The interpretation of quantum mechanics known as QBism developed out of efforts to understand the probabilities arising in quantum physics as Bayesian in character. But this development was neither easy nor without casualties. Many ideas voiced, and even committed to print, during earlier stages of Quantum Bayesianism turn out to be quite fallacious when seen from the vantage point of QBism. I trace the history of what we might call “proto-QBism” becoming QBism proper, showing that the process was one of becoming consistently Jamesian. But William James and phenomenology are evolutionary cousins, and so guided by QBism's history, I will sketch ways in which phenomenological turns may be inspirational for future developments in the QBist project. The prize, I will argue, would be if phenomenology can evoke a new technical development in the reconstruction of quantum theory or the understanding of the classical limit.
The interpretation of quantum mechanics known as QBism developed out of efforts to understand the probabilities arising in quantum physics as Bayesian in character. But this development was neither easy nor without casualties. Many ideas voiced, and even committed to print, during earlier stages of Quantum Bayesianism turn out to be quite fallacious when seen from the vantage point of QBism. I trace the history of what we might call “proto-QBism” becoming QBism proper, showing that the process was one of becoming consistently Jamesian. But William James and phenomenology are evolutionary cousins, and so guided by QBism's history, I will sketch ways in which phenomenological turns may be inspirational for future developments in the QBist project. The prize, I will argue, would be if phenomenology can evoke a new technical development in the reconstruction of quantum theory or the understanding of the classical limit.
Measured by the accuracy of its predictions and the scope of its technological applications, quantum mechanics is one of the most successful theories in science—as well as one of the most misunderstood. The deeper meaning of quantum mechanics remains controversial almost a century after its invention. Providing a way past quantum theory’s paradoxes and puzzles, QBism offers a strikingly new interpretation that opens up for the nonspecialist reader the profound implications of quantum mechanics for how we understand and interact with the world. Short for Quantum Bayesianism, QBism adapts many of the conventional features of quantum mechanics in light of a revised understanding of probability. Bayesian probability, unlike the standard “frequentist probability,” is defined as a numerical measure of the degree of an observer’s belief that a future event will occur or that a particular proposition is true. Bayesianism’s advantages over frequentist probability are that it is applicable to singular events, its probability estimates can be updated based on acquisition of new information, and it can effortlessly include frequentist results. But perhaps most important, much of the weirdness associated with quantum theory—the idea that an atom can be in two places at once, or that signals can travel faster than the speed of light, or that Schrödinger’s cat can be simultaneously dead and alive—dissolves under the lens of QBism. Using straightforward language without equations, Hans Christian von Baeyer clarifies the meaning of quantum mechanics in a commonsense way that suggests a new approach to physics in general.
Without Niels Bohr, QBism would be nothing. But QBism is not Bohr. This paper attempts to show that, despite a popular misconception, QBism is no minor tweak to Bohr's interpretation of quantum mechanics. It is something quite distinct. Along the way, we lay out three tenets of QBism in some detail: 1) The Born Rule---the foundation of what quantum theory means for QBism---is a normative statement. It is about the decision-making behavior any individual agent should strive for; it is not a descriptive "law of nature" in the usual sense. 2) All probabilities, including all quantum probabilities, are so subjective they never tell nature what to do. This includes probability-1 assignments. Quantum states thus have no "ontic hold" on the world. 3) Quantum measurement outcomes just are personal experiences for the agent gambling upon them. Particularly, quantum measurement outcomes are not, to paraphrase Bohr, instances of "irreversible amplification in devices whose design is communicable in common language suitably refined by the terminology of classical physics." Finally, an explicit comparison is given between QBism and Bohr with regard to three subjects: a) The issue of the "detached observer" as it arose in a debate between Pauli and Bohr, b) Bohr's reply to Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen, and c) Bohr's mature notion of "quantum phenomena." At the end, we discuss how Bohr's notion of phenomena may have something to offer the philosophy of William James: A physics from which to further develop his vision of the world---call it an ontology if you will---in which "new being comes in local spots and patches."
This is the first volume that focuses specifically on phenomenological approaches to quantum mechanics. It is also the first volume focusing on the philosophical implications of QBism. This coincidence is not accidental. Phenomenology's rich potential for our understanding of quantum mechanics has long been overlooked by analytic philosophers and phenomenologists alike. The experience-first approach of phenomenology, its descriptive methodology, and Husserl's critique of mathematization do not sit well with “mainstream” analytic philosophy of physics. But as this volume will demonstrate, it sits nicely with the basic tenets of QBism. Conversely, QBism constitutes the most consistent and best-developed interpretation of quantum mechanics that fully embraces the Bohrian idea that a proper understanding of science must be based on the concept of experience. However, since its inception in the early 2000s, QBism has struggled to connect with the philosophical community. Not only are the underlying intuitions shaping and dominating contemporary philosophy of quantum mechanics—namely, that a scientific theory must be purged of all subjective and operational notions such as “experience” or “measurement” and that, consequently, a successful approach to quantum mechanics must be formulated as a “quantum theory without observers”—at odds with QBism. It seems that sometimes the incommensurability already starts at the level of the basic conceptual framework which, in the case of mainstream analytic philosophy, is not very well suited to express some of QBism's main tenets. Considering this situation, the main hypothesis of this volume is that phenomenology and QBism are natural bedfellows, and that both can profit from mutual exchange. In order to make this exchange as profitable as possible, the aim of this introductory chapter is to identify, clarify, and motivate some of the cornerstones of phenomenological approaches to quantum mechanics, to shed light on the main ideas and virtues of QBism, and to discuss points of contact and points of possible conflict between these two projects.
Critics have pointed to conflicting currents in QBism's philosophical self-conception insofar as QBist professions of realism sit uneasily with its Ansatz of personal experience. Rather than dropping the former and turning to phenomenology or to William James’ “radical empiricism”, I suggest that – if QBism is to be considered an interpretation of quantum mechanics – reconciliation may be found by following Bohr in drawing out and applying the non-representational consequences of the quantum postulate. While similarities to a position Rorty termed “epistemological behaviorism” are apparent, QBism can avoid Rorty's anti-representational deconstruction of epistemology by adopting, as did Bohr, a moderate empirical realism about the quantum world.
The purpose of this book is to explain Quantum Bayesianism ('QBism') to "people without easy access to mathematical formulas and equations" (4-5). Qbism is an interpretation of quantum mechanics that "doesn't meddle with the technical aspects of the theory [but instead] reinterprets the fundamental terms of the theory and gives them new meaning" (3). The most important motivation for QBism, enthusiastically stated on the book's cover, is that QBism provides "a way past quantum theory's paradoxes and puzzles" such that much of the weirdness associated with quantum theory "dissolves under the lens of QBism". Could a non-technical book that almost fits in your pocket really succeed in resolving the notorious paradoxes of quantum theory? I believe the answer is: not in this case. There are three primary reasons. Firstly, the argument that QBism solves quantum paradoxes is not convincing. Secondly, it proves difficult to pin down exactly what QBism says. Thirdly, as a scientific theory QBism seems explanatorily inert, which is maybe why the topic of scientific explanation is not broached. Sections 2-4 below discuss each of these problems in turn. However, there is still a wealth of insights that make this book a worthwhile read, and I shall begin with those.