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arXiv:quant-ph/0502032 · Physical Review Letters

Comment on “Secure Communication using Mesoscopic Coherent States”

Zhiliang L. Yuan, Andrew J. Shields

Published Feb 3, 2005• 17 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

In a recent letter, Barbosa et al [PRL 90, 227901(2003)] claim that secure communication is possible with bright coherent pulses, by using quantum noise to hide the data from an eavesdropper. We show here that the secrecy in the scheme of Barbosa et al is unrelated to quantum noise, but rather derives from the secret key that sender and receiver share beforehand.

DOI
10.1103/physrevlett.94.048901

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Confidentiality of information is a key consideration in many networking applications, including e-commerce, online banking, and intelligence operations. How can information be communicated reliably to the legitimate users, while keeping it secret from eavesdroppers? How does such a secrecy constraint on communication affect the limits on information flow in the network? In this chapter, we study these questions under the information theoretic notion of secrecy, which requires each eavesdropper to obtain essentially no information about the messages sent from knowledge of its received sequence, the channel statistics, and the codebooks used. We investigate two approaches to achieve secure communication. The first is to exploit the statistics of the channel from the sender to the legitimate receivers and the eavesdroppers. We introduce the wiretap channel as a 2-receiver broadcast channel with a legitimate receiver and an eavesdropper, and establish its secrecy capacity, which is the highest achievable secret communication rate. The idea is to design the encoder so that the channel from the sender to the receiver becomes effectively stronger than the channel to the eavesdropper; hence the receiver can recover the message but the eavesdropper cannot. This wiretap coding scheme involves multicoding and randomized encoding. If the channel from the sender to the receiver is weaker than that to the eavesdropper, however, secret communication at a positive rate is not possible. This brings us to the second approach to achieve secret communication, which is to use a secret key shared between the sender and the receiver but unknown to the eavesdropper. We show that the rate of such secret key must be at least as high as the rate of the confidential message. This raises the question of how the sender and the receiver can agree on such a long secret key in the first place. After all, if they had a confidential channel with sufficiently high capacity to communicate the key, then why not use it to communicate the message itself! We show that if the sender and the receiver have access to correlated sources (e.g., through a satellite beaming common randomness to them), then they can still agree on a secret key even when the channel has zero secrecy capacity. We first consider the source model for key agreement, where the sender communicates with the receiver over a noiseless public broadcast channel to generate a secret key from their correlated sources.

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Reply to “Comment on ‘Secure direct communication with a quantum one-time-pad’ ”

Fu‐Guo Deng, Gui Lu Long

We reply to the preceding comment which focused on whether there exists a quantum privacy amplification technique for purifying the unknown single-photon states transmitted. In this Reply, we will show that quantum privacy amplification is principally possible, and a specific scheme for direct communication protocol based on single photons has been constructed and will be published elsewhere. Then the secure direct quantum communication is secure against the attack strategy in the preceeding comment by using quantum privacy amplification directly.

Physical Review A•Jul 11, 2005•21 citations
In a recent letter, Barbosa et al [PRL 90, 227901(2003)] claim that secure communication is possible with bright coherent pulses, by using quantum noise to hide the data from an eavesdropper. We show here that the secrecy in the scheme of Barbosa et al is unrelated to quantum noise, but rather derives from the secret key that sender and receiver share beforehand.
Since a strictly single-photon source is not yet available, in quantum cryptography systems, one uses, as information quantum states, coherent radiation of a laser with an average number of photons of μ ≈ 0.1–0.5 in a pulse, attenuated to the quasi-single-photon level. The linear independence of a set of coherent quasi-single-photon information states leads to the possibility of unambiguous measurements that, in the presence of losses in the line, restrict the transmission range of secret keys. Starting from a certain value of critical loss (the length of the line), the eavesdropper knows the entire key, does not make errors, and is not detected—the distribution of secret keys becomes impossible. This problem is solved by introducing an additional reference state with an average number of photons of μcl ≈ 103–106, depending on the length of the communication line. It is shown that the use of a reference state does not allow the eavesdropper to carry out measurements with conclusive outcome while remaining undetected. A reference state guarantees detecting an eavesdropper in a channel with high losses. In this case, information states may contain a mesoscopic average number of photons in the range of μ q ≈ 0.5–102. The protocol proposed is easy to implement technically, admits flexible adjustment of parameters to the length of the communication line, and is simple and transparent for proving the secrecy of keys.
Confidentiality of information is a key consideration in many networking applications, including e-commerce, online banking, and intelligence operations. How can information be communicated reliably to the legitimate users, while keeping it secret from eavesdroppers? How does such a secrecy constraint on communication affect the limits on information flow in the network? In this chapter, we study these questions under the information theoretic notion of secrecy, which requires each eavesdropper to obtain essentially no information about the messages sent from knowledge of its received sequence, the channel statistics, and the codebooks used. We investigate two approaches to achieve secure communication. The first is to exploit the statistics of the channel from the sender to the legitimate receivers and the eavesdroppers. We introduce the wiretap channel as a 2-receiver broadcast channel with a legitimate receiver and an eavesdropper, and establish its secrecy capacity, which is the highest achievable secret communication rate. The idea is to design the encoder so that the channel from the sender to the receiver becomes effectively stronger than the channel to the eavesdropper; hence the receiver can recover the message but the eavesdropper cannot. This wiretap coding scheme involves multicoding and randomized encoding. If the channel from the sender to the receiver is weaker than that to the eavesdropper, however, secret communication at a positive rate is not possible. This brings us to the second approach to achieve secret communication, which is to use a secret key shared between the sender and the receiver but unknown to the eavesdropper. We show that the rate of such secret key must be at least as high as the rate of the confidential message. This raises the question of how the sender and the receiver can agree on such a long secret key in the first place. After all, if they had a confidential channel with sufficiently high capacity to communicate the key, then why not use it to communicate the message itself! We show that if the sender and the receiver have access to correlated sources (e.g., through a satellite beaming common randomness to them), then they can still agree on a secret key even when the channel has zero secrecy capacity. We first consider the source model for key agreement, where the sender communicates with the receiver over a noiseless public broadcast channel to generate a secret key from their correlated sources.
We reply to the preceding comment which focused on whether there exists a quantum privacy amplification technique for purifying the unknown single-photon states transmitted. In this Reply, we will show that quantum privacy amplification is principally possible, and a specific scheme for direct communication protocol based on single photons has been constructed and will be published elsewhere. Then the secure direct quantum communication is secure against the attack strategy in the preceeding comment by using quantum privacy amplification directly.