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Routledge eBooks

QBism

Michel Bitbol, Laura de la Tremblaye

Published Nov 20, 2023• 5 citations
Publisher

Abstract

A discrepancy between the instrumentalist and realist inclinations of QBism, or between its experiential and interactional concepts of measurement, has been repeatedly noticed. Here, we show that this discrepancy can be resolved by adopting a phenomenological approach throughout. In other terms, the difficulty can be overcome by unambiguously choosing the first-person standpoint as a radical origin of knowledge, and by ascending from the situated lived experience of a knowing and acting subject, to the structure and use of the quantum formalism. To reconstruct some crucial features of the objectivity promised by science, and to accommodate the soundest aspect of the realist intuitions of QBist authors, a phenomenological reinterpretation of what is commonly called “the world” is proposed. This reinterpretation is based on Bruce Bégout's “Eco-Phenomenology”, that replaces the concept of a somehow extrinsic relation between subject and world, with the immersive experience of a subject partaking of the world.

DOI
10.4324/9781003259008-10

Related papers

TOWARDS A PHENOMENOLOGICAL CONSTITUTION OF QUANTUM MECHANICS: A QBIST APPROACH

Laura de la Tremblaye, Michel Bitbol

In this programmatic article, our aim is to sketch the outlines of a phenomenological constitution of quantum mechanics, thus drawing the ultimate consequence of previous phenomenological approaches to this theory. In other terms, we wish to show a way to ascend from the situated lived experience of a knowing and acting subject, to the structure and use of the quantum formalism. QBism (Quantum Bayesianism), with its motivated focus on lived experience, and its decision to take the elementary epistemic attitudes of agents as primitives of its axiomatics, will prove a decisive step to progress in this direction.

•Jan 1, 2022•4 citations

Unobservable Entities in QBism and Phenomenology

Jacques Pienaar

The interpretation of quantum theory known as QBism argues that many elements of the formalism have a subjective interpretation. At the same time, QBism claims to be a broadly realist programme. This implies that reality in QBism must be somehow founded upon an agent's subjective experiences (measurement outcomes). To make this idea more precise, we propose to interpret QBism's “experiences” as synonymous with the concept of “perceived phenomena” in phenomenology. This suggests an approach to ontology in which objects can only be physically real if they are in principle observable. But what does “observable” mean? Are atoms, electromagnetic fields, quantum states, or probabilities observable? Here we discuss the different answers to this question given by QBists and phenomenologists, and attempt to reconcile them.

arXiv:2112.14302•Routledge eBooks•Nov 20, 2023•7 citations

QBism, phenomenology, and contextual quantum realism

Igor Evgenievich Pris

A critique of phenomenological interpretation of quantum Bayesianism (QBism) is offered, in particular, the position of M. Bitbol and L. de La Tremblay, which removes remnants of scientific realism from QBism and adopts a radically phenomenological first person point of view. It is shown that phenomenological view of quantum mechanics cannot explain cognition of quantum reality and behavior of real quantum systems, because the ultimate reality for phenomenology is autonomous phenomena, which, in fact, do not exist. Our proposed contextual quantum realism (CQR) does not invert, as the mentioned authors do, but rejects, the traditional relation between experience and reality. By reinterpreting QBism, our CQR removes remnants of phenomenology from it, but in such a way as not to fall into the other extreme – metaphysical realism.

Siberian Journal of Philosophy•May 12, 2023•1 citation

QBism

Thomas A. Ryckman

Critics have pointed to conflicting currents in QBism's philosophical self-conception insofar as QBist professions of realism sit uneasily with its Ansatz of personal experience. Rather than dropping the former and turning to phenomenology or to William James’ “radical empiricism”, I suggest that – if QBism is to be considered an interpretation of quantum mechanics – reconciliation may be found by following Bohr in drawing out and applying the non-representational consequences of the quantum postulate. While similarities to a position Rorty termed “epistemological behaviorism” are apparent, QBism can avoid Rorty's anti-representational deconstruction of epistemology by adopting, as did Bohr, a moderate empirical realism about the quantum world.

Routledge eBooks•Nov 20, 2023•1 citation

QBism and the Subjective Stance

Steven French

Abstract Phenomenology has also been brought to bear on QM in the context of recent discussions over the approach known as ‘QBism’. This takes the theoretical formalism to be simply a device for predicting an agent’s future experiences, rather than as representing the world. Such a first-person perspective has been widely taken to mesh with the phenomenological stance, as usually understood. However, although advocates of QBism maintain that any slide into solipsism can be resisted, they struggle to accommodate what has been called the ‘kicks from the world’. Here it is argued that in order do so while remaining within a phenomenological framework, the correlationist feature identified by London and Bauer should be incorporated. Interestingly, one of the phenomenologist philosophers who is often cited in this specific context, Merleau-Ponty, took classes with Gurwitsch and drew on London and Bauer’s ‘little book’ in his own analysis of quantum physics.

Oxford University Press eBooks•Nov 23, 2023•0 citations

Introducing Phenomenology to QBism and Vice Versa

Philipp Berghofer, Harald A. Wiltsche

This is the first volume that focuses specifically on phenomenological approaches to quantum mechanics. It is also the first volume focusing on the philosophical implications of QBism. This coincidence is not accidental. Phenomenology's rich potential for our understanding of quantum mechanics has long been overlooked by analytic philosophers and phenomenologists alike. The experience-first approach of phenomenology, its descriptive methodology, and Husserl's critique of mathematization do not sit well with “mainstream” analytic philosophy of physics. But as this volume will demonstrate, it sits nicely with the basic tenets of QBism. Conversely, QBism constitutes the most consistent and best-developed interpretation of quantum mechanics that fully embraces the Bohrian idea that a proper understanding of science must be based on the concept of experience. However, since its inception in the early 2000s, QBism has struggled to connect with the philosophical community. Not only are the underlying intuitions shaping and dominating contemporary philosophy of quantum mechanics—namely, that a scientific theory must be purged of all subjective and operational notions such as “experience” or “measurement” and that, consequently, a successful approach to quantum mechanics must be formulated as a “quantum theory without observers”—at odds with QBism. It seems that sometimes the incommensurability already starts at the level of the basic conceptual framework which, in the case of mainstream analytic philosophy, is not very well suited to express some of QBism's main tenets. Considering this situation, the main hypothesis of this volume is that phenomenology and QBism are natural bedfellows, and that both can profit from mutual exchange. In order to make this exchange as profitable as possible, the aim of this introductory chapter is to identify, clarify, and motivate some of the cornerstones of phenomenological approaches to quantum mechanics, to shed light on the main ideas and virtues of QBism, and to discuss points of contact and points of possible conflict between these two projects.

Routledge eBooks•Nov 20, 2023•5 citations
A discrepancy between the instrumentalist and realist inclinations of QBism, or between its experiential and interactional concepts of measurement, has been repeatedly noticed. Here, we show that this discrepancy can be resolved by adopting a phenomenological approach throughout. In other terms, the difficulty can be overcome by unambiguously choosing the first-person standpoint as a radical origin of knowledge, and by ascending from the situated lived experience of a knowing and acting subject, to the structure and use of the quantum formalism. To reconstruct some crucial features of the objectivity promised by science, and to accommodate the soundest aspect of the realist intuitions of QBist authors, a phenomenological reinterpretation of what is commonly called “the world” is proposed. This reinterpretation is based on Bruce Bégout's “Eco-Phenomenology”, that replaces the concept of a somehow extrinsic relation between subject and world, with the immersive experience of a subject partaking of the world.
In this programmatic article, our aim is to sketch the outlines of a phenomenological constitution of quantum mechanics, thus drawing the ultimate consequence of previous phenomenological approaches to this theory. In other terms, we wish to show a way to ascend from the situated lived experience of a knowing and acting subject, to the structure and use of the quantum formalism. QBism (Quantum Bayesianism), with its motivated focus on lived experience, and its decision to take the elementary epistemic attitudes of agents as primitives of its axiomatics, will prove a decisive step to progress in this direction.
The interpretation of quantum theory known as QBism argues that many elements of the formalism have a subjective interpretation. At the same time, QBism claims to be a broadly realist programme. This implies that reality in QBism must be somehow founded upon an agent's subjective experiences (measurement outcomes). To make this idea more precise, we propose to interpret QBism's “experiences” as synonymous with the concept of “perceived phenomena” in phenomenology. This suggests an approach to ontology in which objects can only be physically real if they are in principle observable. But what does “observable” mean? Are atoms, electromagnetic fields, quantum states, or probabilities observable? Here we discuss the different answers to this question given by QBists and phenomenologists, and attempt to reconcile them.
A critique of phenomenological interpretation of quantum Bayesianism (QBism) is offered, in particular, the position of M. Bitbol and L. de La Tremblay, which removes remnants of scientific realism from QBism and adopts a radically phenomenological first person point of view. It is shown that phenomenological view of quantum mechanics cannot explain cognition of quantum reality and behavior of real quantum systems, because the ultimate reality for phenomenology is autonomous phenomena, which, in fact, do not exist. Our proposed contextual quantum realism (CQR) does not invert, as the mentioned authors do, but rejects, the traditional relation between experience and reality. By reinterpreting QBism, our CQR removes remnants of phenomenology from it, but in such a way as not to fall into the other extreme – metaphysical realism.
Critics have pointed to conflicting currents in QBism's philosophical self-conception insofar as QBist professions of realism sit uneasily with its Ansatz of personal experience. Rather than dropping the former and turning to phenomenology or to William James’ “radical empiricism”, I suggest that – if QBism is to be considered an interpretation of quantum mechanics – reconciliation may be found by following Bohr in drawing out and applying the non-representational consequences of the quantum postulate. While similarities to a position Rorty termed “epistemological behaviorism” are apparent, QBism can avoid Rorty's anti-representational deconstruction of epistemology by adopting, as did Bohr, a moderate empirical realism about the quantum world.
Abstract Phenomenology has also been brought to bear on QM in the context of recent discussions over the approach known as ‘QBism’. This takes the theoretical formalism to be simply a device for predicting an agent’s future experiences, rather than as representing the world. Such a first-person perspective has been widely taken to mesh with the phenomenological stance, as usually understood. However, although advocates of QBism maintain that any slide into solipsism can be resisted, they struggle to accommodate what has been called the ‘kicks from the world’. Here it is argued that in order do so while remaining within a phenomenological framework, the correlationist feature identified by London and Bauer should be incorporated. Interestingly, one of the phenomenologist philosophers who is often cited in this specific context, Merleau-Ponty, took classes with Gurwitsch and drew on London and Bauer’s ‘little book’ in his own analysis of quantum physics.
This is the first volume that focuses specifically on phenomenological approaches to quantum mechanics. It is also the first volume focusing on the philosophical implications of QBism. This coincidence is not accidental. Phenomenology's rich potential for our understanding of quantum mechanics has long been overlooked by analytic philosophers and phenomenologists alike. The experience-first approach of phenomenology, its descriptive methodology, and Husserl's critique of mathematization do not sit well with “mainstream” analytic philosophy of physics. But as this volume will demonstrate, it sits nicely with the basic tenets of QBism. Conversely, QBism constitutes the most consistent and best-developed interpretation of quantum mechanics that fully embraces the Bohrian idea that a proper understanding of science must be based on the concept of experience. However, since its inception in the early 2000s, QBism has struggled to connect with the philosophical community. Not only are the underlying intuitions shaping and dominating contemporary philosophy of quantum mechanics—namely, that a scientific theory must be purged of all subjective and operational notions such as “experience” or “measurement” and that, consequently, a successful approach to quantum mechanics must be formulated as a “quantum theory without observers”—at odds with QBism. It seems that sometimes the incommensurability already starts at the level of the basic conceptual framework which, in the case of mainstream analytic philosophy, is not very well suited to express some of QBism's main tenets. Considering this situation, the main hypothesis of this volume is that phenomenology and QBism are natural bedfellows, and that both can profit from mutual exchange. In order to make this exchange as profitable as possible, the aim of this introductory chapter is to identify, clarify, and motivate some of the cornerstones of phenomenological approaches to quantum mechanics, to shed light on the main ideas and virtues of QBism, and to discuss points of contact and points of possible conflict between these two projects.