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arXiv:quant-ph/0212018 · Physical Review Letters

Secure Communication Using Mesoscopic Coherent States

Geraldo A. Barbosa, Eric Corndorf, Prem Kumar, Horace P. Yuen

Published Jun 2, 2003• 206 citations
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Abstract

We demonstrate theoretically and experimentally that secure communication using intermediate-energy (mesoscopic) coherent states is possible. Our scheme is different from previous quantum cryptographic schemes in that a short secret key is explicitly used and in which quantum noise hides both the bit and the key. This encryption scheme allows optical amplification. New avenues are open to secure communications at high speeds in fiber-optic or free-space channels.

DOI
10.1103/physrevlett.90.227901

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Comment on “Secure Communication using Mesoscopic Coherent States”

Zhiliang L. Yuan, Andrew J. Shields

In a recent letter, Barbosa et al [PRL 90, 227901(2003)] claim that secure communication is possible with bright coherent pulses, by using quantum noise to hide the data from an eavesdropper. We show here that the secrecy in the scheme of Barbosa et al is unrelated to quantum noise, but rather derives from the secret key that sender and receiver share beforehand.

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We demonstrate theoretically and experimentally that secure communication using intermediate-energy (mesoscopic) coherent states is possible. Our scheme is different from previous quantum cryptographic schemes in that a short secret key is explicitly used and in which quantum noise hides both the bit and the key. This encryption scheme allows optical amplification. New avenues are open to secure communications at high speeds in fiber-optic or free-space channels.
Quantum-based cryptographic protocols are often said to enjoy security guaranteed by the fundamental laws of physics. However, even carefully designed quantum-based cryptographic schemes may be susceptible to subtle attacks that are outside the original design. As an example, we give attacks against a recently proposed ``secure communication using mesoscopic coherent states'', which employs mesoscopic states, rather than single-photon states. Our attacks can be used either as a known-plaintext attack or in the case where the plaintext has not been randomized. One of our attacks requires beamsplitters and the replacement of a lossy channel by a lossless one. It is successful provided that the original loss in the channel is so big that Eve can obtain 2k2^k2k copies of what Bob receives, where kkk is the length of the seed key pre-shared by Alice and Bob. In addition, substantial improvements over such an exhaustive key search attack can be made, whenever a key is reused. Furthermore, we remark that, under the same assumption of a known or non-random plaintext, Grover's exhaustive key search attack can be applied directly to "secure communication using mesoscopic coherent states", whenever the channel loss is more than 50 percent. Therefore, as far as information-theoretic security is concerned, optically amplified signals necessarily degrade the security of the proposed scheme, when the plaintext is known or non-random. Our attacks apply even if the mesoscopic scheme is used only for key generation with a subsequent use of the key for one-time-pad encryption. Studying those attacks can help us to better define the risk models and parameter spaces in which quantum-based cryptographic schemes can operate securely. Finally, we remark that our attacks do not affect standard protocols such as Bennett-Brassard BB84 protocol or Bennett B92 protocol, which rely on single-photon signals.
The secure distribution of the secret random bit sequences known as `key' material, is an essential precursor to their use for the encryption and decryption of confidential communications. Quantum cryptography is an emerging technology for secure key distribution with single-photon transmissions: Heisenburg's uncertainty principle ensures that an adversary can neither successfully tap the key transmissions, nor evade detection (eavesdropping raises the key error rate above a threshold value). We have developed experimental quantum cryptography systems based on the transmission of non-orthogonal single-photon states to generate shared key material over multi-kilometer optical fiber paths and over line-of-sight links. In both cases, key material is built up using the transmission of a single- photon per bit of an initial secret random sequence. A quantum-mechanically random subset of this sequence is identified, becoming the key material after a data reconciliation stage with the sender. In our optical fiber experiment we have performed quantum key distribution over 24-km of underground optical fiber using single-photon interference states, demonstrating that secure, real-time key generation over `open' multi-km node-to-node optical fiber communications links is possible.
We demonstrate high data-rate quantum-noise{protected data encryption through optical fibers using coherent states of light. Specifically, we demonstrate 650Mbps data encryption through a 10Gbps data-bearing, in-line amplified 200km-long line. In our protocol, legitimate users (who share a short secret-key) communicate using an M-ry signal set while an attacker (who does not share the secret-key) is forced to contend with the fundamental and irreducible quantum-measurement noise of coherent states. Implementations of our protocol using both polarization-encoded signal sets as well as polarization-insensitive phase-keyed signal sets are experimentally and theoretically evaluated. Different from the performance criteria of the cryptographic objective of key generation (quantum key generation), the performance criteria of data encryption are established and carefully considered.
Continuous-variable quantum secure communication encoded by Gaussian mapping offers high-capacity and high transmission rates. For the theoretically secure encryption scheme of a 1-time pad, a highly reliable coherent-state quantum secure communication system has been established, and its security has been quantitatively evaluated using Wyner’s wiretap channel theory. We also propose an information reconstruction scheme based on multidimensional rotation to extract secret messages at low-to-medium signal-to-noise ratios. Meanwhile, to address the unbalanced optical path, we design a self-balanced homodyne detector based on a programmable gain amplifier, achieving an electronic noise variance of 1.624 × 10 − 7 V 2 and a bandwidth of 715 MHz. In 10-km optical fiber transmission, the system successfully achieved secure transmission of the dichroic image, processed 1,536 information blocks, each containing 2 10 continuous variables, with a block error rate of approximately 8.78 × 10 − 5 , and ultimately achieved the secrecy capacity of 2.44 × 10 5 bits per second.