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arXiv:2208.01225 · Physical Review A

Alternative Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen argument based on premises not falsified by Bell's theorem: weak macroscopic realism and weak local realism

Jesse Fulton, Run Yan Teh, M. D. Reid

Published Aug 13, 2024• 6 citations
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Abstract

The Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) paradox gives an argument for the incompleteness of quantum mechanics based on a plausible criterion for reality, as well as the assumption of locality. A general view is that the argument is compromised, because EPR's premises are falsified by Greenberger-Horne-Zeilinger (GHZ) and Bell experiments. In this paper, we present an EPR argument based on premises not falsified by these experiments. First, we consider macroscopic EPR-Bohm, Bell, and GHZ experiments using spins ${\stackrel{\ifmmode \hat{}\else \^{}\fi{}}{S}}_{\ensuremath{\theta}}$ defined by two macroscopically distinct states. The analyzers that realize the unitary operations ${U}_{\ensuremath{\theta}}$ determining the measurement settings $\ensuremath{\theta}$ are nonlinear devices creating macroscopic superposition states. We note two definitions of macroscopic realism (MR). For a system with two macroscopically distinct states available to it, MR posits a predetermined outcome for the measurement ${\stackrel{\ifmmode \hat{}\else \^{}\fi{}}{S}}_{\ensuremath{\theta}}$ distinguishing between the states. Deterministic macroscopic realism assumes MR for the system defined prior to the interaction ${U}_{\ensuremath{\theta}}$ being carried out but is falsifiable by the macroscopic Bell and GHZ proposals. Motivated by arguments to uphold MR (without resorting to decoherence), as well as no-signaling and the properties of a meter, we define a set of premises referred to as weak macroscopic realism (wMR). Weak macroscopic realism (wMR) posits MR for the system after ${U}_{\ensuremath{\theta}}$, at the time ${t}_{f}$---when the system is prepared with respect to the measurement basis, ready for a ``pointer'' measurement and readout. For this system, wMR posits that the outcome of ${\stackrel{\ifmmode \hat{}\else \^{}\fi{}}{S}}_{\ensuremath{\theta}}$ is determined and not changed by interactions that might subsequently occur at a remote system $B$. The premise wMR also posits a weaker version of EPR's criterion for reality. Importantly, we show that the GHZ and Bell predictions are consistent with wMR. Yet, an EPR paradox arises for a macroscopic EPR-Bohm state, based on wMR. As considered by Schr\"odinger, it is possible to measure two complementary spins of system $A$ simultaneously, ``one by direct, the other by indirect measurement'': If we assume wMR, then once both settings are fixed, the outcomes of the two spins are both determined. We revisit the original EPR paradox and find a similar result: An EPR argument can be based on a set of premises, weak local realism, which we show are not falsifiable by GHZ or Bell experiments.

DOI
10.1103/physreva.110.022218

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The Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) paradox gives an argument for the incompleteness of quantum mechanics based on a plausible criterion for reality, as well as the assumption of locality. A general view is that the argument is compromised, because EPR's premises are falsified by Greenberger-Horne-Zeilinger (GHZ) and Bell experiments. In this paper, we present an EPR argument based on premises not falsified by these experiments. First, we consider macroscopic EPR-Bohm, Bell, and GHZ experiments using spins S\ifmmode^\elseˆ\fi\ensuremathθ{\stackrel{\ifmmode \hat{}\else \^{}\fi{}}{S}}_{\ensuremath{\theta}}S\ifmmode^\elseˆ\fi​\ensuremathθ​ defined by two macroscopically distinct states. The analyzers that realize the unitary operations U\ensuremathθ{U}_{\ensuremath{\theta}}U\ensuremathθ​ determining the measurement settings \ensuremathθ\ensuremath{\theta}\ensuremathθ are nonlinear devices creating macroscopic superposition states. We note two definitions of macroscopic realism (MR). For a system with two macroscopically distinct states available to it, MR posits a predetermined outcome for the measurement S\ifmmode^\elseˆ\fi\ensuremathθ{\stackrel{\ifmmode \hat{}\else \^{}\fi{}}{S}}_{\ensuremath{\theta}}S\ifmmode^\elseˆ\fi​\ensuremathθ​ distinguishing between the states. Deterministic macroscopic realism assumes MR for the system defined prior to the interaction U\ensuremathθ{U}_{\ensuremath{\theta}}U\ensuremathθ​ being carried out but is falsifiable by the macroscopic Bell and GHZ proposals. Motivated by arguments to uphold MR (without resorting to decoherence), as well as no-signaling and the properties of a meter, we define a set of premises referred to as weak macroscopic realism (wMR). Weak macroscopic realism (wMR) posits MR for the system after U\ensuremathθ{U}_{\ensuremath{\theta}}U\ensuremathθ​, at the time tf{t}_{f}tf​---when the system is prepared with respect to the measurement basis, ready for a pointer'' measurement and readout. For this system, wMR posits that the outcome of ${\stackrel{\ifmmode \hat{}\else \^{}\fi{}}{S}}_{\ensuremath{\theta}}$ is determined and not changed by interactions that might subsequently occur at a remote system $B$. The premise wMR also posits a weaker version of EPR's criterion for reality. Importantly, we show that the GHZ and Bell predictions are consistent with wMR. Yet, an EPR paradox arises for a macroscopic EPR-Bohm state, based on wMR. As considered by Schr\"odinger, it is possible to measure two complementary spins of system $A$ simultaneously, one by direct, the other by indirect measurement'': If we assume wMR, then once both settings are fixed, the outcomes of the two spins are both determined. We revisit the original EPR paradox and find a similar result: An EPR argument can be based on a set of premises, weak local realism, which we show are not falsifiable by GHZ or Bell experiments.
The Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) paradox was presented as an argument that quantum mechanics is an incomplete description of physical reality. However, the premises on which the argument is based are falsifiable by Bell experiments. In this paper, we examine the EPR paradox from the perspective of Schrodinger's reply to EPR. Schrodinger pointed out that the correlated states of the paradox enable the simultaneous measurement of x^\hat{x}x^ and p^\hat{p}p^​, one by direct, the other by indirect measurement. Schrodinger's analysis takes on a timely importance because a recent experiment realizes these correlations for macroscopic atomic systems. Different to the original argument, Schrodinger's analysis applies to the experiment at the time when the measurement settings have been fixed. In this context, a subset of local realistic assumptions (not negated by Bell's theorem) implies that xxx and ppp are simultaneously precisely defined. Hence, an alternative EPR argument can be presented that quantum mechanics is incomplete, based on a set of (arguably) nonfalsifiable premises. As systems are amplified, macroscopic realism can be invoked, and the premises are referred to as weak macroscopic realism (wMR). In this paper, we propose a realization of Schrodinger's gedanken experiment where field quadrature phase amplitudes X^\hat{X}X^ and P^\hat{P}P^ replace position and momentum. Assuming wMR, we derive a criterion for the incompleteness of quantum mechanics, showing that the criterion is feasible for current experiments. Questions raised by Schrodinger are resolved. By performing simulations based on an objective-field (QQQ-based) model for quantum mechanics, we illustrate the emergence on amplification of simultaneous predetermined values for X^\hat{X}X^ and P^\hat{P}P^. The values can be regarded as weak elements of reality, along the lines of Bell's macroscopic beables.
The violation of a Leggett–Garg inequality confirms the incompatibility between quantum mechanics and the combined premises (called macro-realism) of macroscopic realism (MR) and noninvasive measurability (NIM). Arguments can be given that the incompatibility arises because MR fails for systems in a superposition of macroscopically distinct states—or else, that NIM fails. In this paper, we consider a strong negation of macro-realism, involving superpositions of coherent states, where the NIM premise is replaced by Bell’s locality premise. We follow recent work and propose the validity of a subset of Einstein–Podolsky–Rosen (EPR) and Leggett–Garg premises, referred to as weak macroscopic realism (wMR). In finding consistency with wMR, we identify that the Leggett–Garg inequalities are violated because of failure of both MR and NIM, but also that both are valid in a weaker (less restrictive) sense. Weak MR is distinguished from deterministic macroscopic realism (dMR) by recognizing that a measurement involves a reversible unitary interaction that establishes the measurement setting. Weak MR posits that a predetermined value for the outcome of a measurement can be attributed to the system after the interaction, when the measurement setting is experimentally specified. An extended definition of wMR considers the “element of reality” defined by EPR for system A, where one can predict with certainty the outcome of a measurement on A by performing a measurement on system B. Weak MR posits that this element of reality exists once the unitary interaction determining the measurement setting at B has occurred. We demonstrate compatibility of systems violating Leggett–Garg inequalities with wMR but point out that dMR has been shown to be falsifiable. Other tests of wMR are proposed, the predictions of wMR agreeing with quantum mechanics. Finally, we compare wMR with macro-realism models discussed elsewhere. An argument in favour of wMR is presented: wMR resolves a potential contradiction pointed out by Leggett and Garg between failure of macro-realism and assumptions intrinsic to quantum measurement theory.
Bohm's spin polarization modification of the paradox of Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen has served as the basis for numerous analyses of the roles of hidden variables and Einstein locality in quantum mechanics. The present note points out how corresponding analyses can be carried out on the original formulation of Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen (EPR) in terms of observations of position and momentum. Concrete conceptual experiments are proposed to furnish tangible illustrations of EPR tests of reality, and a position-momentum variant of Bell's inequality is formulated. Implications regarding joint measurements of position and momentum, delayed choice experiments, and superluminal communication are discussed briefly.
We consider a new version of the Einstein - Podolsky - Rosen (EPR) paradox in which the measurements have limited accuracy, so that a photon number is specified only to plus or minus a macroscopic number of photons. In our example the minimum quantum uncertainty product for the two relevant conjugate quantities is itself a macroscopic photon number. This new version of the EPR situation is stronger than the original microscopic versions, which were based on the validity, now disproved by Bell experiments, of `local realism' at a microscopic level. The new version is based on the validity of `macroscopic local realism', which has to date not been questioned.
Wigner's friend paradoxes highlight contradictions between measurements made by friends inside a laboratory and superobservers outside the laboratory, who have access to an entangled state of the measurement apparatus. Where there are two separated laboratories, the contradictions lead to no-go theorems for observer-independent facts, thus challenging concepts of objectivity. Here, we examine the paradoxes from the perspective of establishing consistency with macroscopic realism. We present versions of the Brukner-Wigner's-friend and Frauchiger-Renner paradoxes in which the spin-1/21/21/2 systems measured by the friends correspond to two macroscopically distinct states. The local unitary operations ${U}_{{\ensuremath{\theta}}_{j}}$ that determine the measurement settings ${\ensuremath{\theta}}_{j}$ at each laboratory are carried out using nonlinear interactions, which are tailored to ensure that measurements need only distinguish between the macroscopically distinct states. The macroscopic paradoxes are perplexing, seemingly suggesting there is no objectivity in a macroscopic limit. However, we demonstrate consistency with a contextual weak form of macroscopic realism (wMR): The premise wMR asserts that each system jjj can be considered to have a definite spin outcome ${\ensuremath{\lambda}}_{{\ensuremath{\theta}}_{j}}$, at the time after the system has undergone the local unitary rotation ${U}_{{\ensuremath{\theta}}_{j}}$ to prepare it in a suitable measurement basis. We further show that the paradoxical outcomes imply failure of deterministic macroscopic local realism and arise when there are unitary interactions ${U}_{{\ensuremath{\theta}}_{j}}$ occurring due to a change of measurement setting at both laboratories, with respect to the state prepared by each friend. In models which validate wMR, there is a breakdown of a subset of the assumptions that constitute the Bell-locality premise. A similar interpretation involving a contextual weak form of local realism exists for the original paradoxes.
We use the Greenberger-Horne-Zeilinger [in Bell's Theorem, Quantum Theory,and Conceptions of the Universe, edited by M. Kafatos (Kluwer Academic, Dordrecht, 1989)] approach to present three demonstrations of the failure of Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) [Phys. Rev. 47, 777 (1935)] local realism for the case of two spinless particles in a two-particle interferometer. The original EPR assumptions of locality and reality do not suffice for this. First, we use the EPR assumptions of locality and reality to establish that in a two-particle interferometer, the path taken by each particle is an element of reality. Second, we supplement the EPR premises by the postulate that when the path taken by a particle is an element of reality, all paths not taken are empty. We emphasize that our approach is not applicable to a single-particle interferometer because there the path taken by the particle cannot be established as an element of reality. We point out that there are real conceptual differences between single-particle, two-particle, and multiparticle interferometry.