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arXiv:quant-ph/9906005

Quantum measurement breaks Lorentz symmetry

Ian Colin Percival

Published Jun 1, 1999• 16 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

Traditionally causes come before effects, but according to modern physics things aren't that simple. Special relativity shows that `before' and `after' are relative, and quantum measurement is even more subtle. Since the nonlocality of Bell's theorem, it has been known that quantum measurement has an uneasy relation with special relativity, described by Shimony as `peaceful coexistence'. Hardy's theorem says that quantum measurement requires a preferred Lorentz frame. The original proofs of the theorem depended on there being no backward causality, even at the quantum level. In quant-ph/9803044 this condition was removed. It was only required that systems with classical inputs and outputs had no causal loops. Here the conditions are weakened further: there should be no forbidden causal loops as defined in the text. The theory depends on a transfer function analysis, which is introduced in detail before application to specific systems.

DOI
10.48550/arxiv.quant-ph/9906005

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Traditionally causes come before effects, but according to modern physics things aren't that simple. Special relativity shows that before' and after' are relative, and quantum measurement is even more subtle. Since the nonlocality of Bell's theorem, it has been known that quantum measurement has an uneasy relation with special relativity, described by Shimony as `peaceful coexistence'. Hardy's theorem says that quantum measurement requires a preferred Lorentz frame. The original proofs of the theorem depended on there being no backward causality, even at the quantum level. In quant-ph/9803044 this condition was removed. It was only required that systems with classical inputs and outputs had no causal loops. Here the conditions are weakened further: there should be no forbidden causal loops as defined in the text. The theory depends on a transfer function analysis, which is introduced in detail before application to specific systems.
I present a thought experiment in quantum mechanics and tease out some of its implications for the doctrine of “peaceful coexistence”, which, following Shimony, I take to be the proposition that quantum mechanics does not force us to revise or abandon the relativistic picture of causality. I criticize the standard arguments in favour of peaceful coexistence on the grounds that they are question‐begging, and suggest that the breakdown of Lorentz‐invariant relativity as a principle theory would be a natural development, given the general trend of physics in this century.
Hardy's theorem states that the hidden variables of any realistic theory of quantum measurement, whose predictions agree with ordinary quantum theory, must have a preferred Lorentz frame. This presents the conflict between special relativity and any realistic dynamics of quantum measurement in a severe form. The conflict is resolved using a ‘measurement field’, which provides a time–like function of space–time points and a definition of simultaneity in the context of a curved space–time. Locally this theory is consistent with special relativity, but globally, special relativity is not enough; the time dilation of general relativity and the standard cosmic time of the Robertson–Walker cosmologies are both essential. A simple but crude example is a relativistic quantum measurement dynamics based on the non–relativistic measurement dynamics of Luders.
It has been debated whether quantum mechanics and special relativity are incompatible and whether there is a preferred Lorentz frame if they are incompatible. Bell's theorem is an important cornerstone, but it does not give us a definite positive answer due to the existence of supplementary assumptions or theoretical loopholes; there are unitary quantum theories which evade Bell's theorem and claim that they are compatible with special relativity. In this paper, I address the important issue of whether unitary quantum theories are compatible with special relativity. I propose a new Gedankenexperiment, a variant of the EPR-Bohm experiment with a superobserver who can undo a measurement. In this experiment, there is a stronger correlation (between the results of two spacelike separated measurements) than the correlation investigated in Bell's theorem. Based on an analysis of the correlations in different Lorentz frames, I prove that unitary single-world theories are incompatible with special relativity, and in order to avoid the incompatibility, there must exist a preferred Lorentz frame in these theories. Moreover, I argue that the incompatibility proof also applies to a proper version of the many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics. This closes the major theoretical loopholes of Bell's theorem, including relationalism, retrocausality, and superdeterminism. Finally, I argue that the stronger correlation found in the Gedankenexperiment cannot be explained by retrocausal processes or even the common causes in the past, but only be explained by nonlocal processes or actions at a distance. This provides a test of unitary quantum theories, as well as a further support for the new incompatibility proof beyond Bell's theorem.
Abstract Although Bell’s theorem tells us that any interpretation of quantum mechanics must fail to satisfy Bell’s locality condition, the question of Lorentz­invariance is apparently left open by Bell’s theorem. In­ deed, it has been argued by many that nonlocality is compatible with Lorentz­invariance, given certain interpretations of the latter, or of the former. Some give a ‘weak’ interpretation of Lorentz­ invariance, compatible with a ‘strong’ violation of locality. For example, Bohm’s (1952) theory violates locality in a way that requires a preferred frame; but empirical Lorentz­invariance is preserved in the Bohm theory ­ there is no experiment that could determine the preferred frame. (See, for example, Valentini (199la,b), Bohm and Hiley (1993), and Cushing (1994).) On the other hand, ‘orthodox’ interpretations of special relativity maintain a notion of ‘fundamental
Thus far I have been primarily concerned with how an interpretation of quantum mechanics might, or might not, be local. This question is traditionally not sharply distinguished from the question of whether quantum mechanics is consistent with the theory of relativity. However, the two questions are indeed quite distinct, and should be recognized as such explicitly. The theory of relativity What does relativity require? As a first approximation, we may make the distinction by noting that the requirements of the theory of relativity are themselves unclear. Minimally, relativity seems to require that there be no way to distinguish one reference frame from another – i.e., that there be no experimental procedure that can determine which of two inertial observers is ‘really’ moving, or more generally that there be no way to discover an observer's absolute velocity. Most authors are willing to find in (special) relativity a stronger requirement: namely, Lorentz-invariance. They say that relativity requires that in fact there is no such thing as absolute velocity. This requirement goes beyond the minimum – it might be that there is an absolute rest frame (so that absolute velocities are given by motion relative to this frame) while there is no way to find it. (As I will discuss in chapter 9, exactly this situation occurs in Bohm's theory.)