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Quantum Mechanics and No-Hidden Variable Theories: Comparing the Bell, Kochen-Specker and Free Will Theorems

P.A. Steijlen

Published Aug 26, 2014• 0 citations
OpenAlex

Abstract

This thesis explores the exact differences between the two most well-known no-hidden variable theories: the Bell theorem and the Kochen-Specker theorem. Furthermore, it tries to place a newer result called `the free will theorem', as developed by John Conway and Simon Kochen, in this context. To compare the Bell and Kochen-Specker theorems a reformulation of the two theorems by David Mermin will be discussed, which turns out to lead to an even stronger no-hidden variable theory. From the discussion of the free will theorem and the critical reactions it has elicited, it will become clear that the free will theorem is actually very similar to this stronger no-hidden variable theory.

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•Jan 1, 2008•0 citations
This thesis explores the exact differences between the two most well-known no-hidden variable theories: the Bell theorem and the Kochen-Specker theorem. Furthermore, it tries to place a newer result called `the free will theorem', as developed by John Conway and Simon Kochen, in this context. To compare the Bell and Kochen-Specker theorems a reformulation of the two theorems by David Mermin will be discussed, which turns out to lead to an even stronger no-hidden variable theory. From the discussion of the free will theorem and the critical reactions it has elicited, it will become clear that the free will theorem is actually very similar to this stronger no-hidden variable theory.
One of the statements one would hear pretty early in any quantum mechanics course is that for quantum particles there are properties which do not have definite values. For example, if we measure |+〉 in standard basis, the best we can do to describe the outcome is to say, that with probability 1/2 we will get 0 and with probability 1/2 we will get 1. Yet one could wonder, is this really the way things are or is it just because our description of this quantum particle is incomplete, but in fact there are some hidden variables inside every quantum system that contain enough information to tell the outcome of measurement (see Fig. 1). However, many people disdain the idea of hidden variables, so there has been rather long history of theorems that forbid theories involving hidden variables. Usually if one wants to prove some no hidden variables theorem he has to assume something about the hidden variables theories he is going to forbid. One of such assumptions is non-contextuality, which means that the outcome we get after measuring with an observable is the same regardless of what other observables we choose to measure at the same time. The first theorem forbidding hidden variables theories is due to von Neumann in 1932. Then for a third of a century everyone cited von Neumann’s work carelessly, till Bell in 1966 indicated that there was an unreasonable assumption in von Neumann’s proof and urged for further examination of the problem (see [6] and [1] for more historical details). Bell also constructed a hidden variables model for one qubit that could assign the outcome of any observable in a way consistent with quantum mechanics. He also proved two theorems that forbid non-contextual hidden variables theories using counterexamples with larger quantum systems. Yet surprisingly he himself thought that hidden variables do exists and considered these theorems only as characterizations of the hidden variables theory we should look for. In this essay we will discuss several versions of one of the two Bell’s theorems. The theorem we will consider was also independently proven by Kochen and Specker in 1967 (see [5]), hence it is called Bell-Kochen-Specker theorem. For shortness and in order not to mix this theorem with another Bell’s theorem from now on we will refer to it as Kochen-Specker theorem. We will be interested in proving several versions of this theorem and the following lemma will turn out to be of great use:
Abstract In chapter 12 we give an overview of the historical development of hidden-variable theories aiming to attribute ‘hidden’ definite outcomes to any potential measurement on a quantum system. We start with a discussion of von Neumann’s assumption on hidden-variable models, which was later realized not to hold by Hermann, Kochen, Specker, and Bell, going into detail on Bell’s refutation of von Neumann’s arguments. We then turn to the notion of contextuality, which severely restricts hidden-variable models: we discuss Gleason’s theorem before stating and proving the famous Kochen-Specker theorem, as well as the simpler versions of Peres’ nonet and Mermin’s pentagram. These results show that quantum mechanics is not compatible with the assignment of definite measurement outcomes to all possible measurements, and such assignments can hence only be made once a restricted set of observables, a context, is selected
Although skeptical of the prohibitive power of no-hidden-variables theorems, John Bell was himself responsible for the two most important ones. I describe some recent versions of the lesser known of the two (familiar to experts as the "Kochen-Specker theorem") which have transparently simple proofs. One of the new versions can be converted without additional analysis into a powerful form of the very much better known "Bell's Theorem," thereby clarifying the conceptual link between these two results of Bell.
In this talk I present a simple derivation of an old result of Kochen and Specker, which is apparently unrelated to the famous work of Bell on hidden variables, but is presumably equally important. Kochen and Specker showed in 1967 that quantum mechanics cannot be embedded into a classical stochastic theory, provided the quantum theoretical probability distributions are reproduced and one additional highly desirable property is satisfied. This showed in a striking manner what were the difficulties in implementing the Einstein programme of a `complete' version of quantum mechanics.
I begin with description of quantum entanglement and its relevance to the EPR-type experiments, which played a decisive role in rejecting determinism and hidden-variable theories. Thereby I prove the closely-related Kochen-Specker paradox, on which also the main object of my paper, the recently published Conway and Kochen’s Free Will Theorem, is founded. It is being shown there, on the basis of three physical axioms, following from the special theory of relativity and quantum mechanics, that if the choice for a particular type of spin 1 experiment is not a function of the information accessible to the experimenters, then its outcome is equally not a function of the information accessible to the particles. Therefor the response of the particles can be seen as free. In conclusion I mention some critical remarks on the theorem, expressed in subsequent responses to the original article.