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arXiv:1904.10991

No-Go Theorems and the Foundations of Quantum Physics

Andréa Oldofredi

Published Apr 24, 2019• 1 citation
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

In the history of quantum physics several no-go theorems have been proved, and many of them have played a central role in the development of the theory, such as Bell's or the Kochen-Specker theorem. A recent paper by F. Laudisa has raised reasonable doubts concerning the strategy followed in proving some of these results, since they rely on the standard framework of quantum mechanics, a theory that presents several ontological problems. The aim of this paper is twofold: on the one hand, I intend to reinforce Laudisa's methodological point by critically discussing Malament's theorem in the context of the philosophical foundation of Quantum Field Theory; secondly, I rehabilitate Gisin's theorem showing that Laudisa's concerns do not apply to it.

DOI
10.48550/arxiv.1904.10991

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In the history of quantum physics several no-go theorems have been proved, and many of them have played a central role in the development of the theory, such as Bell's or the Kochen-Specker theorem. A recent paper by F. Laudisa has raised reasonable doubts concerning the strategy followed in proving some of these results, since they rely on the standard framework of quantum mechanics, a theory that presents several ontological problems. The aim of this paper is twofold: on the one hand, I intend to reinforce Laudisa's methodological point by critically discussing Malament's theorem in the context of the philosophical foundation of Quantum Field Theory; secondly, I rehabilitate Gisin's theorem showing that Laudisa's concerns do not apply to it.
Quantum mechanics is an extraordinarily successful scientific theory. But more than 100 years after it was first introduced, the interpretation of the theory remains controversial. This Element introduces some of the most puzzling questions at the foundations of quantum mechanics and provides an up-to-date and forward-looking survey of the most prominent ways in which physicists and philosophers of physics have attempted to resolve them. Topics covered include nonlocality, contextuality, the reality of the wavefunction and the measurement problem. The discussion is supplemented with descriptions of some of the most important mathematical results from recent work in quantum foundations, including Bell's theorem, the Kochen-Specker theorem and the PBR theorem.
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One of the statements one would hear pretty early in any quantum mechanics course is that for quantum particles there are properties which do not have definite values. For example, if we measure |+〉 in standard basis, the best we can do to describe the outcome is to say, that with probability 1/2 we will get 0 and with probability 1/2 we will get 1. Yet one could wonder, is this really the way things are or is it just because our description of this quantum particle is incomplete, but in fact there are some hidden variables inside every quantum system that contain enough information to tell the outcome of measurement (see Fig. 1). However, many people disdain the idea of hidden variables, so there has been rather long history of theorems that forbid theories involving hidden variables. Usually if one wants to prove some no hidden variables theorem he has to assume something about the hidden variables theories he is going to forbid. One of such assumptions is non-contextuality, which means that the outcome we get after measuring with an observable is the same regardless of what other observables we choose to measure at the same time. The first theorem forbidding hidden variables theories is due to von Neumann in 1932. Then for a third of a century everyone cited von Neumann’s work carelessly, till Bell in 1966 indicated that there was an unreasonable assumption in von Neumann’s proof and urged for further examination of the problem (see [6] and [1] for more historical details). Bell also constructed a hidden variables model for one qubit that could assign the outcome of any observable in a way consistent with quantum mechanics. He also proved two theorems that forbid non-contextual hidden variables theories using counterexamples with larger quantum systems. Yet surprisingly he himself thought that hidden variables do exists and considered these theorems only as characterizations of the hidden variables theory we should look for. In this essay we will discuss several versions of one of the two Bell’s theorems. The theorem we will consider was also independently proven by Kochen and Specker in 1967 (see [5]), hence it is called Bell-Kochen-Specker theorem. For shortness and in order not to mix this theorem with another Bell’s theorem from now on we will refer to it as Kochen-Specker theorem. We will be interested in proving several versions of this theorem and the following lemma will turn out to be of great use:
We review a series of recent no-go theorems that extend the methodological and conceptual framework introduced by Bell's theorem to more sophisticated operational scenarios involving independent sources, quantum networks, joint measurements, and multiple observers. Many of these results were originally developed within quantum information science and are scattered across the literature, where their technical and application-driven success has partly obscured their broader foundational significance. We organize them around a common Bell-inspired methodology that extends beyond quantum nonlocality, and emphasize how increasingly rich operational structures change which physical assumptions can be tested.