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arXiv:2412.00406

Resolving Schrödinger's analysis of the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen paradox: an incompleteness criterion and weak elements of reality

C. McGuigan, Run Yan Teh, P. D. Drummond, M. D. Reid

Published Nov 30, 2024• 2 citations
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Abstract

The Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) paradox was presented as an argument that quantum mechanics is an incomplete description of physical reality. However, the premises on which the argument is based are falsifiable by Bell experiments. In this paper, we examine the EPR paradox from the perspective of Schrodinger's reply to EPR. Schrodinger pointed out that the correlated states of the paradox enable the simultaneous measurement of $\hat{x}$ and $\hat{p}$, one by direct, the other by indirect measurement. Schrodinger's analysis takes on a timely importance because a recent experiment realizes these correlations for macroscopic atomic systems. Different to the original argument, Schrodinger's analysis applies to the experiment at the time when the measurement settings have been fixed. In this context, a subset of local realistic assumptions (not negated by Bell's theorem) implies that $x$ and $p$ are simultaneously precisely defined. Hence, an alternative EPR argument can be presented that quantum mechanics is incomplete, based on a set of (arguably) nonfalsifiable premises. As systems are amplified, macroscopic realism can be invoked, and the premises are referred to as weak macroscopic realism (wMR). In this paper, we propose a realization of Schrodinger's gedanken experiment where field quadrature phase amplitudes $\hat{X}$ and $\hat{P}$ replace position and momentum. Assuming wMR, we derive a criterion for the incompleteness of quantum mechanics, showing that the criterion is feasible for current experiments. Questions raised by Schrodinger are resolved. By performing simulations based on an objective-field ($Q$-based) model for quantum mechanics, we illustrate the emergence on amplification of simultaneous predetermined values for $\hat{X}$ and $\hat{P}$. The values can be regarded as weak elements of reality, along the lines of Bell's macroscopic beables.

DOI
10.48550/arxiv.2412.00406

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The Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) paradox was presented as an argument that quantum mechanics is an incomplete description of physical reality. However, the premises on which the argument is based are falsifiable by Bell experiments. In this paper, we examine the EPR paradox from the perspective of Schrodinger's reply to EPR. Schrodinger pointed out that the correlated states of the paradox enable the simultaneous measurement of x^\hat{x}x^ and p^\hat{p}p^​, one by direct, the other by indirect measurement. Schrodinger's analysis takes on a timely importance because a recent experiment realizes these correlations for macroscopic atomic systems. Different to the original argument, Schrodinger's analysis applies to the experiment at the time when the measurement settings have been fixed. In this context, a subset of local realistic assumptions (not negated by Bell's theorem) implies that xxx and ppp are simultaneously precisely defined. Hence, an alternative EPR argument can be presented that quantum mechanics is incomplete, based on a set of (arguably) nonfalsifiable premises. As systems are amplified, macroscopic realism can be invoked, and the premises are referred to as weak macroscopic realism (wMR). In this paper, we propose a realization of Schrodinger's gedanken experiment where field quadrature phase amplitudes X^\hat{X}X^ and P^\hat{P}P^ replace position and momentum. Assuming wMR, we derive a criterion for the incompleteness of quantum mechanics, showing that the criterion is feasible for current experiments. Questions raised by Schrodinger are resolved. By performing simulations based on an objective-field (QQQ-based) model for quantum mechanics, we illustrate the emergence on amplification of simultaneous predetermined values for X^\hat{X}X^ and P^\hat{P}P^. The values can be regarded as weak elements of reality, along the lines of Bell's macroscopic beables.
The Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) paradox gives an argument for the incompleteness of quantum mechanics based on a plausible criterion for reality, as well as the assumption of locality. A general view is that the argument is compromised, because EPR's premises are falsified by Greenberger-Horne-Zeilinger (GHZ) and Bell experiments. In this paper, we present an EPR argument based on premises not falsified by these experiments. First, we consider macroscopic EPR-Bohm, Bell, and GHZ experiments using spins ${\stackrel{\ifmmode \hat{}\else \^{}\fi{}}{S}}_{\ensuremath{\theta}}$ defined by two macroscopically distinct states. The analyzers that realize the unitary operations ${U}_{\ensuremath{\theta}}$ determining the measurement settings $\ensuremath{\theta}$ are nonlinear devices creating macroscopic superposition states. We note two definitions of macroscopic realism (MR). For a system with two macroscopically distinct states available to it, MR posits a predetermined outcome for the measurement ${\stackrel{\ifmmode \hat{}\else \^{}\fi{}}{S}}_{\ensuremath{\theta}}$ distinguishing between the states. Deterministic macroscopic realism assumes MR for the system defined prior to the interaction ${U}_{\ensuremath{\theta}}$ being carried out but is falsifiable by the macroscopic Bell and GHZ proposals. Motivated by arguments to uphold MR (without resorting to decoherence), as well as no-signaling and the properties of a meter, we define a set of premises referred to as weak macroscopic realism (wMR). Weak macroscopic realism (wMR) posits MR for the system after ${U}_{\ensuremath{\theta}}$, at the time tf{t}_{f}tf​---when the system is prepared with respect to the measurement basis, ready for a ``pointer'' measurement and readout. For this system, wMR posits that the outcome of ${\stackrel{\ifmmode \hat{}\else \^{}\fi{}}{S}}_{\ensuremath{\theta}}$ is determined and not changed by interactions that might subsequently occur at a remote system BBB. The premise wMR also posits a weaker version of EPR's criterion for reality. Importantly, we show that the GHZ and Bell predictions are consistent with wMR. Yet, an EPR paradox arises for a macroscopic EPR-Bohm state, based on wMR. As considered by Schr\"odinger, it is possible to measure two complementary spins of system AAA simultaneously, ``one by direct, the other by indirect measurement'': If we assume wMR, then once both settings are fixed, the outcomes of the two spins are both determined. We revisit the original EPR paradox and find a similar result: An EPR argument can be based on a set of premises, weak local realism, which we show are not falsifiable by GHZ or Bell experiments.
We show that quantum mechanics predicts an Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen paradox (EPR), and also a contradiction with local hidden variable theories, for photon number measurements which have limited resolving power, to the point of imposing an uncertainty in the photon number result which is macroscopic in absolute terms. We show how this can be interpreted as a failure of a new, very strong premise, called macroscopic local realism. We link this premise to the Schrodinger-cat paradox. Our proposed experiments ensure all fields incident on each measurement apparatus are macroscopic. We show that an alternative measurement scheme corresponds to balanced homodyne detection of quadrature phase amplitudes. The implication is that where either EPR correlations or failure of local realism is predicted for continuous variable (quadrature phase amplitude) measurements, one can perform a modified experiment which would lead to conclusions about the much stronger premise of macroscopic local realism.
In 1935 Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen (EPR) published an important paper in which they claimed that the whole formalism of quantum mechanics together with what they called "Reality Criterion" imply that quantum mechanics cannot be complete. That is, there must exist some elements of reality that are not described by quantum mechanics. There must be, they concluded, a more complete description of physical reality behind quantum mechanics. There must be a state, a hidden variable, characterizing the state of affairs in the world in more details than the quantum mechanical state, something that also reflects the missing elements of reality. Under some further but quite plausible assumptions, this conclusion implies that in some spin-correlation experiments the measured quantum mechanical probabilities should satisfy particular inequalities (Bell-type inequalities). The paradox consists in the fact that quantum probabilities do not satisfy these inequalities. And this paradoxical fact has been confirmed by several laboratory experiments in the last three decades. The problem is still open and hotly debated among both physicists and philosophers. It has motivated a wide range of research from the most fundamental quantum mechanical experiments through foundations of probability theory to the theory of stochastic causality as well as the metaphysics of free will.
The Einstein–Podolsky–Rosen (EPR) argument was originally posed as a challenge to the completeness of quantum mechanics, rather than its empirical adequacy. While subsequent developments—most notably Bell’s theorem and experimental tests of nonlocal correlations— have constrained classes of hidden-variable theories, they have not resolved the underlying on- tological question raised by EPR: whether the quantum state exhausts physical reality. In this paper, we revisit the EPR criterion of completeness from the perspective of a temporally grounded physical framework, the Temporal Inertia Framework (TIF). We argue that the orig- inal EPR dilemma rests on an implicit assumption that physical reality must be specified on spacelike hypersurfaces, an assumption shared by both EPR and Bohr. By relaxing this assump- tion and allowing physical correlations to arise from shared temporal structure rather than local spatial variables or superluminal influence, one may satisfy the EPR realism criterion without violating relativistic causality or Bell-type constraints. Quantum mechanics is thus interpreted as operationally complete but ontologically incomplete, with quantum indeterminacy emerging from dynamical interactions with a proposed underlying temporal structure.
The Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen argument for the incompleteness of quantum mechanics involves two assumptions: one about locality and the other about when it is legitimate to infer the existence of an element-of-reality. Using one simple thought experiment, we argue that quantum predictions and the relativity of simultaneity require that both these assumptions fail, whether or not quantum mechanics is complete. EPR’s (1935) argument for the incompleteness of QM turns upon the following sufficient condition: “If, without in any way disturbing a system, we can predict with certainty (i.e., with probability equal to unity) the value of a physical quantity, then there exists an element of physical reality corresponding to this physical quantity.“ EPR apply this condition in a case where knowledge gained from measuring one quantum system allows one to predict with certainty a value for a physical quantity on another.
When it was first put forward, special relativity struck many people as counterintuitive and possibly inconsistent, as we saw when we considered the twin paradox in Chapter 17. Quantum mechanics had a similar effect, only to a much greater and longer lasting degree, from the time of its inception in the mid 1920s until the present. This reaction to quantum theory was not confined to an initial confusion that often accompanies a new subject, but remained a life-long puzzle for Einstein, to mention only the most prominent opponent of what he took to be the reigning orthodoxy. In this chapter we study a famous attempt by Einstein and two of his colleagues to show that quantum mechanics was, if not logically inconsistent, then at least an incomplete theory. This charge of incompleteness is just that raised by Schrödinger's cat paradox (Section 21.4). THE EPR PARADOX In 1935 Einstein, Boris Podolsky (1896–1966) and Nathan Rosen (1909–1995) (hereafter referred to as EPR) published a paper titled ‘Can Quantum-Mechanical Description of Physical Reality Be Considered Complete?’. They take as their criterion for the completeness of a theory that it contains terms corresponding to every relevant entity found in reality. For example, in the classical description of a system, such as a planet going around the sun, there are symbols representing the position r , the momentum p and so forth for the various parts of the system.