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arXiv:2110.07743 · The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science

On the Objectivity of Measurement Outcomes

Elias Okon

Published Jan 21, 2022• 5 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

Recent arguments, involving entangled systems shared by sets of Wigner's friend arrangements, allegedly show that the assumption that the experiments performed by the friends yield definite outcomes, is incompatible with quantum predictions. From this, it is concluded that the results of measurements cannot be thought of as being actual or objective. Here, I show that these arguments depend upon a mistaken assumption, regarding the ("mixed") correlations between the results of the friends and those of "the Wigners", which leads to invalid predictions. It is not, then, that the assumption of definite outcomes leads to trouble, but that the results derived with such an assumption are contrasted with faulty predictions. Next, I explore the more famous no-go theorems by Frauchiger and Renner and by Brukner, on which these recent arguments are motivated. Regarding the first, I show that, although it is cast in a different form, it also rests on the mistaken assumption regarding "mixed" correlations--rendering it invalid. Regarding Brukner's theorem, I point out that it depends on the quite unattractive assumption of locality, a fact that fully diminishes its force. Throughout, I illustrate my claims with explicit calculations within pilot-wave theory.

DOI
10.1086/719046

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Abstract The notorious Wigner’s friend thought experiment (and modifications thereof) has received renewed interest especially due to new arguments that force us to question some of the fundamental assumptions of quantum theory. In this paper, we formulate a no-go theorem for the persistent reality of Wigner’s friend’s perception, which allows us to conclude that the perceptions that the friend has of her own measurement outcomes at different times cannot “share the same reality”, if seemingly natural quantum mechanical assumptions are met. More formally, this means that, in a Wigner’s friend scenario, there is no joint probability distribution for the friend’s perceived measurement outcomes at two different times, that depends linearly on the initial state of the measured system and whose marginals reproduce the predictions of unitary quantum theory. This theorem entails that one must either (1) propose a nonlinear modification of the Born rule for two-time predictions, (2) sometimes prohibit the use of present information to predict the future—thereby reducing the predictive power of quantum theory—or (3) deny that unitary quantum mechanics makes valid single-time predictions for all observers. We briefly discuss which of the theorem’s assumptions are more likely to be dropped within various popular interpretations of quantum mechanics.

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Recent arguments, involving entangled systems shared by sets of Wigner's friend arrangements, allegedly show that the assumption that the experiments performed by the friends yield definite outcomes, is incompatible with quantum predictions. From this, it is concluded that the results of measurements cannot be thought of as being actual or objective. Here, I show that these arguments depend upon a mistaken assumption, regarding the ("mixed") correlations between the results of the friends and those of "the Wigners", which leads to invalid predictions. It is not, then, that the assumption of definite outcomes leads to trouble, but that the results derived with such an assumption are contrasted with faulty predictions. Next, I explore the more famous no-go theorems by Frauchiger and Renner and by Brukner, on which these recent arguments are motivated. Regarding the first, I show that, although it is cast in a different form, it also rests on the mistaken assumption regarding "mixed" correlations--rendering it invalid. Regarding Brukner's theorem, I point out that it depends on the quite unattractive assumption of locality, a fact that fully diminishes its force. Throughout, I illustrate my claims with explicit calculations within pilot-wave theory.
The Wigner's friend thought experiment was intended to illustrate the difficulty one has in describing an agent as a quantum system when that agent performs a measurement. While it does pose a challenge to the orthodox interpretation of quantum theory, most modern interpretations have no trouble in resolving the difficulty. Recently, a number of extensions of Wigner's ideas have been proposed. We provide a gentle introduction to six such arguments, modifying the specifics of many of them so that they are as simple and unified as possible. In particular, we show that all of the arguments hinge on assumptions about correlations between measurement outcomes that are not accessible to any observer, even in principle. We then provide a critical analysis of each argument, focusing especially on how well one can motivate the required assumptions regarding these inaccessible correlations. Although we argue that some of these assumptions are not entirely well-motivated, all of the arguments do shed light on the nature of quantum theory, especially when concerning the description of agents and their measurements.
In his famous thought experiment, Wigner assigns an entangled state to the composite quantum system made up of Wigner's friend and her observed system. While the two of them have different accounts of the process, each Wigner and his friend can in principle verify his/her respective state assignments by performing an appropriate measurement. As manifested through a click in a detector or a specific position of the pointer, the outcomes of these measurements can be regarded as reflecting directly observable "facts". Reviewing arXiv:1507.05255, I will derive a no-go theorem for observer-independent facts, which would be common both for Wigner and the friend. I will then analyze this result in the context of a newly-derived theorem arXiv:1604.07422, where Frauchiger and Renner prove that "single-world interpretations of quantum theory cannot be self-consistent". It is argued that "self-consistency" has the same implications as the assumption that observational statements of different observers can be compared in a single (and hence an observer-independent) theoretical framework. The latter, however, may not be possible, if the statements are to be understood as relational in the sense that their determinacy is relative to an observer.
A recent argument, attributed to Masanes, is claimed to show that the assumption that quantum measurements have definite, objective outcomes, is incompatible with quantum predictions. In this work, a detailed examination of the argument shows that it has a much narrower field of application than previously recognized. In particular, it is found: i) that the argument only applies to hidden-variable models with a particular feature; and ii) that such a feature is not present in most hidden-variable models, including pilot-wave theory. It is concluded that the argument does not succeed in calling into question the objectivity of quantum measurements.
Wigner's friend paradoxes highlight contradictions between measurements made by friends inside a laboratory and superobservers outside the laboratory, who have access to an entangled state of the measurement apparatus. Where there are two separated laboratories, the contradictions lead to no-go theorems for observer-independent facts, thus challenging concepts of objectivity. Here, we examine the paradoxes from the perspective of establishing consistency with macroscopic realism. We present versions of the Brukner-Wigner's-friend and Frauchiger-Renner paradoxes in which the spin-1/21/21/2 systems measured by the friends correspond to two macroscopically distinct states. The local unitary operations ${U}_{{\ensuremath{\theta}}_{j}}$ that determine the measurement settings ${\ensuremath{\theta}}_{j}$ at each laboratory are carried out using nonlinear interactions, which are tailored to ensure that measurements need only distinguish between the macroscopically distinct states. The macroscopic paradoxes are perplexing, seemingly suggesting there is no objectivity in a macroscopic limit. However, we demonstrate consistency with a contextual weak form of macroscopic realism (wMR): The premise wMR asserts that each system jjj can be considered to have a definite spin outcome ${\ensuremath{\lambda}}_{{\ensuremath{\theta}}_{j}}$, at the time after the system has undergone the local unitary rotation ${U}_{{\ensuremath{\theta}}_{j}}$ to prepare it in a suitable measurement basis. We further show that the paradoxical outcomes imply failure of deterministic macroscopic local realism and arise when there are unitary interactions ${U}_{{\ensuremath{\theta}}_{j}}$ occurring due to a change of measurement setting at both laboratories, with respect to the state prepared by each friend. In models which validate wMR, there is a breakdown of a subset of the assumptions that constitute the Bell-locality premise. A similar interpretation involving a contextual weak form of local realism exists for the original paradoxes.
The decoherence interpretation of quantum measurements is applied to Wigner's-friend experiments. A framework in which all the experimental outcomes arise from unitary evolutions is proposed. Within it, a measurement is not completed until an uncontrolled environment monitorizes the state composed of the system, the apparatus, and the observer. The (apparent) wave-function collapse and the corresponding randomness result from tracing out this environment; it is thus the ultimate responsible party for the emergence of definite outcomes. Two main effects arise from this fact. First, external interference measurements, trademark of Wigner's-friend experiments, modify the memory records of the internal observers; this framework provides a univocal protocol to calculate all these changes. Second, it can be used to build a consistent scenario for the recently proposed extended versions of the Wigner's-friend experiment. In regard to the work of Frauchiger and Renner [Nat. Commun. 9, 3711 (2018)], this framework shows that the agents' claims become consistent if the changes in their memories are properly taken into account. Furthermore, the particular setup discussed by Brukner [Entropy 20, 350 (2018)] cannot be tested against the decoherence framework, because it does not give rise to well-defined outcomes according to this formalism. A variation of this setup, devised to fill this gap, makes it possible to assign joint truth values to the observations made by all the agents. This framework also narrows the requisites for such experiments, making them virtually impossible to apply to conscious (human) beings. Notwithstanding, it also opens the door to future realizations on quantum machines.
Abstract The notorious Wigner’s friend thought experiment (and modifications thereof) has received renewed interest especially due to new arguments that force us to question some of the fundamental assumptions of quantum theory. In this paper, we formulate a no-go theorem for the persistent reality of Wigner’s friend’s perception, which allows us to conclude that the perceptions that the friend has of her own measurement outcomes at different times cannot “share the same reality”, if seemingly natural quantum mechanical assumptions are met. More formally, this means that, in a Wigner’s friend scenario, there is no joint probability distribution for the friend’s perceived measurement outcomes at two different times, that depends linearly on the initial state of the measured system and whose marginals reproduce the predictions of unitary quantum theory. This theorem entails that one must either (1) propose a nonlinear modification of the Born rule for two-time predictions, (2) sometimes prohibit the use of present information to predict the future—thereby reducing the predictive power of quantum theory—or (3) deny that unitary quantum mechanics makes valid single-time predictions for all observers. We briefly discuss which of the theorem’s assumptions are more likely to be dropped within various popular interpretations of quantum mechanics.