Probabilistic models (developped by workers such as Boltzmann, on foundations due to pioneers such as Bayes) were commonly regarded merely as approximations to a deterministic reality before the roles were reversed by the quantum revolution (under the leadership of Heisenberg and Dirac) whereby it was the deterministic description that was reduced to the status of an approximation, while the role of the observer became particularly prominent. The concomitant problem of lack of objectivity in the original Copenhagen interpretation has not been satisfactorily resolved in newer approaches of the kind pioneered by Everett. The deficiency of such interpretations is attributable to failure to allow for the anthropic aspect of the problem, meaning {\it a priori} uncertainty about the identity of the observer. The required reconciliation of subjectivity with objectivity is achieved here by distinguishing the concept of an observer from that of a perceptor, whose chances of identification with a particular observer need to be prescribed by a suitable anthropic principle. It is proposed that this should be done by an entropy ansatz according to which the relevant micro-anthropic weighting is taken to be proportional to the logarithm of the relevant number of Everett type branch-channels.
Probabilistic models (developped by workers such as Boltzmann, on foundations due to pioneers such as Bayes) were commonly regarded merely as approximations to a deterministic reality before the roles were reversed by the quantum revolution (under the leadership of Heisenberg and Dirac) whereby it was the deterministic description that was reduced to the status of an approximation, while the role of the observer became particularly prominent. The concomitant problem of lack of objectivity in the original Copenhagen interpretation has not been satisfactorily resolved in newer approaches of the kind pioneered by Everett. The deficiency of such interpretations is attributable to failure to allow for the anthropic aspect of the problem, meaning {\it a priori} uncertainty about the identity of the observer. The required reconciliation of subjectivity with objectivity is achieved here by distinguishing the concept of an observer from that of a perceptor, whose chances of identification with a particular observer need to be prescribed by a suitable anthropic principle. It is proposed that this should be done by an entropy ansatz according to which the relevant micro-anthropic weighting is taken to be proportional to the logarithm of the relevant number of Everett type branch-channels.
Introduction As a prescription for ascribing a priori probability weightings to the eventuality of finding oneself in the position of particular conceivable observers, the anthropic principle was originally developed for application to problems of cosmology [1] and biology [2]. The purpose of this chapter is to provide a self-contained introductory account of the motivation and reasoning underlying the recent development [3] of a more refined version of the anthropic principle that is needed for the provision of a coherent interpretation of quantum theory. In order to describe ordinary laboratory applications, it is commonly convenient, and entirely adequate, to use a ‘Copenhagen’ type representation, in which a Hilbert state vector undergoes ‘collapse’ when an observation is made. However, from a broader perspective it is rather generally recognized that such a collapse cannot correspond to any actual physical process. A leading school of thought on this subject was founded by Everett [4], who maintained the principle of the physical reality of the Hilbert state, and deduced that — in view of the agreement that no physical collapse process occurs — none of the ensuing branch channels can be ‘more real than the rest’. This was despite the paradox posed by the necessity that they be characterized by different (my italics) ‘weightings’, the nature of which was never satisfactorily explained. This intellectual flaw in the Everett doctrine was commonly overlooked, not so much by its adherents, who were seriously concerned about it [5], as by its opponents, who were upset by its revolutionary ‘multi-universe’ implications.
Abstract. The problem of interpreting quantum theory on a large (e.g. cosmological) scale has been commonly conceived as a search for objective reality in a framework that is fundamentally probabilistic. The Everett programme attempts to evade the issue by the reintroduction of determinism at the global level of a “state vector of the universe”. The present approach is based on the recognition that, like determinism, objective reality is an unrealistic objective. It is shown how an objective theory of an essentially subjective reality can be set up using an appropriately weighted probability measure on the relevant set of Hilbert subspaces. It is suggested that an entropy principle (superseding the weak anthropic principle) should be used to provide the weighting that is needed. Text for exposition presented at Interdisciplinary Colloquium “La Philosophie de la
Although ultimately motivated by quantum theoretical considerations, Everett's many-world idea remains valid, as an approximation, in the classical limit. However to be applicable it must in any case be applied in conjunction with an appropriate anthropic principle, whose precise formulation involves an anthropic quotient that can be normalised to unity for adult humans but that would be lower for infants and other animals. The outcome is a deterministic multiverse in which the only function of chance is the specification of one's particular identity.
There are currently several versions of Everett's relative state interpretation of quantum mechanics, responding to a number of perceived problems for the original proposal. One of those problems is whether Everett's idea is in accord with the standard 'probabilistic' interpretation implicit in the Born rule. I argue in defence of what appears to be Everett's original view on this. The contribution I aim to make is a more complete discussion of the central issues of the identity of objects and observers over time and how the concept of expectation can be applied when all 'possible' outcomes of a measurement process are regarded as actually occurring.
In classical physics there is, in accordance with common sense, an objective world ‘out there’. That world evolves in a clear and deterministic way, being governed by precisely formulated mathematical equations. This is as true for the theories of Maxwell and Einstein as it is for the original Newtonian scheme. Physical reality is taken to exist independently of ourselves; and exactly how the classical world ‘is’ is not affected by how we might choose to look at it. Moreover, our bodies and our brains are themselves to be part of that world. They, also, are viewed as evolving according to the same precise and deterministic classical equations. All our actions are to be fixed by these equations - no matter how we might feel that our conscious wills may be influencing how we behave. Such a picture appears to lie at the background of most serious 1 philosophical arguments concerned with the nature of reality, of our conscious perceptions, and of our apparent free will. Some people might have an uncomfortable feeling that there should also be a role for quantum theory - that fundamental but disturbing scheme of things which, in the first quarter of this century, arose out of observations of subtle discrepancies between the actual behaviour of the world and the descriptions of classical physics. To many, the term ‘quantum theory’ evokes merely some vague concept of an ‘uncertainty principle’, which, at the level of particles, atoms or molecules, forbids precision in our descriptions and yields merely probabilistic behaviour. Actually, quantum descriptions are very precise, as we shall see, although radically different from the familiar classical ones. Moreover, we shall find, despite a common view to the contrary, that probabilities do not arise at the minute quantum level of particles, atoms, or molecules - those evolve deterministically - but, seemingly, via some mysterious larger-scale action connected with the emergence of a classical world that we can consciously perceive. We must try to understand this, and how quantum theory forces us to change our view of physical reality.
How does it come about then, that great scientists such as Einstein, Schrödinger and De Broglie are nevertheless dissatisfied with the situation? Of course, all these objections are levelled not against the correctness of the formulae, but against their interpretation. […] The lesson to be learned from what I have told of the origin of quantum mechanics is that probable refinements of mathematical methods will not suffice to produce a satisfactory theory, but that somewhere in our doctrine is hidden a concept, unjustified by experience, which we must eliminate to open up the road. (Born [1954], pp. 8, 11) It is truly surprising how little difference all this makes. Most physicists use quantum mechanics every day in their working lives without needing to worry about the fundamental problem of its interpretation. (Weinberg [1992], p. 66) I endorse the view that it may be of no relevance to the acceptability of the Everett interpretation of quantum mechanics as a physical theory whether or not an informed observer can be uncertain about the outcome of a quantum measurement prior to its having occurred. However, I suggest that the very possibility of post-measurement, pre-observation uncertainty has an essential role to play in both confirmation theory and decision theory in a branching universe. This is supported by arguments which do not appeal to van Fraassen’s Reflection Principle. 1. Dendritic Unitary Evolution 2. The Born–Vaidman Rule 3. Greaves on Uncertainty 4. Retroactive Counterfactual Uncertainty 5. Odds and Ends