In this paper we consider the phenomenon of superpositions in quantum mechanics and suggest a way to deal with the idea in a logical setting from a syntactical point of view, that is, as subsumed in the language of the formalism, and not semantically. We restrict the discussion to the propositional level only. Then, after presenting the motivations and a possible world semantics, the formalism is outlined and we also consider within this schema the claim that superpositions may involve contradictions, as in the case of the Schrödinger's cat, which (it is usually said) is both alive and dead. We argue that this claim is a misreading of the quantum case. Finally, we sketch a new form of quantum logic that involves three kinds of negations and present the relationships among them. The paper is a first approach to the subject, introducing some main guidelines to be developed by a `syntactical' logical approach to quantum superpositions.
In this paper we consider the phenomenon of superpositions in quantum mechanics and suggest a way to deal with the idea in a logical setting from a syntactical point of view, that is, as subsumed in the language of the formalism, and not semantically. We restrict the discussion to the propositional level only. Then, after presenting the motivations and a possible world semantics, the formalism is outlined and we also consider within this schema the claim that superpositions may involve contradictions, as in the case of the Schrödinger's cat, which (it is usually said) is both alive and dead. We argue that this claim is a misreading of the quantum case. Finally, we sketch a new form of quantum logic that involves three kinds of negations and present the relationships among them. The paper is a first approach to the subject, introducing some main guidelines to be developed by a `syntactical' logical approach to quantum superpositions.
In this paper we consider the phenomenon of superpositions in quantum mechanics and suggest a way to deal with the idea in a logical setting from a syntactical point of view, that is, as subsumed in the language of the formalism, and not semantically. We restrict the discussion to the propositional level only. Then, after presenting the motivations and a possible world semantics, the formalism is outlined and we also consider within this schema the claim that superpositions may involve contradictions, as in the case of the Schrödinger's cat, which (it is usually said) is both alive and dead. We argue that this claim is a misreading of the quantum case. Finally, we sketch a new form of quantum logic that involves three kinds of negations and present the relationships among them. The paper is a first approach to the subject, introducing some main guidelines to be developed by a `syntactical' logical approach to quantum superpositions.
In [7] the authors of this paper argued in favor of the possibility to consider a Paraconsistent Approach to Quantum Superpositions (PAQS). We claimed that, even though most interpretations of quantum mechanics (QM) attempt to escape contradictions, there are many hints -coming from present technical and experimental developments in QM- that indicate it could be worth while to engage in a research of this kind. Recently, Arenhart and Krause have raised several arguments against the PAQS [1, 2, 3]. In [11, 12] it was argued that their reasoning presupposes a metaphysical stance according to which the physical representation of reality must be exclusively considered in terms of the equation: Actuality = Reality. However, from a different metaphysical standpoint their problems disappear. It was also argued that, if we accept the idea that quantum superpositions exist in a (contradictory) potential realm, it makes perfect sense to develop QM in terms of a paraconsistent approach and claim that quantum superpositions are contradictory, contextual existents. Following these ideas, and taking as a standpoint an interpretation in terms of the physical notions of power and potentia put forward in [10, 12, 15], we present a paraconsistent formalization of quantum superpositions that attempts to capture the main features of QM.
In this lecture, intended for a general audience, I describe Schrödinger's thought experiment which was designed to show the strange results of extending the formalism of quantum theory, particularly the idea of superposition, beyond the subatomic regime. I describe a way to understand superposition in the terms of formal logic. I trace the development of Schrodinger's ideas after this thought experiment, and briefly sketch some work which realises it in actual experiments, and proposals for taking it further.
According to quantum mechanics, the pure states of a microsystem are represented by vectors in a Hilbert Space. Sentences of the form, "x є L" (where x is the state vector for a system, L a subspace of the appropriate Hilbert space), may be called Q-propositions: such sentences serve to summarise our information about the results of possible experiments on the system. Quantum logic investigates the relations which hold among the Q-propositions about a given physical sys tem. These logical relations correspond to algebraic relations among the subspaces of Hilbert space. The algebra of this set of subspaces is non-Boolean, and may be regarded either as an orthomodular lattice or as a partial Boolean algebra. With each type of structure we can associate a logic. A general approach to the semantics for such a logic is provided in terms of interpretations of a formal language within an algebraic structure; an interpretation maps sentences of the language homomorphically onto elements of the structure. When the structure in question is a Boolean algera, the resulting logic is classical; here we develop a semantics for the logic associated with partial Boolean algebras. Two systems of proof, based on the natural deduction systems of Gentzen, are shown for this logic. With respect to the given sematics, these calculi are sound and weakly complete. Strong completeness is conjectured. Quantum logic deals with the logical relations between sentences, and so is properly called a logic. However, it is the logic appropriate to a limited class of sentences: proposals that it should replace classical logic wherever the latter is used should be viewed with suspicion.
We put forward a new take on the logic of quantum mechanics, following Schroedinger's point of view that it is composition which makes quantum theory what it is, rather than its particular propositional structure due to the existence of superpositions, as proposed by Birkhoff and von Neumann. This gives rise to an intrinsically quantitative kind of logic, which truly deserves the name `logic' in that it also models meaning in natural language, the latter being the origin of logic, that it supports automation, the most prominent practical use of logic, and that it supports probabilistic inference.
The term proposition usually denotes in quantum mechanics (QM) an element of (standard) quantum logic (QL). Within the orthodox interpretation of QM the propositions of QL cannot be associated with sentences of a language stating properties of individual samples of a physical system, since properties are nonobjective in QM. This makes the interpretation of propositions problematical. The difficulty can be removed by adopting the objective interpretation of QM proposed by one of the authors (semantic realism, or SR, interpretation). In this case, a unified perspective can be adopted for QM and classical mechanics (CM), and a simple first order predicate calculus L(x) with Tarskian semantics can be constructed such that one can associate a physical proposition (i.e., a set of physical states) with every sentence of L(x). The set Pf of all physical propositions is partially ordered and contains a subset PTf of testable physical propositions whose order structure depends on the criteria of testability established by the physical theory. In particular, PTf turns out to be a Boolean lattice in CM, while it can be identified with QL in QM. Hence the propositions of QL can be associated with sentences of L(x), or also with the sentences of a suitable quantum language LTQ(x), and the structure of QL characterizes the notion of testability in QM. One can then show that the notion of quantum truth does not conflict with the classical notion of truth within this perspective. Furthermore, the interpretation of QL propounded here proves to be equivalent to a previous pragmatic interpretation worked out by one of the authors, and can be embodied within a more general perspective which considers states as first order predicates of a broader language with a Kripkean semantics.