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arXiv:1203.0952

Classical Anthropic Everett model: indeterminacy in a preordained multiverse

Brandon Carter

Published Mar 5, 2012• 4 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

Although ultimately motivated by quantum theoretical considerations, Everett's many-world idea remains valid, as an approximation, in the classical limit. However to be applicable it must in any case be applied in conjunction with an appropriate anthropic principle, whose precise formulation involves an anthropic quotient that can be normalised to unity for adult humans but that would be lower for infants and other animals. The outcome is a deterministic multiverse in which the only function of chance is the specification of one's particular identity.

DOI
10.48550/arxiv.1203.0952

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Although ultimately motivated by quantum theoretical considerations, Everett's many-world idea remains valid, as an approximation, in the classical limit. However to be applicable it must in any case be applied in conjunction with an appropriate anthropic principle, whose precise formulation involves an anthropic quotient that can be normalised to unity for adult humans but that would be lower for infants and other animals. The outcome is a deterministic multiverse in which the only function of chance is the specification of one's particular identity.
There are currently several versions of Everett's relative state interpretation of quantum mechanics, responding to a number of perceived problems for the original proposal. One of those problems is whether Everett's idea is in accord with the standard 'probabilistic' interpretation implicit in the Born rule. I argue in defence of what appears to be Everett's original view on this. The contribution I aim to make is a more complete discussion of the central issues of the identity of objects and observers over time and how the concept of expectation can be applied when all 'possible' outcomes of a measurement process are regarded as actually occurring.
Probabilistic models (developped by workers such as Boltzmann, on foundations due to pioneers such as Bayes) were commonly regarded merely as approximations to a deterministic reality before the roles were reversed by the quantum revolution (under the leadership of Heisenberg and Dirac) whereby it was the deterministic description that was reduced to the status of an approximation, while the role of the observer became particularly prominent. The concomitant problem of lack of objectivity in the original Copenhagen interpretation has not been satisfactorily resolved in newer approaches of the kind pioneered by Everett. The deficiency of such interpretations is attributable to failure to allow for the anthropic aspect of the problem, meaning {\it a priori} uncertainty about the identity of the observer. The required reconciliation of subjectivity with objectivity is achieved here by distinguishing the concept of an observer from that of a perceptor, whose chances of identification with a particular observer need to be prescribed by a suitable anthropic principle. It is proposed that this should be done by an entropy ansatz according to which the relevant micro-anthropic weighting is taken to be proportional to the logarithm of the relevant number of Everett type branch-channels.
A brief development of the Multiverse idea is given, including its implication in connection with the Anthropic Principle. Emphasis is put upon its quantum physical aspect. Considerations include the collapse of wave functions, complementarity, the superposition of states and decoherence. The role of relativity is touched upon in the context of space-time and world lines. The interplay between determinism and stochastics is discussed and a tool kit for simulation is proposed, including entity relationships. The importance of operators, common states and observables is outlined. Within this simulation methodology an everyday example and a historic example for a transition from Multiverse to a specific universe are presented.
Clues from psychology indicate that human cognition are not only based on classical probability theory as explained by Kolmogorov’s axioms but additionally on quantum probability. Quantum probabilities lead to the conclusion that our brain adapted to the Everett many-worlds reality trough the evolutionary process. The Everett many-worlds theory views reality as a many-branched tree in which every possible quantum outcome is realized. In this context, one of the cognitive brain functions is to provide a causally consistent explanation of events to maintain self-identity over time. Causality is related to a meaningful explanation. For impossible explanations, causality does not exist, and the identity of the self breaks. Only in meaningful causal worlds may personal identities exist.
Introduction As a prescription for ascribing a priori probability weightings to the eventuality of finding oneself in the position of particular conceivable observers, the anthropic principle was originally developed for application to problems of cosmology [1] and biology [2]. The purpose of this chapter is to provide a self-contained introductory account of the motivation and reasoning underlying the recent development [3] of a more refined version of the anthropic principle that is needed for the provision of a coherent interpretation of quantum theory. In order to describe ordinary laboratory applications, it is commonly convenient, and entirely adequate, to use a ‘Copenhagen’ type representation, in which a Hilbert state vector undergoes ‘collapse’ when an observation is made. However, from a broader perspective it is rather generally recognized that such a collapse cannot correspond to any actual physical process. A leading school of thought on this subject was founded by Everett [4], who maintained the principle of the physical reality of the Hilbert state, and deduced that — in view of the agreement that no physical collapse process occurs — none of the ensuing branch channels can be ‘more real than the rest’. This was despite the paradox posed by the necessity that they be characterized by different (my italics) ‘weightings’, the nature of which was never satisfactorily explained. This intellectual flaw in the Everett doctrine was commonly overlooked, not so much by its adherents, who were seriously concerned about it [5], as by its opponents, who were upset by its revolutionary ‘multi-universe’ implications.