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9 Objective probability and quantum fuzziness

Ulrich Mohrhoff

Published Mar 5, 2007• 8 citations
OpenAlex

Abstract

This paper offers a critique of the Bayesian interpretation of quantum mechanics with particular focus on a paper by Caves, Fuchs, and Schack containing a critique of the “objective preparations view ” or OPV. It also aims to carry the discussion beyond the hardened positions of Bayesians and proponents of the OPV. Several claims made by Caves et al. are rebutted, including the claim that different pure states may legitimately be assigned to the same system at the same time, and the claim that the quantum nature of a preparation device cannot legitimately be ignored. Both Bayesians and proponents of the OPV regard the time dependence of a quantum state as the continuous dependence on time of an evolving state of some kind. This leads to a false dilemma: quantum states are either objective states of nature or subjective states of belief. In reality they are neither. The present paper views the aforesaid dependence as a dependence on the time of the measurement to whose possible outcomes

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Physics Today•Nov 30, 2012•1 citation
This paper offers a critique of the Bayesian interpretation of quantum mechanics with particular focus on a paper by Caves, Fuchs, and Schack containing a critique of the “objective preparations view ” or OPV. It also aims to carry the discussion beyond the hardened positions of Bayesians and proponents of the OPV. Several claims made by Caves et al. are rebutted, including the claim that different pure states may legitimately be assigned to the same system at the same time, and the claim that the quantum nature of a preparation device cannot legitimately be ignored. Both Bayesians and proponents of the OPV regard the time dependence of a quantum state as the continuous dependence on time of an evolving state of some kind. This leads to a false dilemma: quantum states are either objective states of nature or subjective states of belief. In reality they are neither. The present paper views the aforesaid dependence as a dependence on the time of the measurement to whose possible outcomes
The Quantum Bayesian view of Caves, Fuchs and Schack is presented, this being a view according to which quantum state assignments are purely personal and subjective, just as probability assignments are for subjective Bayesians. It is noted that the rationale for the approach derives from an interesting conjunction of a general realism about physics, combined with anti-realism about much of the structure of quantum mechanics. More detail of the position is then provided and the important question of how the approach handles the shifty divide between system and apparatus explained. Finally, the view is defended from three common objections: that it is tacitly solipsistic; that it is overly instrumentalist; and last, that it cannot adequately deal with the data that would be experimentally available in a Wigner’s Friend scenario.
I consider the "Quantum Bayesian" view of quantum theory as expounded in a 2006 paper of Caves, Fuchs, and Schack. I argue that one can accept a generally personalist, decision-theoretic view of probability, including probability as manifested in quantum physics, while nevertheless accepting that in some situations, including some in quantum physics, probabilities may in a useful sense be thought of as objectively correct. This includes situations in which the ascription of a quantum state should be thought of as objectively correct. I argue that this does not cause any prima facie objectionable sort of action at a distance, though it may involve adopting the attitude that certain dispositional properties of things are not "localized" at those things. Whether this insouciant view of nonlocality and objectivity can survive more detailed analysis is a matter for further investigation.
Zurek's existential interpretation of quantum mechanics suffers from three classical prejudices, including the belief that space and time are intrinsically and infinitely differentiated. These compel him to relativize the concept of objective existence in two ways. The elimination of these prejudices makes it possible to recognize the quantum formalism's ontological implications — the relative and contingent reality of spatiotemporal distinctions and the extrinsic and finite spatiotemporal differentiation of the physical world — which in turn makes it possible to arrive at an unqualified objective existence. Contrary to a widespread misconception, viewing the quantum formalism as being fundamentally a probability algorithm does not imply that quantum mechanics is concerned with states of knowledge rather than states of Nature. On the contrary, it makes possible a complete and strongly objective description of the physical world that requires no reference to observers. What objectively exists, in a sense that requires no qualification, is (i) the trajectories of macroscopic objects, whose fuzziness is empirically irrelevant, (ii) the properties and values of whose possession these trajectories provide indelible records, and (iii) the fuzzy and temporally undifferentiated states of affairs that obtain between measurements and are described by counterfactual probability assignments.
A quantum state, via the Born Rule, assigns probabilities to the different possible values of observables of a quantum system. It is only in virtue of these probabilities — or, alternatively, expectation values — that quantum mechanics is empirically testable. Since assigning a state to a system means assigning probabilities to the values of observables, it may seem natural to read Peierls’ claim that the state ‘represents our knowledge of the system’ (Peierls [1991], p. 19) as a shorthand for saying that the state represents our knowledge of these probabilities. The latter view is sometimes even straightforwardly identified with the epistemic conception of states, for example by Marchildon, who claims that ‘[i]n the epistemic view [of quantum states], the state vector (or wave function or density matrix) does not represent the objective state of a microscopic system […], but rather our knowledge of the probabilities of outcomes of future measurements’ (Marchildon [2004], p. 1454). However, according to an argument due to Fuchs and endorsed by Timpson, 31 the idea that quantum states represent our knowledge about quantum probabilities should not be regarded as the core claim of the epistemic conception of quantum states, simply because, as they argue, this idea is in fact incompatible with the latter. These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.
Because it’s important that physicists discuss the problems of quantum foundations, I was delighted to see David Mermin’s commentary on “fixing the shifty split.” But I must disagree with my friend’s view.There are multiple ways of interpreting probabilities.11. A. Hobson, Concepts in Statistical Mechanics, Gordon and Breach, New York (1971), p. 27. In quantum physics, the Bayesian “degree of belief” interpretation can be appropriate for mixed states, but only the frequentist or “ensemble” interpretation applies to the pure states that Mermin discusses.A recent paper by Matthew Pusey and coauthors22. M. F. Pusey, J. Barrett, T. Rudolph, http://arxiv.org/abs/1111.3328v1. concludes that if two different pure quantum states are assigned to a single physical situation, one of the states is objectively wrong. The proof’s main assumption is that any quantum system has some set of real physical properties, labeled λ. Pusey and coauthors show that two different pure states cannot represent the same λ. So, although their paper implies but does not assume that quantum states are physically real, it does assume that each specific physical situation has behind it some kind of physical reality. Chris Fuchs, quoted favorably by Mermin, might dispute the notion that some kind of physical reality actually exists, but most physicists are probably sufficiently realist to grant that notion. Without such a notion, science lies somewhere between solipsism and superstition.Whenever I hear subjective interpretations of quantum physics, I wonder about such questions as the one Mermin quotes from Albert Einstein: Can a mouse collapse a wavefunction? Mermin’s Bayesian response, that a mouse cannot but a physics student can, doesn’t reassure me. Were wavefunctions not collapsing before there were physicists?The “Wigner’s friend” paradox, as described in Mermin’s commentary, doesn’t need a subjective interpretation to find a solution. In fact, Eugene Wigner abandoned his interpretation around 1970 once he became aware of the ideas underlying quantum decoherence.33. M. Schlosshauer, Decoherence and the Quantum-to-Classical Transition, Springer, Berlin (2007), p. 364. Suppose Wigner’s friend makes a measurement, the outcome of which is known to the friend but not to Wigner. Regardless of whether the outcome is known, and in fact regardless of the presence of the friend, the measurement device must decohere the quantum system that’s being measured, putting the system into a mixed state of the either/or form, with no interferences, just like a coin that’s been flipped. A definite outcome has thus occurred, and Wigner and his friend will both agree on this. Neither the friend nor Wigner affects the outcome. She has simply “looked” and now knows the outcome, while Wigner doesn’t know. That is not paradoxical and does not require a revision of our understanding of pure quantum states.There’s no reason to give up on a realist interpretation of quantum physics, much less a realist interpretation of nature itself.REFERENCESSection:ChooseTop of pageREFERENCES <<1. A. Hobson, Concepts in Statistical Mechanics, Gordon and Breach, New York (1971), p. 27. Google Scholar2. M. F. Pusey, J. Barrett, T. Rudolph, http://arxiv.org/abs/1111.3328v1. Google Scholar3. M. Schlosshauer, Decoherence and the Quantum-to-Classical Transition, Springer, Berlin (2007), p. 364. Google Scholar© 2012 American Institute of Physics.