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arXiv:quant-ph/0307193 · Synthese

Realism in energy transition processes: an example from Bohmian quantum mechanics

J. Acácio de Barros, José Paulo Rodrigues Furtado de Mendonça, Nelson Pinto-Neto

Published Jan 8, 2007• 1 citation
arXivHTMLPDF
DOI
10.1007/s11229-006-9123-z

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