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arXiv:1412.4209

Quantum Measurement and the Paulian Idea

Christopher A. Fuchs, Ruediger Schack

Published Dec 13, 2014• 11 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

In the quantum Bayesian (or QBist) conception of quantum theory, "quantum measurement" is understood not as a comparison of something pre-existent with a standard, but instead indicative of the creation of something new in the universe: Namely, the fresh experience any agent receives upon taking an action on the world. We explore the implications of this for any would-be ontology underlying QBism. The concept that presently stands out as a candidate "material for our universe's composition" is "experience" itself, or what John Wheeler called "observer-participancy".

DOI
10.48550/arxiv.1412.4209

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In the quantum Bayesian (or QBist) conception of quantum theory, "quantum measurement" is understood not as a comparison of something pre-existent with a standard, but instead indicative of the creation of something new in the universe: Namely, the fresh experience any agent receives upon taking an action on the world. We explore the implications of this for any would-be ontology underlying QBism. The concept that presently stands out as a candidate "material for our universe's composition" is "experience" itself, or what John Wheeler called "observer-participancy".
Without Niels Bohr, QBism would be nothing. But QBism is not Bohr. This paper attempts to show that, despite a popular misconception, QBism is no minor tweak to Bohr's interpretation of quantum mechanics. It is something quite distinct. Along the way, we lay out three tenets of QBism in some detail: 1) The Born Rule---the foundation of what quantum theory means for QBism---is a normative statement. It is about the decision-making behavior any individual agent should strive for; it is not a descriptive "law of nature" in the usual sense. 2) All probabilities, including all quantum probabilities, are so subjective they never tell nature what to do. This includes probability-1 assignments. Quantum states thus have no "ontic hold" on the world. 3) Quantum measurement outcomes just are personal experiences for the agent gambling upon them. Particularly, quantum measurement outcomes are not, to paraphrase Bohr, instances of "irreversible amplification in devices whose design is communicable in common language suitably refined by the terminology of classical physics." Finally, an explicit comparison is given between QBism and Bohr with regard to three subjects: a) The issue of the "detached observer" as it arose in a debate between Pauli and Bohr, b) Bohr's reply to Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen, and c) Bohr's mature notion of "quantum phenomena." At the end, we discuss how Bohr's notion of phenomena may have something to offer the philosophy of William James: A physics from which to further develop his vision of the world---call it an ontology if you will---in which "new being comes in local spots and patches."
Abstract The idea that the quantum probabilities are best construed as the personal/subjective degrees of belief of Bayesian agents is an old one. In recent years the idea has been vigorously pursued by a group of physicists who fly the banner of quantum Bayesianism (QBism). The present paper aims to identify the prospects and problems of implementing QBism, and it critically assesses the claim that QBism provides a resolution (or dissolution) of some of the long-standing foundations issues in quantum mechanics, including the measurement problem and puzzles of nonlocality.
The interpretation of quantum theory known as QBism argues that many elements of the formalism have a subjective interpretation. At the same time, QBism claims to be a broadly realist programme. This implies that reality in QBism must be somehow founded upon an agent's subjective experiences (measurement outcomes). To make this idea more precise, we propose to interpret QBism's “experiences” as synonymous with the concept of “perceived phenomena” in phenomenology. This suggests an approach to ontology in which objects can only be physically real if they are in principle observable. But what does “observable” mean? Are atoms, electromagnetic fields, quantum states, or probabilities observable? Here we discuss the different answers to this question given by QBists and phenomenologists, and attempt to reconcile them.
A discrepancy between the instrumentalist and realist inclinations of QBism, or between its experiential and interactional concepts of measurement, has been repeatedly noticed. Here, we show that this discrepancy can be resolved by adopting a phenomenological approach throughout. In other terms, the difficulty can be overcome by unambiguously choosing the first-person standpoint as a radical origin of knowledge, and by ascending from the situated lived experience of a knowing and acting subject, to the structure and use of the quantum formalism. To reconstruct some crucial features of the objectivity promised by science, and to accommodate the soundest aspect of the realist intuitions of QBist authors, a phenomenological reinterpretation of what is commonly called “the world” is proposed. This reinterpretation is based on Bruce Bégout's “Eco-Phenomenology”, that replaces the concept of a somehow extrinsic relation between subject and world, with the immersive experience of a subject partaking of the world.
In this programmatic article, our aim is to sketch the outlines of a phenomenological constitution of quantum mechanics, thus drawing the ultimate consequence of previous phenomenological approaches to this theory. In other terms, we wish to show a way to ascend from the situated lived experience of a knowing and acting subject, to the structure and use of the quantum formalism. QBism (Quantum Bayesianism), with its motivated focus on lived experience, and its decision to take the elementary epistemic attitudes of agents as primitives of its axiomatics, will prove a decisive step to progress in this direction.
QBism has long recognized quantum states, positive-operator-valued measure elements, Kraus operators, and even unitary operations to be of the same type: they express aspects of an agent's belief system concerning the consequences (for her) of actions she might take upon her external world. Such action-consequence pairs have conventionally been called ``quantum measurements.'' The calculus of quantum theory is then viewed as an empirically motivated addition to Bayesian decision theory when brought to this notion of measurement. This radical approach has allowed QBism to eliminate conceptual problems that plague other interpretations of quantum mechanics. However, one issue has remained elusive: If a QBist does not believe in the existence of an ontic (agent-independent) dynamical variable evolving over time, why would there be any constraints on her quantum-state assignment in the absence of performing a measurement? Why would she introduce unitary or open-system quantum dynamics at all? Here, we present a representation theorem based on van Fraassen's reflection principle to answer these questions. Simply put, an agent's assignment of quantum dynamics represents her belief that a measurement action she is contemplating would not change her current odds for future gambles. A corollary to this approach is that one can make sense of ``open-system dynamics'' without the need to introduce an ``environment with a measurement record,'' as is common in decoherence accounts of quantum measurement. QBism's understanding instead rests more fundamentally on an agent's beliefs about the system of interest (not system plus environment) and her judgments about measurements she might perform on that system. More broadly, this result establishes QBism's contention that measurement itself is the central concept of quantum theory and thus the framework upon which any future QBist ontology must hang.