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arXiv:2109.08153

Letters for Andrei: QBism and the Unfinished Nature of Nature

Christopher A. Fuchs

Published Sep 16, 2021• 2 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

From the Text: How shall I tribute Andrei Khrennikov in this volume? With an email collection of course! But with what theme? It ought to be something big. One of the troubles of QBism's ontological program is that it is so sideways to the ways most run-of-the-mill philosophers of physics think, they don't even have the tools to parse its sentences. They simply can't see it as having to do with ontology at all. Maybe there is no remedy for this except to wait for the generation to die away. But QBism can and must move forward. Here we select some emails that might inspire a young researcher to throw in on the QBist ontological project, to help develop it on its own terms. The road to a proper, detailed QBist ontology is sure to be a hard one, but one has to start somewhere.

DOI
10.48550/arxiv.2109.08153

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Mermin replies: Understanding the Now was not the main purpose of my March 2014 commentary. My primary point was that a new way of resolving the puzzles and paradoxes of quantum mechanics, called QBism by Christopher Fuchs and Rüdiger Schack, was also able to settle that longstanding problem in classical physics. After my earlier commentary on QBism (Physics Today, July 2012, page 8), I was concerned that many of the letters about it (December 2012, page 8) had sounded the same theme: that the letter writer’s own way of looking at quantum mechanics was already perfectly satisfactory. I hoped that by applying QBist thinking to a strictly classical problem, I could disengage those readers from their favorite interpretation of quantum mechanics and help them think about QBism on its own merits. I recently emphasized in Nature11. N. D. Mermin, Nature 507, 421 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1038/507421a that QBism sheds light on classical physics, too, but there I discussed quantum applications of QBism as well as classical applications (“CBism”).The letters here all address only the problem of the Now but not the fact that I deal with it through a classical application of QBism. While I’m disappointed that they say nothing about QBism or CBism, I’m pleased that they all agree that the problem of the Now is indeed a problem. Not everybody does.Berge Tatian and B. K. Ridley both criticize me for taking the Now to be a point. But I don’t. I call the Now an event “whose duration and location are restricted enough that it can usefully be represented as a point in space and time.” I say that “the events we experience are complex, extended entities” and that “to represent our actual experiences as a collection of mathematical points … is a brilliant strategic simplification, but we ought not to confuse a cartoon … with the experience itself.”Ridley’s comment “Nor could one person’s Now be exactly the same as another’s” suggests that I say it could be. What I do say is “The commonality of my Now and your Now whenever we are together requires that our Nows must coincide at each of two consecutive meetings.” “Commonality” or “coincide” mean only that our two private Now experiences happen at a common place and time, not that they are identical. Indeed, the personal experiences of different people are incomparable, except through the imperfect medium of language.I agree with James Hartle on much in the paper he cites, but we have important differences. He takes spacetime to be objective and fundamental; I take it to be an abstract tool used by an agent to organize her experience. He uses the notion of a point in spacetime uncritically; I regard it as an approximate representation of an agent’s spatially and temporally extended experience. He takes an agent’s experience to be an objective property of the agent, like the contents of a register. I take an agent’s experience to be private and self-evident to that agent and to be the fundamental basis for her inference of an external world; the experience of each agent plays a special role for that—and only that—agent, analogous to the special role played by “the classical domain” in the quantum mechanics of Lev Landau and Evgeny Lifshitz.Rudolf Peierls wrote to John Bell in 1980, “In my view, a description of the laws of physics consists in giving us a set of correlations between successive observations. By observations I mean … what our senses can experience. That we have senses and can experience such sensations is an empirical fact, which has not been deduced (and in my opinion cannot be deduced) from current physics.”22. S. Lee, ed., Sir Rudolf Peierls: Selected Private and Scientific Correspondence, vol. 2, World Scientific, River Edge, NJ (2009), p. 807. If “us” is expanded to “each of us,” then nobody has ever put QBism and CBism more concisely than that.REFERENCESSection:ChooseTop of pageREFERENCES <<CITING ARTICLES1. N. D. Mermin, Nature 507, 421 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1038/507421a, Google ScholarCrossref, ISI2. S. Lee, ed., Sir Rudolf Peierls: Selected Private and Scientific Correspondence, vol. 2, World Scientific, River Edge, NJ (2009), p. 807. Google ScholarCrossref© 2014 American Institute of Physics.

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From the Text: How shall I tribute Andrei Khrennikov in this volume? With an email collection of course! But with what theme? It ought to be something big. One of the troubles of QBism's ontological program is that it is so sideways to the ways most run-of-the-mill philosophers of physics think, they don't even have the tools to parse its sentences. They simply can't see it as having to do with ontology at all. Maybe there is no remedy for this except to wait for the generation to die away. But QBism can and must move forward. Here we select some emails that might inspire a young researcher to throw in on the QBist ontological project, to help develop it on its own terms. The road to a proper, detailed QBist ontology is sure to be a hard one, but one has to start somewhere.
Recently I posted a paper entitled "External observer reflections on QBism". As any external observer, I was not able to reflect all features of QBism properly. The comments I received from one of QBism's creators, C. A. Fuchs, were very valuable to me in better understanding the views of QBists. Some of QBism's features are very delicate and extracting them from articles of QBists is not a simple task. Therefore, I hope that the second portion of my reflections on QBism (or, strictly speaking, my reflections on Fuchs reflections on my earlier reflections) might be interesting and useful for other experts in quantum foundations and quantum information theory (especially, taking into account my previous aggressively anti-QBism position). In the present paper I correct some of my earlier posted critical comments on QBism. At the same time, other critical comments gained new validation through my recent deeper understanding of QBists views on a number of problems.
Mermin replies: Understanding the Now was not the main purpose of my March 2014 commentary. My primary point was that a new way of resolving the puzzles and paradoxes of quantum mechanics, called QBism by Christopher Fuchs and Rüdiger Schack, was also able to settle that longstanding problem in classical physics. After my earlier commentary on QBism (Physics Today, July 2012, page 8), I was concerned that many of the letters about it (December 2012, page 8) had sounded the same theme: that the letter writer’s own way of looking at quantum mechanics was already perfectly satisfactory. I hoped that by applying QBist thinking to a strictly classical problem, I could disengage those readers from their favorite interpretation of quantum mechanics and help them think about QBism on its own merits. I recently emphasized in Nature11. N. D. Mermin, Nature 507, 421 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1038/507421a that QBism sheds light on classical physics, too, but there I discussed quantum applications of QBism as well as classical applications (“CBism”).The letters here all address only the problem of the Now but not the fact that I deal with it through a classical application of QBism. While I’m disappointed that they say nothing about QBism or CBism, I’m pleased that they all agree that the problem of the Now is indeed a problem. Not everybody does.Berge Tatian and B. K. Ridley both criticize me for taking the Now to be a point. But I don’t. I call the Now an event “whose duration and location are restricted enough that it can usefully be represented as a point in space and time.” I say that “the events we experience are complex, extended entities” and that “to represent our actual experiences as a collection of mathematical points … is a brilliant strategic simplification, but we ought not to confuse a cartoon … with the experience itself.”Ridley’s comment “Nor could one person’s Now be exactly the same as another’s” suggests that I say it could be. What I do say is “The commonality of my Now and your Now whenever we are together requires that our Nows must coincide at each of two consecutive meetings.” “Commonality” or “coincide” mean only that our two private Now experiences happen at a common place and time, not that they are identical. Indeed, the personal experiences of different people are incomparable, except through the imperfect medium of language.I agree with James Hartle on much in the paper he cites, but we have important differences. He takes spacetime to be objective and fundamental; I take it to be an abstract tool used by an agent to organize her experience. He uses the notion of a point in spacetime uncritically; I regard it as an approximate representation of an agent’s spatially and temporally extended experience. He takes an agent’s experience to be an objective property of the agent, like the contents of a register. I take an agent’s experience to be private and self-evident to that agent and to be the fundamental basis for her inference of an external world; the experience of each agent plays a special role for that—and only that—agent, analogous to the special role played by “the classical domain” in the quantum mechanics of Lev Landau and Evgeny Lifshitz.Rudolf Peierls wrote to John Bell in 1980, “In my view, a description of the laws of physics consists in giving us a set of correlations between successive observations. By observations I mean … what our senses can experience. That we have senses and can experience such sensations is an empirical fact, which has not been deduced (and in my opinion cannot be deduced) from current physics.”22. S. Lee, ed., Sir Rudolf Peierls: Selected Private and Scientific Correspondence, vol. 2, World Scientific, River Edge, NJ (2009), p. 807. If “us” is expanded to “each of us,” then nobody has ever put QBism and CBism more concisely than that.REFERENCESSection:ChooseTop of pageREFERENCES <<CITING ARTICLES1. N. D. Mermin, Nature 507, 421 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1038/507421a, Google ScholarCrossref, ISI2. S. Lee, ed., Sir Rudolf Peierls: Selected Private and Scientific Correspondence, vol. 2, World Scientific, River Edge, NJ (2009), p. 807. Google ScholarCrossref© 2014 American Institute of Physics.
To remind you, this book is based on a course I taught in 2006. On the last day of class, I followed the great tradition pioneered by Richard Feynman, in which the last class should be one where you can ask the teacher anything. Feynman's rule was that you could ask about anything except politics, religion, or the final exam. In my case, there was no final exam, and I didn't even make politics or religion off-limits. This chapter collects some of the questions people asked me, together with my responses. Student: Do you often think about using computer science to limit or give us a hint about physical theories? Do you think that we'll be able to discover physical theories which give more powerful models than quantum computation? Scott: Is BQP the end of the road, or is there more to be found? That's a fantastic question, and I wish more people would think about it. I’m being a bit of a politician here and not answering directly, because obviously the answer is “I don't know.” I guess the whole idea with science is that if we don't know the answer, we don't try to sprout one out of our butt or something. We try to base our answers on something. So, everything we know is consistent with the idea that quantum computing is the end of the road. Greg Kuperberg had an analogy I really liked. He said that there are people who keep saying that we've gone from classical to quantum mechanics so what other surprises are in store? But maybe that's like first assuming the Earth is flat, and then on discovering that it's round, saying who knows, maybe it has the topology of a Klein bottle. There's a surprise in a given direction, but once you've assimilated it, there may not be any further surprise in that same direction.