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International Studies in the Philosophy of Science

On the edge of a paradigm shift: Quantum nonlocality and the breakdown of peaceful coexistence

Kent A. Peacock

Published Jul 1, 1998• 10 citations
Publisher

Abstract

I present a thought experiment in quantum mechanics and tease out some of its implications for the doctrine of “peaceful coexistence”, which, following Shimony, I take to be the proposition that quantum mechanics does not force us to revise or abandon the relativistic picture of causality. I criticize the standard arguments in favour of peaceful coexistence on the grounds that they are question‐begging, and suggest that the breakdown of Lorentz‐invariant relativity as a principle theory would be a natural development, given the general trend of physics in this century.

DOI
10.1080/02698599808573588

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Traditionally causes come before effects, but according to modern physics things aren't that simple. Special relativity shows that `before' and `after' are relative, and quantum measurement is even more subtle. Since the nonlocality of Bell's theorem, it has been known that quantum measurement has an uneasy relation with special relativity, described by Shimony as `peaceful coexistence'. Hardy's theorem says that quantum measurement requires a preferred Lorentz frame. The original proofs of the theorem depended on there being no backward causality, even at the quantum level. In quant-ph/9803044 this condition was removed. It was only required that systems with classical inputs and outputs had no causal loops. Here the conditions are weakened further: there should be no forbidden causal loops as defined in the text. The theory depends on a transfer function analysis, which is introduced in detail before application to specific systems.

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The theory of relativity is essentially the culmination of classical physics. Although revisions in our concepts of space and time are necessitated by both the special and general theories of relativity, the notion of causality, in which a cause precedes its effect, remains intact in the relativistic formulations of electrodynamics and mechanics and of gravitation. An upper limit is set on the speed of bodies, and of the propagation of energy, and physical quantities are often defined operationally, but once we adjust ourselves to these new rules, our representations of physical processes proceed pretty much as they did in classical physics. On the other hand, quantum theory seems to require a much more profound philosophical revision of our thought patterns. Even the viability of the usual meaning of a causal connection between one event and another is there called into question.

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The present conference takes place in the same year that celebrates the centenary of Albert Einstein. Hence it is a good occasion to reflect on those problems which have been at the core of Einstein’s intellectual activity. Undoubtedly the foundation of quantum mechanics (QM) is one of these problems. It is known that Einstein was never convinced by the interpretation of quantum mechanics accepted, in his times and still now, by the majority of physicists. The fact that he was sharing this skepticism with people like Schrödinger and, most of all, the fact that no convincing answer, to the doubts of these people, had emerged in a more than half a century old debate, helped in keeping alive the attention of a growing number of people on this problem.The crucial issue is that the standard interpretation of QM has some physical implications which are experimentally verifiable and which, for several years, have been thought to be incompatible with relativity theory (the so‐called “quantum nonlocality”). On the other hand alternative, more intuitive, interpretations (such as the ensemble interpretation) seemed to be ruled out from very well confirmed experimental data.The way out from this impasse has required a deep analysis of the connections between mathematics and physics as well as the emergence of new ideas both in mathematics (non‐Kolmogorovian probabilities) and in physics (the theory of adaptive systems).The Einstein centenary is a good occasion for a short survey of these developments with the goal of answering the intriguing question posed in the title of the present paper.

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I present a thought experiment in quantum mechanics and tease out some of its implications for the doctrine of “peaceful coexistence”, which, following Shimony, I take to be the proposition that quantum mechanics does not force us to revise or abandon the relativistic picture of causality. I criticize the standard arguments in favour of peaceful coexistence on the grounds that they are question‐begging, and suggest that the breakdown of Lorentz‐invariant relativity as a principle theory would be a natural development, given the general trend of physics in this century.
Traditionally causes come before effects, but according to modern physics things aren't that simple. Special relativity shows that `before' and `after' are relative, and quantum measurement is even more subtle. Since the nonlocality of Bell's theorem, it has been known that quantum measurement has an uneasy relation with special relativity, described by Shimony as `peaceful coexistence'. Hardy's theorem says that quantum measurement requires a preferred Lorentz frame. The original proofs of the theorem depended on there being no backward causality, even at the quantum level. In quant-ph/9803044 this condition was removed. It was only required that systems with classical inputs and outputs had no causal loops. Here the conditions are weakened further: there should be no forbidden causal loops as defined in the text. The theory depends on a transfer function analysis, which is introduced in detail before application to specific systems.
We provide a new formulation of the Local Friendliness no-go theorem of Bong et al. [Nat. Phys. 16, 1199 (2020)] from fundamental causal principles, providing another perspective on how it puts strictly stronger bounds on quantum reality than Bell's theorem. In particular, quantum causal models have been proposed as a way to maintain a peaceful coexistence between quantum mechanics and relativistic causality while respecting Leibniz's methodological principle. This works for Bell's theorem but does not work for the Local Friendliness no-go theorem, which considers an extended Wigner's Friend scenario. More radical conceptual renewal is required; we suggest that cleaving to Leibniz's principle requires extending relativity to events themselves.
On the Limits of “Undecidability”: Quantum Physics, Deconstruction, and Anti-realism Christopher Norris (bio) I Philosophers of science have responded in various ways to the conceptual and interpretative problems thrown up by quantum mechanics. These problems emerged a century ago from Planck’s researches into black-body radiation and have scarcely been resolved—rather, if anything, deepened and complicated—by the intensive debate that has surrounded them since that time.1 For some theorists, the resultant dilemmas (of observer “interference,” wave/particle dualism, quantum superposition, nonlocal causality, superluminal [faster-than-light] propagation, etc.) are such as to entail drastic revisions to our very idea of the physical world as existing and exerting its causal powers quite apart from our current best theories or investigative methods.2 For others again, quantum mechanics just is the best theory currently available, whatever the problems that it happens to create for our normal habits of logical thought or consistent reasoning on the evidence. Thus logic itself may have to be revised—right down to putative “laws of thought” such as noncontradiction and excluded middle—if these turn out to conflict with the results of quantum-mechanical theory or experiment.3 This is the view taken by Hilary Putnam in his writings on quantum logic and also by others, von Neumann among them, for whom the working rule in any such trade-off is to keep the physics as simple as possible even if the result is to complicate logic by introducing values other than those of determinate (bivalent) truth or falsehood.4 Very often it consorts with the argument that if quantum mechanics is right—at any rate on the standard Copenhagen interpretation—then we had best give up any hope of retaining a “classical” Einsteinian ontology, that is to say, a Lorentz-invariant account of space-time coordinates where the speed of light is the limiting value for assignments of position, velocity, and causal propagation.5 Hence Einstein’s famous series of debates with Niels Bohr when he devised a whole range of increasingly elaborate thought-experiments designed to prove that the quantum-mechnical description of reality had to be in some way “incomplete,” or not to have reckoned with some crucial factor that would bring it into line with logical reasoning and a causal-realist ontology. For on Einstein’s view there was simply no room in science for a theory—such as Bohr’s—that involved either the suspension of classical truth/falsehood [End Page 407] values or the idea of some “spooky action-at-a-distance” which contravened both commonsense realism and the requirements of Special Relativity.6 However it is Bohr who is generally thought to have carried the day in these debates. In which case—so it is argued—we are left with a choice between three possible “solutions.” These are (1) the hypothesis that quantum mechanics is “incomplete” or open to an alternative (“hidden-variables”) interpretation;7 (2) the adoption of an alternative (many-valued or non-bivalent) quantum logic that effectively conjures such problems away;8 or (3) the conclusion that realism may have to be abandoned in favour of some radically different ontology or worldview which counts this a price worth paying in order to conserve the predictive power of the standard quantum formalisms.9 On option (3) there is a further choice of interpretative views according to the theorist’s preferred choice between the various models (or possible-world scenarios) currently on offer. Thus the model may be one that embraces nonlocal simultaneous particle interaction, or which gives up space-time covariance (relative to the speed of light) as required by Einstein’s Special Theory. Or again it may be one that somehow envisions—strangest of all—the splitting-off of multiple coexistent but non-interacting “worlds” whenever the wave-packet collapses or whenever an act of measurement is performed upon any such quantum-system whose properties must be thought of as strictly indeterminate until that moment.10 For, according to its partisans, this theory is the most economical—i.e., involves least conflict with the standard quantum formalisms—despite its baroque proliferation of alternative worlds and its well-nigh unthinkable implications when applied...
The theory of relativity is essentially the culmination of classical physics. Although revisions in our concepts of space and time are necessitated by both the special and general theories of relativity, the notion of causality, in which a cause precedes its effect, remains intact in the relativistic formulations of electrodynamics and mechanics and of gravitation. An upper limit is set on the speed of bodies, and of the propagation of energy, and physical quantities are often defined operationally, but once we adjust ourselves to these new rules, our representations of physical processes proceed pretty much as they did in classical physics. On the other hand, quantum theory seems to require a much more profound philosophical revision of our thought patterns. Even the viability of the usual meaning of a causal connection between one event and another is there called into question.
The present conference takes place in the same year that celebrates the centenary of Albert Einstein. Hence it is a good occasion to reflect on those problems which have been at the core of Einstein’s intellectual activity. Undoubtedly the foundation of quantum mechanics (QM) is one of these problems. It is known that Einstein was never convinced by the interpretation of quantum mechanics accepted, in his times and still now, by the majority of physicists. The fact that he was sharing this skepticism with people like Schrödinger and, most of all, the fact that no convincing answer, to the doubts of these people, had emerged in a more than half a century old debate, helped in keeping alive the attention of a growing number of people on this problem.The crucial issue is that the standard interpretation of QM has some physical implications which are experimentally verifiable and which, for several years, have been thought to be incompatible with relativity theory (the so‐called “quantum nonlocality”). On the other hand alternative, more intuitive, interpretations (such as the ensemble interpretation) seemed to be ruled out from very well confirmed experimental data.The way out from this impasse has required a deep analysis of the connections between mathematics and physics as well as the emergence of new ideas both in mathematics (non‐Kolmogorovian probabilities) and in physics (the theory of adaptive systems).The Einstein centenary is a good occasion for a short survey of these developments with the goal of answering the intriguing question posed in the title of the present paper.