Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Log inSign up
Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Blog
Job Board
Q3AS

© 2026 Aqora Quantum S.A.S.

TermsPrivacyLegal Notice

arXiv:quant-ph/9904081

Quantum mechanics and elements of reality

Ulrich Mohrhoff

Published Apr 26, 1999• 5 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

It is widely accepted that a Born probability of 1 is sufficient for the existence of a corresponding element of reality. Recently Vaidman has extended this idea to the ABL probabilities of the time-symmetrized version of quantum mechanics originated by Aharonov, Bergmann, and Lebowitz. Several authors have objected to Vaidman's time-symmetrized elements of reality without casting doubt on the widely accepted sufficiency condition for `ordinary' elements of reality. In this paper I show that while the proper truth condition for a quantum counterfactual is an ABL probability of 1, neither a Born probability of 1 nor an ABL probability of 1 is sufficient for the existence of an element of reality. The reason this is so is that the contingent properties of quantum-mechanical systems are extrinsic. To obtain this result, I need to discuss objective probabilities, retroactive causality, and the objectivity or otherwise of the psychological arrow of time. One consequence of the extrinsic nature of quantum-mechanical properties is that quantum mechanics presupposes property-defining actual events (or states of affairs) and therefore cannot be called upon to account for their occurrence (existence). Neither these events nor the correlations between them are capable of explanation, the former because they are causal primaries, the latter because they are fundamental: there are no underlying causal processes. Causal connections are something we project onto the statistical correlations, and this works only to the extent that statistical variations can be ignored. There are nevertheless important conclusions to be drawn from the quantum-mechanical correlations, such as the spatial nonseparability of the world.

DOI
10.48550/arxiv.quant-ph/9904081

Related papers

What quantum mechanics is trying to tell us

Ulrich Mohrhoff

This article presents a novel interpretation of quantum mechanics. It extends the meaning of “measurement” to include all property-indicating facts. Intrinsically, space is undifferentiated: There are no points on which a world of locally instantiated physical properties could be built. Instead, reality is built on facts, in the sense that the properties of things are extrinsic, or supervenient on property-indicating facts. The actual extent to which the world is spatially and temporally differentiated (that is, the extent to which spatiotemporal relations and distinctions are warranted by the facts) is necessarily limited. Notwithstanding that the state vector does nothing but assign probabilities, quantum mechanics affords a complete understanding of the actual world. If there is anything that is incomplete, it is the actual world, but its incompleteness exists only in relation to a conceptual framework that is more detailed than the actual world. Two deep-seated misconceptions are responsible for the interpretational difficulties associated with quantum mechanics: the notion that the spatial and temporal aspects of the world are adequately represented by sets with the cardinality of the real numbers, and the notion of an instantaneous state that evolves in time. The latter is an unwarranted (in fact, incoherent) projection of our apparent “motion in time” into the world of physics. Equally unwarranted, at bottom, is the use of causal concepts. There nevertheless exists a “classical” domain in which language suggestive of nomological necessity may be used. Quantum mechanics not only is strictly consistent with the existence of this domain but also presupposes it in several ways.

arXiv:quant-ph/9903051•American Journal of Physics•Aug 1, 2000•41 citations

Quantum Physics and Reality

Rudolf Haag

Abstract Apparent paradoxes in Quantum Physics demand a sharp distinction between a "real part of the world" and the realm of possibilities. In the former we may distinguish individual elements (coarse events) relating to space-time, with causal connections between them respecting the relativistic locality principle. The latter, quantitatively described by probability assignments conditioned on existing facts and depending on the definition of equivalence classes of situations, cannot be subdivided in space-time categories. There are global correlations (Pauli principle...). The cut between the realms of facts and possibilities implies an evolutionary picture of the "real world" in which the (generalized) arrow of time assumes basic significance. Some deficiencies of existing theory are pointed out.

Zeitschrift für Naturforschung A•Feb 1, 2001•3 citations

THIS ELUSIVE OBJECTIVE EXISTENCE

Ulrich Mohrhoff

Zurek's existential interpretation of quantum mechanics suffers from three classical prejudices, including the belief that space and time are intrinsically and infinitely differentiated. These compel him to relativize the concept of objective existence in two ways. The elimination of these prejudices makes it possible to recognize the quantum formalism's ontological implications — the relative and contingent reality of spatiotemporal distinctions and the extrinsic and finite spatiotemporal differentiation of the physical world — which in turn makes it possible to arrive at an unqualified objective existence. Contrary to a widespread misconception, viewing the quantum formalism as being fundamentally a probability algorithm does not imply that quantum mechanics is concerned with states of knowledge rather than states of Nature. On the contrary, it makes possible a complete and strongly objective description of the physical world that requires no reference to observers. What objectively exists, in a sense that requires no qualification, is (i) the trajectories of macroscopic objects, whose fuzziness is empirically irrelevant, (ii) the properties and values of whose possession these trajectories provide indelible records, and (iii) the fuzzy and temporally undifferentiated states of affairs that obtain between measurements and are described by counterfactual probability assignments.

arXiv:quant-ph/0401179•International Journal of Quantum Information•Jun 1, 2004•10 citations

Objective probabilities, quantum counterfactuals, and the ABL rule: Apropos of Kastner's comment

Ulrich Mohrhoff

The ABL rule is derived and shown to be a tool of standard quantum mechanics. Objections by Kastner [quant-ph/0003098v3] and others to the counterfactual use of the ABL rule are shown to be groundless. In particular, this use is not restricted in the way Kastner has claimed. A variant of the three-box experiment due to Vaidman is discussed. It is argued that Born probabilities (and hence state vectors or density operators) are not the right basis for drawing ontological inferences. What quantum mechanics is trying to tell us about the world must be inferred from the objective ABL probabilities that are assigned to counterfactuals. The correct inferences, however, will remain incomprensible until a prevalent but inconsistent way of thinking about the temporal aspect of the world is rejected.

arXiv:quant-ph/0006116•Jun 26, 2000•0 citations

Hidden Determinism, Probability, and Time's Arrow

Hans Primas

In present-day physics the fundamental dynamical laws are taken as a time-translation-invariant and time-reversal-invariant one-parameter groups of automorphisms of the underlying mathematical structure. In this context-independent and empirically inaccessible description there is no past, present or future, hence no distinction between cause and effect. To get the familiar description in terms of causes and effects, the time-reversal symmetry of the fundamental dynamics has to be broken. Thereby one gets two representations, one satisfying the generally accepted rules of retarded causality (no effect can precede its cause). The other one describes the strange rules of advanced causality. For entangled (but not necessarily interacting) quantum systems the arrow of time must have the same direction for all subsystems. But for classical systems, or for classical subsystems of quantum systems, this argument does not hold. As a cosequence, classical systems allow the conceptual possibility of advanced causality in addition to retarded causality. Every mathematically formulated dynamics of statistically reproducible events can be extended to a description in terms of a one-parameter group of automorphisms of an enlarged mathematical structure which describes a fictitious hidden determinism. Consequently, randomness in the sense of mathematical probability theory is only a weak generalization of determinism. The popular ideas that in quantum theory there are gaps in the causal chain which allow the accommodation of the freedom of human action are fantasies which have no basis in present-day quantum mechanics. Quantum events are governed by strict statistical laws. Freedom of action is a constitutive necessity of all experimental science which requires a violation of the statistical predictions of physics. We conclude that the presently adopted first principles of theoretical physics can neither explain the autonomy of the psyche nor account for the freedom of action necessary for experimental science.

•Jan 1, 2002•15 citations

Physical Reality and Information - Three Hypotheses

Gerd Niestegge

Since its emergence, quantum mechanics has been a challenge for an understanding of reality which is based on our intuition in a classical world. Nevertheless, it has often been tried to impose this understanding of reality on quantum theory - with limited success. Instead, it might be a better alternative to redefine the meaning of physical reality. This is the objective of the paper. A consideration of the quantum measurement process, conditional probabilities and some well-known typical quantum physical experiments provides the reasoning for the following three hypotheses: (1) Prior to a first measurement, a physical system is not in a quantum state. (2) Physical reality is all that and only that about which (classical) information is available in the universe. (3) Information creation is an independent process and is not covered by the Schroedinger equation. It is the first step of the quantum measurement process and does not have a classical counterpart. The first hypothesis makes sense only if the quantum measurement process can be described without presupposing an initial state for the system under consideration. This becomes possible by the objective conditional probabilities which represent the transition probabilities between the outcomes of successive quantum measurements and have been introduced by the author in some recent papers. The second hypothesis holds as well in the classical case, but a certain incompleteness of reality is typical of quantum mechanics and the origin of many quantum phenomena. Classically, the existence of a complete reality is presumed, and hypothesis 3 has no meaning then.

arXiv:1003.2379•Mar 11, 2010•1 citation
It is widely accepted that a Born probability of 1 is sufficient for the existence of a corresponding element of reality. Recently Vaidman has extended this idea to the ABL probabilities of the time-symmetrized version of quantum mechanics originated by Aharonov, Bergmann, and Lebowitz. Several authors have objected to Vaidman's time-symmetrized elements of reality without casting doubt on the widely accepted sufficiency condition for `ordinary' elements of reality. In this paper I show that while the proper truth condition for a quantum counterfactual is an ABL probability of 1, neither a Born probability of 1 nor an ABL probability of 1 is sufficient for the existence of an element of reality. The reason this is so is that the contingent properties of quantum-mechanical systems are extrinsic. To obtain this result, I need to discuss objective probabilities, retroactive causality, and the objectivity or otherwise of the psychological arrow of time. One consequence of the extrinsic nature of quantum-mechanical properties is that quantum mechanics presupposes property-defining actual events (or states of affairs) and therefore cannot be called upon to account for their occurrence (existence). Neither these events nor the correlations between them are capable of explanation, the former because they are causal primaries, the latter because they are fundamental: there are no underlying causal processes. Causal connections are something we project onto the statistical correlations, and this works only to the extent that statistical variations can be ignored. There are nevertheless important conclusions to be drawn from the quantum-mechanical correlations, such as the spatial nonseparability of the world.
This article presents a novel interpretation of quantum mechanics. It extends the meaning of “measurement” to include all property-indicating facts. Intrinsically, space is undifferentiated: There are no points on which a world of locally instantiated physical properties could be built. Instead, reality is built on facts, in the sense that the properties of things are extrinsic, or supervenient on property-indicating facts. The actual extent to which the world is spatially and temporally differentiated (that is, the extent to which spatiotemporal relations and distinctions are warranted by the facts) is necessarily limited. Notwithstanding that the state vector does nothing but assign probabilities, quantum mechanics affords a complete understanding of the actual world. If there is anything that is incomplete, it is the actual world, but its incompleteness exists only in relation to a conceptual framework that is more detailed than the actual world. Two deep-seated misconceptions are responsible for the interpretational difficulties associated with quantum mechanics: the notion that the spatial and temporal aspects of the world are adequately represented by sets with the cardinality of the real numbers, and the notion of an instantaneous state that evolves in time. The latter is an unwarranted (in fact, incoherent) projection of our apparent “motion in time” into the world of physics. Equally unwarranted, at bottom, is the use of causal concepts. There nevertheless exists a “classical” domain in which language suggestive of nomological necessity may be used. Quantum mechanics not only is strictly consistent with the existence of this domain but also presupposes it in several ways.
Abstract Apparent paradoxes in Quantum Physics demand a sharp distinction between a "real part of the world" and the realm of possibilities. In the former we may distinguish individual elements (coarse events) relating to space-time, with causal connections between them respecting the relativistic locality principle. The latter, quantitatively described by probability assignments conditioned on existing facts and depending on the definition of equivalence classes of situations, cannot be subdivided in space-time categories. There are global correlations (Pauli principle...). The cut between the realms of facts and possibilities implies an evolutionary picture of the "real world" in which the (generalized) arrow of time assumes basic significance. Some deficiencies of existing theory are pointed out.
Zurek's existential interpretation of quantum mechanics suffers from three classical prejudices, including the belief that space and time are intrinsically and infinitely differentiated. These compel him to relativize the concept of objective existence in two ways. The elimination of these prejudices makes it possible to recognize the quantum formalism's ontological implications — the relative and contingent reality of spatiotemporal distinctions and the extrinsic and finite spatiotemporal differentiation of the physical world — which in turn makes it possible to arrive at an unqualified objective existence. Contrary to a widespread misconception, viewing the quantum formalism as being fundamentally a probability algorithm does not imply that quantum mechanics is concerned with states of knowledge rather than states of Nature. On the contrary, it makes possible a complete and strongly objective description of the physical world that requires no reference to observers. What objectively exists, in a sense that requires no qualification, is (i) the trajectories of macroscopic objects, whose fuzziness is empirically irrelevant, (ii) the properties and values of whose possession these trajectories provide indelible records, and (iii) the fuzzy and temporally undifferentiated states of affairs that obtain between measurements and are described by counterfactual probability assignments.
The ABL rule is derived and shown to be a tool of standard quantum mechanics. Objections by Kastner [quant-ph/0003098v3] and others to the counterfactual use of the ABL rule are shown to be groundless. In particular, this use is not restricted in the way Kastner has claimed. A variant of the three-box experiment due to Vaidman is discussed. It is argued that Born probabilities (and hence state vectors or density operators) are not the right basis for drawing ontological inferences. What quantum mechanics is trying to tell us about the world must be inferred from the objective ABL probabilities that are assigned to counterfactuals. The correct inferences, however, will remain incomprensible until a prevalent but inconsistent way of thinking about the temporal aspect of the world is rejected.
In present-day physics the fundamental dynamical laws are taken as a time-translation-invariant and time-reversal-invariant one-parameter groups of automorphisms of the underlying mathematical structure. In this context-independent and empirically inaccessible description there is no past, present or future, hence no distinction between cause and effect. To get the familiar description in terms of causes and effects, the time-reversal symmetry of the fundamental dynamics has to be broken. Thereby one gets two representations, one satisfying the generally accepted rules of retarded causality (no effect can precede its cause). The other one describes the strange rules of advanced causality. For entangled (but not necessarily interacting) quantum systems the arrow of time must have the same direction for all subsystems. But for classical systems, or for classical subsystems of quantum systems, this argument does not hold. As a cosequence, classical systems allow the conceptual possibility of advanced causality in addition to retarded causality. Every mathematically formulated dynamics of statistically reproducible events can be extended to a description in terms of a one-parameter group of automorphisms of an enlarged mathematical structure which describes a fictitious hidden determinism. Consequently, randomness in the sense of mathematical probability theory is only a weak generalization of determinism. The popular ideas that in quantum theory there are gaps in the causal chain which allow the accommodation of the freedom of human action are fantasies which have no basis in present-day quantum mechanics. Quantum events are governed by strict statistical laws. Freedom of action is a constitutive necessity of all experimental science which requires a violation of the statistical predictions of physics. We conclude that the presently adopted first principles of theoretical physics can neither explain the autonomy of the psyche nor account for the freedom of action necessary for experimental science.
Since its emergence, quantum mechanics has been a challenge for an understanding of reality which is based on our intuition in a classical world. Nevertheless, it has often been tried to impose this understanding of reality on quantum theory - with limited success. Instead, it might be a better alternative to redefine the meaning of physical reality. This is the objective of the paper. A consideration of the quantum measurement process, conditional probabilities and some well-known typical quantum physical experiments provides the reasoning for the following three hypotheses: (1) Prior to a first measurement, a physical system is not in a quantum state. (2) Physical reality is all that and only that about which (classical) information is available in the universe. (3) Information creation is an independent process and is not covered by the Schroedinger equation. It is the first step of the quantum measurement process and does not have a classical counterpart. The first hypothesis makes sense only if the quantum measurement process can be described without presupposing an initial state for the system under consideration. This becomes possible by the objective conditional probabilities which represent the transition probabilities between the outcomes of successive quantum measurements and have been introduced by the author in some recent papers. The second hypothesis holds as well in the classical case, but a certain incompleteness of reality is typical of quantum mechanics and the origin of many quantum phenomena. Classically, the existence of a complete reality is presumed, and hypothesis 3 has no meaning then.