As it is known, neither classical logical conjunction “and” nor classical logical alternative “either…or” can replace “+” representing a linear superposition of two quantum states. Therefore, to provide a logical account of the quantum superposition, one must either reconsider the standard interpretation of quantum mechanics (making it fit for classical bivalent logic) or replace the standard logic with a deviant logic suitable for describing the superposition. In this paper, a supervaluation approach to the description of the quantum superposition is considered. In accordance with this approach, the indefinite propositions, which correspond to the superposition states, lack truth-values of any kind, even granting that their compounds (such as logical alternative “either…or”) can have truth-values. As an illustration, the supervaluationist account of the superposition of spin states is presented.
As it is known, neither classical logical conjunction “and” nor classical logical alternative “either…or” can replace “+” representing a linear superposition of two quantum states. Therefore, to provide a logical account of the quantum superposition, one must either reconsider the standard interpretation of quantum mechanics (making it fit for classical bivalent logic) or replace the standard logic with a deviant logic suitable for describing the superposition. In this paper, a supervaluation approach to the description of the quantum superposition is considered. In accordance with this approach, the indefinite propositions, which correspond to the superposition states, lack truth-values of any kind, even granting that their compounds (such as logical alternative “either…or”) can have truth-values. As an illustration, the supervaluationist account of the superposition of spin states is presented.
The topos approach to the formulation of physical theories includes a new form of quantum logic. We present this topos quantum logic, including some new results, and compare it to standard quantum logic, all with an eye to conceptual issues. In particular, we show that topos quantum logic is distributive, multi-valued, contextual and intuitionistic. It incorporates superposition without being based on linear structures, has a built-in form of coarse-graining which automatically avoids interpretational problems usually associated with the conjunction of propositions about incompatible physical quantities, and provides a material implication that is lacking from standard quantum logic. Importantly, topos quantum logic comes with a clear geometrical underpinning. The representation of pure states and truth-value assignments are discussed. It is briefly shown how mixed states fit into this approach.
Abstract This paper gives a formulation of quantum logic in the abstract algebraic setting laid out by Dunn and Hardegree (2001). On this basis, it provides a comparative analysis of viable quantum logical bivalent semantics and their classical counterparts, thereby showing that the truth-functional status of classical and quantum connectives is not as different as usually thought. Then it points out that bivalent semantics for quantum logic – compatible with realism about quantum mechanics – can be maintained, albeit at the price of truth-functionality. Finally, the paper critically addresses Geoffrey Hellman’s argument (1980) that this lack of truth-functionality entails a change of meaning between classical and quantum connectives.
The term proposition usually denotes in quantum mechanics (QM) an element of (standard) quantum logic (QL). Within the orthodox interpretation of QM the propositions of QL cannot be associated with sentences of a language stating properties of individual samples of a physical system, since properties are nonobjective in QM. This makes the interpretation of propositions problematical. The difficulty can be removed by adopting the objective interpretation of QM proposed by one of the authors (semantic realism, or SR, interpretation). In this case, a unified perspective can be adopted for QM and classical mechanics (CM), and a simple first order predicate calculus L(x) with Tarskian semantics can be constructed such that one can associate a physical proposition (i.e., a set of physical states) with every sentence of L(x). The set Pf of all physical propositions is partially ordered and contains a subset PTf of testable physical propositions whose order structure depends on the criteria of testability established by the physical theory. In particular, PTf turns out to be a Boolean lattice in CM, while it can be identified with QL in QM. Hence the propositions of QL can be associated with sentences of L(x), or also with the sentences of a suitable quantum language LTQ(x), and the structure of QL characterizes the notion of testability in QM. One can then show that the notion of quantum truth does not conflict with the classical notion of truth within this perspective. Furthermore, the interpretation of QL propounded here proves to be equivalent to a previous pragmatic interpretation worked out by one of the authors, and can be embodied within a more general perspective which considers states as first order predicates of a broader language with a Kripkean semantics.
In this paper we consider the phenomenon of superpositions in quantum mechanics and suggest a way to deal with the idea in a logical setting from a syntactical point of view, that is, as subsumed in the language of the formalism, and not semantically. We restrict the discussion to the propositional level only. Then, after presenting the motivations and a possible world semantics, the formalism is outlined and we also consider within this schema the claim that superpositions may involve contradictions, as in the case of the Schrödinger's cat, which (it is usually said) is both alive and dead. We argue that this claim is a misreading of the quantum case. Finally, we sketch a new form of quantum logic that involves three kinds of negations and present the relationships among them. The paper is a first approach to the subject, introducing some main guidelines to be developed by a `syntactical' logical approach to quantum superpositions.
In this paper we consider the phenomenon of superpositions in quantum mechanics and suggest a way to deal with the idea in a logical setting from a syntactical point of view, that is, as subsumed in the language of the formalism, and not semantically. We restrict the discussion to the propositional level only. Then, after presenting the motivations and a possible world semantics, the formalism is outlined and we also consider within this schema the claim that superpositions may involve contradictions, as in the case of the Schrödinger's cat, which (it is usually said) is both alive and dead. We argue that this claim is a misreading of the quantum case. Finally, we sketch a new form of quantum logic that involves three kinds of negations and present the relationships among them. The paper is a first approach to the subject, introducing some main guidelines to be developed by a `syntactical' logical approach to quantum superpositions.
The thesis investigates the possibility of a classical semantics for quantum propositional structures. A classical semantics is defined as a set of mappings each of which is (i) bivalent, i.e., the value 1 (true) or 0 (false) is assigned to each proposition, and (ii) truth-functional, i.e., the logical operations are preserved. In addition, this set must be "full", i.e., any pair of distinct propositions is assigned different values by some mapping in the set. When the propositions make assertions about the properties of classical or of quantum systems, the mappings should also be (iii) "state-induced", i.e., values assigned by the semantics should accord with values assigned by classical or by quantum mechanics. In classical propositional logic, (equivalence classes of) propositions form a Boolean algebra, and each semantic mapping assigns the value 1 to the members of a certain subset of the algebra, namely, an ultrafilter, and assigns 0 to the members of the dual ultraideal, where the union of these two subsets is the entire algebra. The propositional structures of classical mechanics are likewise Boolean algebras, so one can straightforwardly provide a classical semantics, which also satisfies (iii). However, quantum propositional structures are non-Boolean, so it is an open question whether a semantics satisfying (i), (ii) and (iii) can be provided. Von Neumann first proposed (1932) that the algebraic structures of the subspaces (or projectors) of Hilbert space be regarded as the pro-positional structures PQM of quantum mechanics. These structures have been formalized in two ways: as orthomodular lattices which have the binary operations "and", "or", defined among all elements, compatible [symbol omitted] and incompatible [symbol omitted]; and as partial-Boolean algebras which have the binary operations defined among only compatible elements. In the thesis, two basic senses in which these structures are non-Boolean are discriminated. And two notions of truth-functionality are distinguished: truth-functionality [symbols omitted] applicable to the PQM lattices; and truth-functionality [symbol omitted] applicable to both the lattices and partial-Boolean algebras. Then it is shown how the lattice definitions of "and", "or", among incompatibles rule out a bivalent, truth-functional [symbols omitted] semantics for any lattice containing incompatible, elements. In contrast, the Gleason and Kochen-Specker proofs of the impossibility of hidden-variables for quantum mechanics show the impossibility of a bivalent, truth-functional [symbol omitted] semantics for three-or-higher dimensional Hilbert space structures; and the presence of incompatible elements is necessary but is not sufficient to rule out such a semantics. As for (iii), each quantum state-induced expectation-function on a PQM truth-functionally assigns 1 and 0 values to the elements in a ultrafilter and dual ultraideal of PQM³ where, in general the union of an ultrafilter and its dual ultraideal is smaller than the entire structure. Thus it is argued that each expectation-function is the quantum analog of a classical semantic mapping, even though the domain where each expectation-function is bivalent and truth-functional is usually a non-Boolean substructure of PQM. The final portion of the thesis surveys proposals for the introduction of hidden variables into quantum mechanics, proofs of the impossibility of such hidden-variable proposals, and criticisms of these impossibility proofs. And arguments in favour of the partial-Boolean algebra, rather than the orthomodular lattice, formalization of the quantum propositional structures are reviewed.