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arXiv:quant-ph/9906015 · Proceedings of the Royal Society A Mathematical Physical and Engineering Sciences

Quantum theory of probability and decisions

David Deutsch

Published Aug 8, 1999• 596 citations
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Abstract

The probabilistic predictions of quantum theory are conventionally obtained from a special probabilistic axiom. But that is unnecessary because all the practical consequences of such predictions follow from the remaining non–probabilistic axioms of quantum theory, together with the non–probabilistic part of classical decision theory.
DOI
10.1098/rspa.1999.0443

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In a recent paper, Deutsch claims to derive the ‘probabilistic predictions of quantum theory’ from the ‘non–probabilistic axioms of quantum theory’ and the ‘nonprobabilistic part of classical decision theory.’ We show that his derivation includes a crucial hidden assumption that vitiates the force of his argument. Furthermore, we point out that in classical decision theory a standard set of non–probabilistic axioms is already sufficient to endow possible outcomes with a natural probability structure. Within that context we argue that Gleason's theorem, relying on fewer assumptions than Deutsch, provides a compelling derivation of the quantum probability law.
Quantum theory makes the most accurate empirical predictions and yet it lacks simple, comprehensible physical principles from which the theory can be uniquely derived. A broad class of probabilistic theories exist which all share some features with quantum theory, such as probabilistic predictions for individual outcomes (indeterminism), the impossibility of information transfer faster than speed of light (no-signaling) or the impossibility of copying of unknown states (no-cloning). A vast majority of attempts to find physical principles behind quantum theory either fall short of deriving the theory uniquely from the principles or are based on abstract mathematical assumptions that require themselves a more conclusive physical motivation. Here, we show that classical probability theory and quantum theory can be reconstructed from three reasonable axioms: (1) (Information capacity) All systems with information carrying capacity of one bit are equivalent. (2) (Locality) The state of a composite system is completely determined by measurements on its subsystems. (3) (Reversibility) Between any two pure states there exists a reversible transformation. If one requires the transformation from the last axiom to be continuous, one separates quantum theory from the classical probabilistic one. A remarkable result following from our reconstruction is that no probability theory other than quantum theory can exhibit entanglement without contradicting one or more axioms.
After briefly recalling some of the main theses of quantum probability concerning the foundational aspects of quantum mechanics and of probability theory, we describe the various categories of axioms in classical probability theory and focus our attention on the classical conditioning axioms. Four classical conditioning axioms are proposed, their probabilistic and model-independent meaning is discussed and it is proven that: (i) the only mathematical realization of these axioms is the classical Bayes rule (or equivalently the classical theorem of composite probabilities) and (ii) von Neumann's projection postulate, which can be considered one of the first examples of quantum conditioning axioms, violates two of these axioms. Finally, we construct an example showing that, even in classical probability, an uncritical application of Bayes' rule can lead to non-optimal predictions. This article is part of the theme issue 'Quantum theory and topology in models of decision making (Part 2)'.
In this paper we derive the complex Hilbert space formalism of quantum theory from four simple information theoretic axioms. It is shown that quantum theory is the only non classical probabilistic theory satisfying the following axioms: distinguishability, conservation, reversibility, composition. The new results of this reconstruction compared to other reconstructions by other authors are: (i) we get rid of axiom "subspace" in favor of axiom conservation eliminating mathematical requirements contained in previous axiomatics; (ii) we are able to classify all the probabilistic theories that are consistent requiring (a) only the first two axioms (b) only the first three axioms; this could be useful in experimental tests of quantum theory since it gives the possibility to understand whether or not other mathematical models could be consistent with such tests; (iii) we provide a connection between two different approaches to quantum foundations, quantum logic and the one based on information theoretic primitives showing that any theory satisfying the first two axioms given above either is classical or is a theory in which physical systems are described by a projective geometry.
A major problem facing no-collapse interpretations of quantum mechanics in the tradition of Everett is how to understand the probabilistic axiom of quantum mechanics (the Born rule) in the context of a deterministic theory in which every outcome of a measurement occurs. Deutsch claims to derive a decision-theoretic analogue of the Born rule from the non-probabilistic part of quantum mechanics and some non-probabilistic axioms of classical decision theory, and hence concludes that no probabilistic axiom is needed. I argue that Deutsch’s derivation begs the question.