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arXiv:2304.08450 · Journal of Philosophical Logic

Quantum Logic and Meaning

Sebastian Horvat, Iulian D. Toader

Published Nov 11, 2025• 7 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

Abstract This paper gives a formulation of quantum logic in the abstract algebraic setting laid out by Dunn and Hardegree (2001). On this basis, it provides a comparative analysis of viable quantum logical bivalent semantics and their classical counterparts, thereby showing that the truth-functional status of classical and quantum connectives is not as different as usually thought. Then it points out that bivalent semantics for quantum logic – compatible with realism about quantum mechanics – can be maintained, albeit at the price of truth-functionality. Finally, the paper critically addresses Geoffrey Hellman’s argument (1980) that this lack of truth-functionality entails a change of meaning between classical and quantum connectives.

DOI
10.1007/s10992-025-09818-2

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Abstract This paper gives a formulation of quantum logic in the abstract algebraic setting laid out by Dunn and Hardegree (2001). On this basis, it provides a comparative analysis of viable quantum logical bivalent semantics and their classical counterparts, thereby showing that the truth-functional status of classical and quantum connectives is not as different as usually thought. Then it points out that bivalent semantics for quantum logic – compatible with realism about quantum mechanics – can be maintained, albeit at the price of truth-functionality. Finally, the paper critically addresses Geoffrey Hellman’s argument (1980) that this lack of truth-functionality entails a change of meaning between classical and quantum connectives.
The thesis investigates the possibility of a classical semantics for quantum propositional structures. A classical semantics is defined as a set of mappings each of which is (i) bivalent, i.e., the value 1 (true) or 0 (false) is assigned to each proposition, and (ii) truth-functional, i.e., the logical operations are preserved. In addition, this set must be "full", i.e., any pair of distinct propositions is assigned different values by some mapping in the set. When the propositions make assertions about the properties of classical or of quantum systems, the mappings should also be (iii) "state-induced", i.e., values assigned by the semantics should accord with values assigned by classical or by quantum mechanics. In classical propositional logic, (equivalence classes of) propositions form a Boolean algebra, and each semantic mapping assigns the value 1 to the members of a certain subset of the algebra, namely, an ultrafilter, and assigns 0 to the members of the dual ultraideal, where the union of these two subsets is the entire algebra. The propositional structures of classical mechanics are likewise Boolean algebras, so one can straightforwardly provide a classical semantics, which also satisfies (iii). However, quantum propositional structures are non-Boolean, so it is an open question whether a semantics satisfying (i), (ii) and (iii) can be provided. Von Neumann first proposed (1932) that the algebraic structures of the subspaces (or projectors) of Hilbert space be regarded as the pro-positional structures PQM of quantum mechanics. These structures have been formalized in two ways: as orthomodular lattices which have the binary operations "and", "or", defined among all elements, compatible [symbol omitted] and incompatible [symbol omitted]; and as partial-Boolean algebras which have the binary operations defined among only compatible elements. In the thesis, two basic senses in which these structures are non-Boolean are discriminated. And two notions of truth-functionality are distinguished: truth-functionality [symbols omitted] applicable to the PQM lattices; and truth-functionality [symbol omitted] applicable to both the lattices and partial-Boolean algebras. Then it is shown how the lattice definitions of "and", "or", among incompatibles rule out a bivalent, truth-functional [symbols omitted] semantics for any lattice containing incompatible, elements. In contrast, the Gleason and Kochen-Specker proofs of the impossibility of hidden-variables for quantum mechanics show the impossibility of a bivalent, truth-functional [symbol omitted] semantics for three-or-higher dimensional Hilbert space structures; and the presence of incompatible elements is necessary but is not sufficient to rule out such a semantics. As for (iii), each quantum state-induced expectation-function on a PQM truth-functionally assigns 1 and 0 values to the elements in a ultrafilter and dual ultraideal of PQM³ where, in general the union of an ultrafilter and its dual ultraideal is smaller than the entire structure. Thus it is argued that each expectation-function is the quantum analog of a classical semantic mapping, even though the domain where each expectation-function is bivalent and truth-functional is usually a non-Boolean substructure of PQM. The final portion of the thesis surveys proposals for the introduction of hidden variables into quantum mechanics, proofs of the impossibility of such hidden-variable proposals, and criticisms of these impossibility proofs. And arguments in favour of the partial-Boolean algebra, rather than the orthomodular lattice, formalization of the quantum propositional structures are reviewed.
We address the old question whether a logical understanding of Quantum Mechanics requires abandoning some of the principles of classical logic. Against Putnam and others (Among whom we may count or not E. W. Beth, depending on how we interpret some of his statements), our answer is a clear “no”. Philosophically, our argument is based on combining a formal semantic approach, in the spirit of E. W. Beth’s proposal of applying Tarski’s semantical methods to the analysis of physical theories, with an empirical–experimental approach to Logic, as advocated by both Beth and Putnam, but understood by us in the view of the operational- realistic tradition of Jauch and Piron, i.e. as an investigation of “the logic of yes–no experiments” (or “questions”). Technically, we use the recently-developed setting of Quantum Dynamic Logic (Baltag and Smets 2005, 2008) to make explicit the operational meaning of quantum-mechanical concepts in our formal semantics. Based on our recent results (Baltag and Smets 2005), we show that the correct interpretation of quantum-logical connectives is dynamical, rather than purely propositional. We conclude that there is no contradiction between classical logic and (our dynamic reinterpretation of) quantum logic. Moreover, we argue that the Dynamic-Logical perspective leads to a better and deeper understanding of the “non-classicality” of quantum behavior than any perspective based on static Propositional Logic.
The purpose of this paper is to prove that the construction of a quantum logic is a task of specific interest for non-classical logic, but that it is relevant neither to the methodology of quantum mechanics nor to the formalisation of the alternative yes-no process. The main argument is that quantum structures (for example, orthocomplemented partially ordered sets, orthomodular lattices and partial algebras) are not systems of logic proper, but rather are perfectly formalizable structures in classical logic. In § 1, the orthodox formulation of Jauch and Piron are analyzed. I affirm that the objections made by these authors against “quantum logic” are not eliminated by the introduction of a conditional in the lattice structures, since the true reason why quantum “logic” is not really logic lies in its formulation, which is not that of a propositional system, but rather that of a specific theory whose model is these lattices. It is argued that the collection of the properties satisfied by certain objects of a structure does not justify their presentation as purely logical properties, nor does the presence of certain operations of the least upper bound and greatest lower bound permit us to call symbols introduced by analogy in propositionaI logic “connectives”. In any case, if that formalization is indeed possible, it does not imply the adoption of a new logic as a formal instrument for quantum mechanics. In § 2, aspects of quantum theories which are especially semantic in nature are analyzed. I agree with van Fraassen’s statement in the sense that that semantic formulation makes specific concepts of the theory clearer, but it does not attempt to construct its own logic. I deduce that it is non-classical logic which can actually take advantage of quantum semantics, as a model which, eventually, could throw light on the metalogical properties of certain special propositional systems. Finally, by using Benioff’s profound set theory analysis, I advance the hypothesis that classical logic is possibly the only one that can account for the richness of the meanings that appear in quantum mechanics.[Summary by Carlos Lungarzo]
This paper treats some of the issues raised by Putnam's discussion of, and claims for, quantum logic, specifically: that its proposal is a response to experimental difficulties; that it is a reasonable replacement for classical logic because its connectives retain their classical meanings, and because it can be derived as a logic of tests. We argue that the first claim is wrong(1), and that while conjunction and disjunction can be considered to retain their classical meanings, negation cruciallydoes not.The argument is conductedviaa thorough analysis of how the meet, join and complementation operations are defined in the relevant logical structures, respectively Boolean- and ortholattices(3). Since Putnam wishes to reinstate a realist interpretation of quantum mechanics, we ask how quantum logic can be a logic of realism. We show that it certainly cannot be a logic ofbivalencerealism (i.e., of truth and falsity), although itisconsistent with some form ofontologicalrealism(4). Finally, we show that while a reasonable explication of the idealized notion of test yields interesting mathematical structure, it by no means yields the rich ortholattice structure which Putnam (following Finkelstein) seeks.
Abstract Quantum logics are non-classical logics defined from the mathematical formalism of quantum mechanics. While they are conventionally used to model inferential processes in physics, their scope of application is potentially much broader. We argue that quantum logics can serve as a framework to model human cognition, as their semantics seem able to capture not only how people make inferences about quantum mechanics, but also how they reason in general. We begin by defining quantum logics from an algebraic perspective in a classical first-order setting. Next, we present findings from cognitive science that suggest these logics are apt to characterize human reasoning. We then consider how such a connection between quantum logics and cognition contributes to longstanding philosophical debates about the epistemological status of logic and the problem of adoption. Finally, we discuss how cognitive applications of quantum logics could advance our understanding of human psychology and even quantum foundations.
As it is known, neither classical logical conjunction “and” nor classical logical alternative “either…or” can replace “+” representing a linear superposition of two quantum states. Therefore, to provide a logical account of the quantum superposition, one must either reconsider the standard interpretation of quantum mechanics (making it fit for classical bivalent logic) or replace the standard logic with a deviant logic suitable for describing the superposition. In this paper, a supervaluation approach to the description of the quantum superposition is considered. In accordance with this approach, the indefinite propositions, which correspond to the superposition states, lack truth-values of any kind, even granting that their compounds (such as logical alternative “either…or”) can have truth-values. As an illustration, the supervaluationist account of the superposition of spin states is presented.