Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Log inSign up
Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Blog
Job Board
Q3AS

© 2026 Aqora Quantum S.A.S.

TermsPrivacyLegal Notice

arXiv:1405.2390

My Struggles with the Block Universe

Christopher A. Fuchs, Maximilian Schlosshauer, Blake C. Stacey

Published May 10, 2014• 57 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

This document is the second installment of three in the Cerro Grande Fire Series. Like its predecessor arXiv:quant-ph/0105039, "Notes on a Paulian Idea," it is a collection of letters written to various friends and colleagues, most of whom regularly circuit this archive. The unifying theme of all the letters is that each has something to do with the quantum. Particularly, the collection chronicles the emergence of Quantum Bayesianism as a robust view of quantum theory, eventually evolving into the still-more-radical "QBism" (with the B standing for no particular designation anymore), as it took its most distinctive turn away from various Copenhagen Interpretations. Included are many anecdotes from the history of quantum information theory: for instance, the story of the origin of the terms "qubit" and "quantum information" from their originator's own mouth, a copy of a rejection letter written by E. T. Jaynes for one of Rolf Landauer's original erasure-cost principle papers, and much more. Specialized indices are devoted to historical, technical, and philosophical matters. More roundly, the document is an attempt to provide an essential ingredient, unavailable anywhere else, for turning QBism into a live option within the vast spectrum of quantum foundational thought.

DOI
10.48550/arxiv.1405.2390

Related papers

Notes on a Paulian Idea: Foundational, Historical, Anecdotal and Forward-Looking Thoughts on the Quantum

Christopher A. Fuchs, N. David Mermin

This document is the first installment of three in the Cerro Grande Fire Series. It is a collection of letters written to various colleagues, most of whom regularly circuit this archive, including Howard Barnum, Paul Benioff, Charles Bennett, Herbert Bernstein, Doug Bilodeau, Gilles Brassard, Jeffrey Bub, Carlton Caves, Gregory Comer, Robert Griffiths, Adrian Kent, Rolf Landauer, Hideo Mabuchi, David Mermin, David Meyer, Michael Nielsen, Asher Peres, John Preskill, Mary Beth Ruskai, Ruediger Schack, Abner Shimony, William Wootters, Anton Zeilinger, and many others. The singular thread sewing all the letters together is the quantum. Some of the pieces are my best efforts to date to give substance to an evanescent thought I see rising from the field of quantum information---I call it the Paulian idea. To the extent I have communicated its misty shadow to my correspondents and seen a twinkle of enthusiasm, it seemed worthwhile to expand the jury on this anniversary occasion.

arXiv:quant-ph/0105039•May 9, 2001•71 citations

Letters for Andrei: QBism and the Unfinished Nature of Nature

Christopher A. Fuchs

From the Text: How shall I tribute Andrei Khrennikov in this volume? With an email collection of course! But with what theme? It ought to be something big. One of the troubles of QBism's ontological program is that it is so sideways to the ways most run-of-the-mill philosophers of physics think, they don't even have the tools to parse its sentences. They simply can't see it as having to do with ontology at all. Maybe there is no remedy for this except to wait for the generation to die away. But QBism can and must move forward. Here we select some emails that might inspire a young researcher to throw in on the QBist ontological project, to help develop it on its own terms. The road to a proper, detailed QBist ontology is sure to be a hard one, but one has to start somewhere.

arXiv:2109.08153•Sep 16, 2021•2 citations

Minds and values in the quantum universe

Henry Pierce Stapp

Copenhagen is the perfect setting for our discussion of matter and information. We have been charged ‘to explore the current concept of matter from scientific, philosophical, and theological perspectives’. The essential foundation for this work is the output of the intense intellectual struggles that took place here in Copenhagen during the twenties, principally between Niels Bohr, Werner Heisenberg, and Wolfgang Pauli. Those struggles replaced the then-prevailing Newtonian idea of matter as ‘solid, massy, hard, impenetrable, moveable particles’ with a new concept that allowed, and in fact demanded, entry into the laws governing the motion of matter of the consequences of decisions made by human subjects. This change in the laws swept away the meaningless billiard-ball universe, and replaced it with a universe in which we human beings, by means of our intentional effort, can make a difference in how the ‘matter’ in our bodies behaves.

Cambridge University Press eBooks•Sep 23, 2010•9 citations

Minds and values in the quantum universe

Henry Pierce Stapp

Copenhagen is the perfect setting for our discussion of matter and information. We have been charged ‘to explore the current concept of matter from scientific, philosophical, and theological perspectives’. The essential foundation for this work is the output of the intense intellectual struggles that took place here in Copenhagen during the twenties, principally between Niels Bohr, Werner Heisenberg, and Wolfgang Pauli. Those struggles replaced the then-prevailing Newtonian idea of matter as ‘solid, massy, hard, impenetrable, moveable particles’ with a new concept that allowed, and in fact demanded, entry into the laws governing the motion of matter of the consequences of decisions made by human subjects. This change in the laws swept away the meaningless billiard-ball universe, and replaced it with a universe in which we human beings, by means of our intentional effort, can make a difference in how the ‘matter’ in our bodies behaves.

Cambridge University Press eBooks•May 15, 2014•2 citations

Quantum Measurement and the Paulian Idea

Christopher A. Fuchs, Ruediger Schack

In the quantum Bayesian (or QBist) conception of quantum theory, "quantum measurement" is understood not as a comparison of something pre-existent with a standard, but instead indicative of the creation of something new in the universe: Namely, the fresh experience any agent receives upon taking an action on the world. We explore the implications of this for any would-be ontology underlying QBism. The concept that presently stands out as a candidate "material for our universe's composition" is "experience" itself, or what John Wheeler called "observer-participancy".

arXiv:1412.4209•Dec 13, 2014•11 citations

Notwithstanding Bohr, the Reasons for QBism

Christopher A. Fuchs

Without Niels Bohr, QBism would be nothing. But QBism is not Bohr. This paper attempts to show that, despite a popular misconception, QBism is no minor tweak to Bohr's interpretation of quantum mechanics. It is something quite distinct. Along the way, we lay out three tenets of QBism in some detail: 1) The Born Rule---the foundation of what quantum theory means for QBism---is a normative statement. It is about the decision-making behavior any individual agent should strive for; it is not a descriptive "law of nature" in the usual sense. 2) All probabilities, including all quantum probabilities, are so subjective they never tell nature what to do. This includes probability-1 assignments. Quantum states thus have no "ontic hold" on the world. 3) Quantum measurement outcomes just are personal experiences for the agent gambling upon them. Particularly, quantum measurement outcomes are not, to paraphrase Bohr, instances of "irreversible amplification in devices whose design is communicable in common language suitably refined by the terminology of classical physics." Finally, an explicit comparison is given between QBism and Bohr with regard to three subjects: a) The issue of the "detached observer" as it arose in a debate between Pauli and Bohr, b) Bohr's reply to Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen, and c) Bohr's mature notion of "quantum phenomena." At the end, we discuss how Bohr's notion of phenomena may have something to offer the philosophy of William James: A physics from which to further develop his vision of the world---call it an ontology if you will---in which "new being comes in local spots and patches."

arXiv:1705.03483•May 9, 2017•109 citations
This document is the second installment of three in the Cerro Grande Fire Series. Like its predecessor arXiv:quant-ph/0105039, "Notes on a Paulian Idea," it is a collection of letters written to various friends and colleagues, most of whom regularly circuit this archive. The unifying theme of all the letters is that each has something to do with the quantum. Particularly, the collection chronicles the emergence of Quantum Bayesianism as a robust view of quantum theory, eventually evolving into the still-more-radical "QBism" (with the B standing for no particular designation anymore), as it took its most distinctive turn away from various Copenhagen Interpretations. Included are many anecdotes from the history of quantum information theory: for instance, the story of the origin of the terms "qubit" and "quantum information" from their originator's own mouth, a copy of a rejection letter written by E. T. Jaynes for one of Rolf Landauer's original erasure-cost principle papers, and much more. Specialized indices are devoted to historical, technical, and philosophical matters. More roundly, the document is an attempt to provide an essential ingredient, unavailable anywhere else, for turning QBism into a live option within the vast spectrum of quantum foundational thought.
This document is the first installment of three in the Cerro Grande Fire Series. It is a collection of letters written to various colleagues, most of whom regularly circuit this archive, including Howard Barnum, Paul Benioff, Charles Bennett, Herbert Bernstein, Doug Bilodeau, Gilles Brassard, Jeffrey Bub, Carlton Caves, Gregory Comer, Robert Griffiths, Adrian Kent, Rolf Landauer, Hideo Mabuchi, David Mermin, David Meyer, Michael Nielsen, Asher Peres, John Preskill, Mary Beth Ruskai, Ruediger Schack, Abner Shimony, William Wootters, Anton Zeilinger, and many others. The singular thread sewing all the letters together is the quantum. Some of the pieces are my best efforts to date to give substance to an evanescent thought I see rising from the field of quantum information---I call it the Paulian idea. To the extent I have communicated its misty shadow to my correspondents and seen a twinkle of enthusiasm, it seemed worthwhile to expand the jury on this anniversary occasion.
From the Text: How shall I tribute Andrei Khrennikov in this volume? With an email collection of course! But with what theme? It ought to be something big. One of the troubles of QBism's ontological program is that it is so sideways to the ways most run-of-the-mill philosophers of physics think, they don't even have the tools to parse its sentences. They simply can't see it as having to do with ontology at all. Maybe there is no remedy for this except to wait for the generation to die away. But QBism can and must move forward. Here we select some emails that might inspire a young researcher to throw in on the QBist ontological project, to help develop it on its own terms. The road to a proper, detailed QBist ontology is sure to be a hard one, but one has to start somewhere.
Copenhagen is the perfect setting for our discussion of matter and information. We have been charged ‘to explore the current concept of matter from scientific, philosophical, and theological perspectives’. The essential foundation for this work is the output of the intense intellectual struggles that took place here in Copenhagen during the twenties, principally between Niels Bohr, Werner Heisenberg, and Wolfgang Pauli. Those struggles replaced the then-prevailing Newtonian idea of matter as ‘solid, massy, hard, impenetrable, moveable particles’ with a new concept that allowed, and in fact demanded, entry into the laws governing the motion of matter of the consequences of decisions made by human subjects. This change in the laws swept away the meaningless billiard-ball universe, and replaced it with a universe in which we human beings, by means of our intentional effort, can make a difference in how the ‘matter’ in our bodies behaves.
Copenhagen is the perfect setting for our discussion of matter and information. We have been charged ‘to explore the current concept of matter from scientific, philosophical, and theological perspectives’. The essential foundation for this work is the output of the intense intellectual struggles that took place here in Copenhagen during the twenties, principally between Niels Bohr, Werner Heisenberg, and Wolfgang Pauli. Those struggles replaced the then-prevailing Newtonian idea of matter as ‘solid, massy, hard, impenetrable, moveable particles’ with a new concept that allowed, and in fact demanded, entry into the laws governing the motion of matter of the consequences of decisions made by human subjects. This change in the laws swept away the meaningless billiard-ball universe, and replaced it with a universe in which we human beings, by means of our intentional effort, can make a difference in how the ‘matter’ in our bodies behaves.
In the quantum Bayesian (or QBist) conception of quantum theory, "quantum measurement" is understood not as a comparison of something pre-existent with a standard, but instead indicative of the creation of something new in the universe: Namely, the fresh experience any agent receives upon taking an action on the world. We explore the implications of this for any would-be ontology underlying QBism. The concept that presently stands out as a candidate "material for our universe's composition" is "experience" itself, or what John Wheeler called "observer-participancy".
Without Niels Bohr, QBism would be nothing. But QBism is not Bohr. This paper attempts to show that, despite a popular misconception, QBism is no minor tweak to Bohr's interpretation of quantum mechanics. It is something quite distinct. Along the way, we lay out three tenets of QBism in some detail: 1) The Born Rule---the foundation of what quantum theory means for QBism---is a normative statement. It is about the decision-making behavior any individual agent should strive for; it is not a descriptive "law of nature" in the usual sense. 2) All probabilities, including all quantum probabilities, are so subjective they never tell nature what to do. This includes probability-1 assignments. Quantum states thus have no "ontic hold" on the world. 3) Quantum measurement outcomes just are personal experiences for the agent gambling upon them. Particularly, quantum measurement outcomes are not, to paraphrase Bohr, instances of "irreversible amplification in devices whose design is communicable in common language suitably refined by the terminology of classical physics." Finally, an explicit comparison is given between QBism and Bohr with regard to three subjects: a) The issue of the "detached observer" as it arose in a debate between Pauli and Bohr, b) Bohr's reply to Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen, and c) Bohr's mature notion of "quantum phenomena." At the end, we discuss how Bohr's notion of phenomena may have something to offer the philosophy of William James: A physics from which to further develop his vision of the world---call it an ontology if you will---in which "new being comes in local spots and patches."