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arXiv:quant-ph/0512021 · Physical Review Letters

Small Accessible Quantum Information Does Not Imply Security

Robert König, Renato Renner, Andor Bariska, Ueli M. Maurer

Published Apr 3, 2007• 144 citations
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Abstract

The security of quantum key distribution is typically defined in terms of the mutual information between the distributed key S and the outcome of an optimal measurement applied to the adversary's system. We show that even if this so-called accessible information is small, the key S might not be secure enough to be used in applications such as one-time pad encryption. This flaw is due to a locking property of the accessible information: one additional (physical) bit of information can increase the accessible information by more than one bit.

DOI
10.1103/physrevlett.98.140502

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The security of quantum key distribution is typically defined in terms of the mutual information between the distributed key S and the outcome of an optimal measurement applied to the adversary's system. We show that even if this so-called accessible information is small, the key S might not be secure enough to be used in applications such as one-time pad encryption. This flaw is due to a locking property of the accessible information: one additional (physical) bit of information can increase the accessible information by more than one bit.
Quantum data locking is a protocol that allows for a small secret key to (un)lock an exponentially larger amount of information, hence yielding the strongest violation of the classical one-time pad encryption in the quantum setting. This violation mirrors a large gap existing between two security criteria for quantum cryptography quantified by two entropic quantities: the Holevo information and the accessible information. We show that the latter becomes a sensible security criterion if an upper bound on the coherence time of the eavesdropper's quantum memory is known. Under this condition, we introduce a protocol for secret key generation through a memoryless qudit channel. For channels with enough symmetry, such as the d-dimensional erasure and depolarizing channels, this protocol allows secret key generation at an asymptotic rate as high as the classical capacity minus one bit.
The problem of security of quantum key protocols is examined. In addition to the distribution of classical keys, the problem of encrypting quantum data and the structure of the operators which perform quantum encryption is studied. It is found that unitary bases are central to both encryption of quantum information, as well as the generation of states used in generalized quantum key distribution (which are called mutually unbiased bases). A one-to-one correspondence between certain unitary bases and mutually unbiased bases is found. Finally, a new protocol for making anonymous classical broadcasts is given along with a security proof. An experimental procedure to implement this protocol is also given. In order to prove these new results, some new bounds for accessible information of quantum sources are obtained.
Alice and Bob share a correlated composite quantum system ABABAB. If ABABAB is used as the key for a one-time pad cryptographic system, we show that the maximum amount of information that Alice can send securely to Bob is the quantum mutual information of ABABAB.
Using quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols, a secret key is created between two distant users (transmitter and receiver) at a particular key rate. Quantum technology can facilitate secure communication for cryptographic applications, combining QKD with one-time-pad (OTP) encryption. In order to ensure the continuous operation of QKD in real-world networks, efforts have been concentrated on optimizing the use of experimental components and effective QKD protocols to improve secret key rates and increase the transmission between multiple users. Generally, in experimental implementations, the secret key rates are limited by single-photon detectors, which are used at the receivers of QKD and create a bottleneck due to their limited detection rates (detectors with low detection efficiency and high detector dead-time). We experimentally show that secret key rates can be increased by combining the time-bin information of two such detectors on the data line of the receiver for the coherent-one-way (COW) QKD protocol with a minimal increase in quantum bit error rate (QBER, the proportion of erroneous bits). Further, we implement a point-to-multipoint COW QKD protocol, introducing an additional receiver module. The three users (one transmitter and two receivers) share the secret key in post-processing, relying on OTP encryption. Typically, the dual-receiver extension can improve the combined secret key rates of the system; however, one has to optimise the experimental parameters to achieve this within security margins. These methods are general and can be applied to any implementation of the COW protocol.
Summary form only given. Quantum information theory suggests the possibility of accomplishing tasks that are beyond the capability of classical computer science, such as information-secure cryptographic key distribution. The lack of security proofs for standard (secret- and public-) key distribution schemes, and the insecurity of the most widely used classical schemes (such as RSA and PGP) against "quantum attacks" emphasises the need for information-secure key distribution. We provide a thorough investigation of security issues for practical quantum key distribution, taking into account channel losses, and a realistic detection process.
We introduce the Quantum Computational Timelock (QCT) model, combining time-lock encryption with a quantitative noisy-quantum-storage assumption. Time-lock encryption gives Bob immediate access to the encoding seed and gives Eve the same final information as access to that seed only after a protected interval. Eve may then process her retained information without computational restriction. We state this delayed-access encryption assumption explicitly and construct MUB-QCT from a complete set of mutually unbiased bases in dimension ddd and an affine pair-wise independent permutation family. For single-copy encoding, every seed-independent immediate measurement has trace-distance advantage at most 1/(2d+1)1/(2\sqrt{d+1})1/(2d+1​) and mutual information at most 1/(d+1)1/(d+1)1/(d+1). Effective residual storage at diamond distance at most δδδ from replacement adds at most δδδ to the individual-attack distinguishing bound. Under i.i.d. individual attacks and entropy-preserving acceptance, we obtain an asymptotic key-rate bound and formulate final-key secrecy in composable trace distance. For mmm independently randomized signals sharing one bit and seed, the optimal leakage under non-adaptive product measurements is min⁡{1,m/(d+1)}\min\{1,m/(d+1)\}min{1,m/(d+1)}, allowing a linear-in-ddd detection enhancement in that attack model. We also construct a seed-independent joint measurement that recovers the bit after disclosure with error at most ε\varepsilonε from O(log⁡d+log⁡(1/ε))O(\log d+\log(1/\varepsilon))O(logd+log(1/ε)) signals, retaining only classical information after measurement. This gives a quantitative separation between product and joint measurements. Bob uses two logical detection outcomes independently of ddd.