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arXiv:quant-ph/9907004

Quantum Probability from Decision Theory?

J. Finkelstein

Published Jul 1, 1999• 3 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

Deutsch has recently (in quant-ph/9906015) offered a justification, based only on the non-probabilistic axioms of quantum theory and of classical decision theory, for the use of the standard quantum probability rules. In this note, this justification is examined.
DOI
10.48550/arxiv.quant-ph/9907004

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In a recent paper, Deutsch claims to derive the ‘probabilistic predictions of quantum theory’ from the ‘non–probabilistic axioms of quantum theory’ and the ‘nonprobabilistic part of classical decision theory.’ We show that his derivation includes a crucial hidden assumption that vitiates the force of his argument. Furthermore, we point out that in classical decision theory a standard set of non–probabilistic axioms is already sufficient to endow possible outcomes with a natural probability structure. Within that context we argue that Gleason's theorem, relying on fewer assumptions than Deutsch, provides a compelling derivation of the quantum probability law.
A major problem facing no-collapse interpretations of quantum mechanics in the tradition of Everett is how to understand the probabilistic axiom of quantum mechanics (the Born rule) in the context of a deterministic theory in which every outcome of a measurement occurs. Deutsch claims to derive a decision-theoretic analogue of the Born rule from the non-probabilistic part of quantum mechanics and some non-probabilistic axioms of classical decision theory, and hence concludes that no probabilistic axiom is needed. I argue that Deutsch’s derivation begs the question.
The main difficulty facing no-collapse theories of quantum mechanics in the Everettian tradition concerns the role of probability within a theory in which every possible outcome of a measurement actually occurs. The problem is two-fold: First, what do probability claims mean within such a theory? Second, what ensures that the probabilities attached to measurement outcomes match those of standard quantum mechanics? Deutsch has recently proposed a decision-theoretic solution to the second problem, according to which agents are rationally required to weight the outcomes of measurements according to the standard quantum-mechanical probability measure. I show that this argument admits counterexamples, and hence fails to establish the standard probability weighting as a rational requirement.
An extended analysis is given of the program, originally suggested by Deutsch, of solving the probability problem in the Everett interpretation by means of decision theory. Deutsch's own proof is discussed, and alternatives are presented which are based upon different decision theories and upon Gleason's Theorem. It is argued that decision theory gives Everettians most or all of what they need from `probability'. Some consequences of (Everettian) quantum mechanics for decision theory itself are also discussed.
After briefly recalling some of the main theses of quantum probability concerning the foundational aspects of quantum mechanics and of probability theory, we describe the various categories of axioms in classical probability theory and focus our attention on the classical conditioning axioms. Four classical conditioning axioms are proposed, their probabilistic and model-independent meaning is discussed and it is proven that: (i) the only mathematical realization of these axioms is the classical Bayes rule (or equivalently the classical theorem of composite probabilities) and (ii) von Neumann's projection postulate, which can be considered one of the first examples of quantum conditioning axioms, violates two of these axioms. Finally, we construct an example showing that, even in classical probability, an uncritical application of Bayes' rule can lead to non-optimal predictions. This article is part of the theme issue 'Quantum theory and topology in models of decision making (Part 2)'.