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arXiv:2004.10173

Everlasting secure key agreement from a quantum computational hybrid security model

Nilesh Vyas, Romain Alleaume

quant-phSubmitted Apr 21, 2020• Announced Apr 22, 2020• 12 citations• Revised Nov 3, 2026 (v2)
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Abstract

We introduce the Quantum Computational Timelock (QCT) model, combining time-lock encryption with a quantitative noisy-quantum-storage assumption. Time-lock encryption gives Bob immediate access to the encoding seed and gives Eve the same final information as access to that seed only after a protected interval. Eve may then process her retained information without computational restriction. We state this delayed-access encryption assumption explicitly and construct MUB-QCT from a complete set of mutually unbiased bases in dimension $d$ and an affine pair-wise independent permutation family. For single-copy encoding, every seed-independent immediate measurement has trace-distance advantage at most $1/(2\sqrt{d+1})$ and mutual information at most $1/(d+1)$. Effective residual storage at diamond distance at most $δ$ from replacement adds at most $δ$ to the individual-attack distinguishing bound. Under i.i.d. individual attacks and entropy-preserving acceptance, we obtain an asymptotic key-rate bound and formulate final-key secrecy in composable trace distance. For $m$ independently randomized signals sharing one bit and seed, the optimal leakage under non-adaptive product measurements is $\min\{1,m/(d+1)\}$, allowing a linear-in-$d$ detection enhancement in that attack model. We also construct a seed-independent joint measurement that recovers the bit after disclosure with error at most $\varepsilon$ from $O(\log d+\log(1/\varepsilon))$ signals, retaining only classical information after measurement. This gives a quantitative separation between product and joint measurements. Bob uses two logical detection outcomes independently of $d$.

DOI
10.48550/arxiv.2004.10173
Comments
(Revised version) 41 pages, 3 figures, Comments Welcome

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We introduce the Quantum Computational Timelock (QCT) model, combining time-lock encryption with a quantitative noisy-quantum-storage assumption. Time-lock encryption gives Bob immediate access to the encoding seed and gives Eve the same final information as access to that seed only after a protected interval. Eve may then process her retained information without computational restriction. We state this delayed-access encryption assumption explicitly and construct MUB-QCT from a complete set of mutually unbiased bases in dimension ddd and an affine pair-wise independent permutation family.
For single-copy encoding, every seed-independent immediate measurement has trace-distance advantage at most 1/(2d+1)1/(2\sqrt{d+1})1/(2d+1​) and mutual information at most 1/(d+1)1/(d+1)1/(d+1). Effective residual storage at diamond distance at most δδδ from replacement adds at most δδδ to the individual-attack distinguishing bound. Under i.i.d. individual attacks and entropy-preserving acceptance, we obtain an asymptotic key-rate bound and formulate final-key secrecy in composable trace distance.
For mmm independently randomized signals sharing one bit and seed, the optimal leakage under non-adaptive product measurements is min⁡{1,m/(d+1)}\min\{1,m/(d+1)\}min{1,m/(d+1)}, allowing a linear-in-ddd detection enhancement in that attack model. We also construct a seed-independent joint measurement that recovers the bit after disclosure with error at most ε\varepsilonε from O(log⁡d+log⁡(1/ε))O(\log d+\log(1/\varepsilon))O(logd+log(1/ε)) signals, retaining only classical information after measurement. This gives a quantitative separation between product and joint measurements. Bob uses two logical detection outcomes independently of ddd.
We introduce an explicit construction for a key distribution protocol in the Quantum Computational Timelock (QCT) security model, where one assumes that computationally secure encryption may only be broken after a time much longer than the coherence time of available quantum memories.Taking advantage of the QCT assumptions, we build a key distribution protocol called HM-QCT from the Hidden Matching problem for which there exists an exponential gap in one-way communication complexity between classical and quantum strategies.We establish that the security of HM-QCT against arbitrary i.i.d. attacks can be reduced to the difficulty of solving the underlying Hidden Matching problem with classical information. Legitimate users, on the other hand, can use quantum communication, which gives them the possibility of sending multiple copies of the same quantum state while retaining an information advantage. This leads to an everlasting secure key distribution scheme over n bosonic modes. Such a level of security is unattainable with purely classical techniques. Remarkably, the scheme remains secure with up to O ( n log ⁡ ( n ) ) input photons for each channel use, extending the functionalities and potentially outperforming QKD rates by several orders of magnitudes.
The HM-QCT protocol, presented by Mazzoncini et al. in 2025, uses a unique feature of quantum information to achieve quantum key distribution (QKD) with secret-key rates beyond standard constructions. The protocol has been designed in the hybrid quantum-computational time-lock (QCT) security model which imposes two independent (but related) restrictions on the attacker: (1) a computationally secure encryption scheme which a successful attacker must break within a narrow timeframe and (2) an assumption that the attacker can only store quantum information with low fidelity. We first review the protocol and its two-assumption model by presenting, in explicit form, the two natural "harvest now, decrypt later" strategies against it, one using quantum memory and one using classical memory. We show how each is excluded by exactly one of the two assumptions, so that harvesting resistance rests on their conjunction and on the presumed existence of a technological gap: the adversary's quantum memory must decohere much faster than the time it takes to break the short-term encryption. Finally, we introduce HM-PRF , a variant that replaces the short-term encryption with a pseudorandom function (PRF) , evaluated locally. By eliminating the transmission of enciphered classical information, the adversary does not need to race an impending expiry event. We compare the security of our construction against the original and argue that our PRF-based assumption yields a more realistic adversary. It simply requires the existence of one-way functions rather than a predicted lasting limitation of quantum computation and memory technology.
A time-lock puzzle allows a sender to hide a message in a puzzle such that recovering the message requires substantially more sequential computation than the time required to generate the puzzle, even when parallel computation is allowed. Applications of time-lock puzzles include timed-release encryption, sealed-bid auctions, electronic voting, fair contract signing, coin flipping, and Byzantine consensus. However, time-lock puzzles are known to be impossible in the classical random oracle model. To overcome the classical barrier, in this work we consider quantum time-lock puzzles, in which the puzzle itself is a quantum state. Our construction in the quantum random oracle model achieves generation in one oracle round, solving in at most TTT oracle rounds, and security against polynomial-width quantum adversaries of depth o(T)o(T)o(T) for every polynomially bounded delay T=T(λ)T=T(λ)T=T(λ), resolving an open problem posed by Mahmoody, Moran, and Vadhan (2011).
Quantum cryptography shows that one can guarantee the secrecy of correlation on the sole basis of the laws of physics, that is, without limiting the computational power of the eavesdropper. The usual security proofs suppose that the authorized partners, Alice and Bob, have a perfect knowledge and control of their quantum systems and devices; for instance, they must be sure that the logical bits have been encoded in true qubits and not in higher dimensional systems. In this paper, we present an approach that circumvents this strong assumption. We define protocols, both for the case of bits and for generic ddd-dimensional outcomes, in which the security is guaranteed by the very structure of the Alice-Bob correlations, under the no-signaling condition. The idea is that if the correlations cannot be produced by shared randomness, then Eve has poor knowledge of Alice's and Bob's symbols. The present study assumes on the one hand that the eavesdropper Eve performs only individual attacks (this is a limitation to be removed in further work), and on the other hand that Eve can distribute any correlation compatible with the no-signaling condition (in this sense her power is greater than what quantum physics allows). Under these assumptions, we prove that the protocols defined here allow extracting secrecy from noisy correlations, when these correlations violate a Bell-type inequality by a sufficiently large amount. The region in which secrecy extraction is possible extends within the region of correlations achievable by measurements on entangled quantum states.
It is known that the maximum classical mutual information, which can be achieved between measurements on pairs of quantum systems, can drastically underestimate the quantum mutual information between them. In this article, we quantify this distinction between classical and quantum information by demonstrating that after removing a logarithmic-sized quantum system from one half of a pair of perfectly correlated bitstrings, even the most sensitive pair of measurements might yield only outcomes essentially independent of each other. This effect is a form of information locking but the definition we use is strictly stronger than those used previously. Moreover, we find that this property is generic, in the sense that it occurs when removing a random subsystem. As such, the effect might be relevant to statistical mechanics or black hole physics. While previous works had always assumed a uniform message, we assume only a min-entropy bound and also explore the effect of entanglement. We find that classical information is strongly locked almost until it can be completely decoded. Finally, we exhibit a quantum key distribution protocol that is 'secure' in the sense of accessible information but in which leakage of even a logarithmic number of bits compromises the secrecy of all others.
For classical--quantum wiretap channels with a transitive covariant input action, both output ensembles admit a description as unitary group orbits of fixed seed states. We use this structure to construct finite-block preprocessing schemes whose private information is an entropy difference evaluated at two distributions related by group convolution. Applying the construction to product groups allows correlations across any fixed number of channel uses. We give a sufficient condition for the associated uniform-input bound to equal the single-use private information. Constant-composition channel codes and universal2_22​ hashing achieve the resulting rates, with trace-distance leakage controlled by sandwiched Rényi information. For uniform outer randomization, the representation structure reduces the comparison-state optimization to Eve's invariant states. For the hybrid binary channel considered by Tikku, Berta and Renes, numerical optimization at three and four uses gives rates above our numerical estimate of the optimized noisy-repetition benchmark wherever that estimate is positive on the tested grid. The improvement comes from noise distributions beyond the family of independent physical flips and a symmetric logical flip. We also prove nonadditivity at an explicit channel parameter using a two-use encoder, an analytic single-use converse, and certified entropy bounds. Finally, we relate the hybrid model to binary phase-shift keying with a fixed receiver measurement.