequalities, similar to Bell's theorem, which can be violated for certain extended Wigner's friend scenarios. A Wigner's friend paradox and the violation of local friendliness inequalities require that no classical record exists, which reveals the result the friend observed during her measurement. Otherwise, Wigner agrees with his friend's description and no local friendliness inequality can be violated. In this article, I introduce classical communication between Wigner and his friend and discuss its effects on the simple as well as extended Wigner's friend experiments. By controlling the properties of a (quasi) classical communication channel between Wigner and the friend, one can regulate how much outcome information about the friend's measurement is revealed. This gives a smooth transition between the paradoxical description and the possibility of violating local friendliness inequalities, on the one hand, and the effectively collapsed case, on the other hand.