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From Newtonian to Bohmian Mechanics: what a structural realist might want to tell us

Vera Matarese

Published Jan 1, 2014• 0 citations
OpenAlex

Abstract

Structural Realism endorses a notion of continuity of structure across different theories that needs clarification (Worrall 1989). In light of this, my contribution aims to provide an example of such continuity. More specifically, my talk concerns Newtonian and Bohmian Mechanics and will raise the question of whether it is possible to see a continuity of structure between the two theories in case we endorse Ontic Structural Realism.

Related papers

For an approximate continuity of structure between Newtonian and Bohmian Mechanics

Vera Matarese

Structural Realism (SR) endorses a notion of continuity of structure across different theories that needs clarification (Worrall 1989). In light of this, my contribution aims to provide an example of such continuity. More specifically, my talk concerns Newtonian and Bohmian Mechanics and raises the question of whether it is possible to see a continuity of structure between the two theories in case we endorse Ontic Structural Realism (OSR). In the first part, I present SR and OSR. In a nutshell, while SR claims that there is continuity of structure and not of content (Worrall 1989) between shifts of different Scientific Theories, OSR advances the bolder claim that all that really exists is structure (Ladyman 1998) and that, for this reason, we have to re-conceptualize objects in terms of the relations they entertain (French and Ladyman 2003). These relations are spelled out by the laws of the theory through mathematical equations. In light of this, two theories present a continuity of structure when the laws remain invariant. However, this is hardly ever the case, since often the equations of one theory reappear as limiting cases of another one. In this case the continuity of structure is only approximate. In the second part,I present the case of the shift between Newtonian and Bohmian Mechanics. Bohmian Mechanics seems to be the most suitable quantum theory that can account for a continuity from Newtonian Mechanics to the quantum domain, since both theories share a primitive ontology that consists of particles in motions. However, if we re-conceptualize the ontology according to OSR, in order to detect a continuity between the two theories, we need a continuity of structure. Hence, the question is whether or not the two theories rely on the same structure. Both theories present a non-local dynamics according to which each particle position depends simultaneously on all the other particles’ positions of the system. Hence, it seems that both ontologies present the same underlying structure. However, contrary to Esfeld (forthcoming), I claim that it is not the case. Indeed, I show that the structure relating all the particles of the system is reducible to many one-to-one relations in Newtonian Mechanics, but not separable in Bohmian Mechanics (Hubert forthcoming). Hence, I argue that while for the Newtonian case the structure is simply non-local, in the Bohmian case it is holistic, since in the latter the whole is prior to the parts. My final question is whether it is still possible to recover a continuity of structure between the two theories. I claim that the answer is up to the physicists working in the classical limit of Bohmian mechanics. In case it is possible to regard the Newtonian laws as limiting cases of the Bohmian laws when some quantity goes to zero (for example Q or ћ as was suggested in the literature (Allori et al. 2002, Holland 1993)), then we can still talk of a continuity. However, this continuity is only approximate, since the two theories do not share the same dynamical structure.

•Jan 1, 2014•0 citations

Structuralist approaches to Bohmian mechanics

Lorenzo Lorenzetti

Abstract Lam and Esfeld have argued that, within Bohmian mechanics, the wave function can be interpreted as a physical structure instantiated by the fundamental particles posited by the theory. Further, to characterize the nature of this structure, they appeal to the framework of Ontic Structural Realism (OSR), thereby proposing a structuralist interpretation of Bohmian mechanics. However, I shall point out that OSR denotes a family of distinct views, each of which maintains a different account about the relation between structures and objects, and entails a different kind of ontology. Thus, in this paper I will show how to articulate the structuralist approach to Bohmian Mechanics accordingly to the different standard versions of OSR, and I will evaluate these alternatives. Moreover, I will propose a novel and sui generis kind of structuralist interpretation of Bohmian Mechanics, based on the framework of metaphysical coherentism.

Synthese•Feb 1, 2022•2 citations

A structuralist reconciliation of the realist and nomological views in Bohmian mechanics

Vera Matarese

This thesis aims to contribute to the discussion of how to interpret the Bohmian ontology. Bohmian Mechanics is a quantum theory that describes the motion of particles, whose trajectories are determined by the quantum wave-function. This theory faces two key questions. The former concerns the metaphysical characterization of the particles; the latter relates to the ontological status of the wave-function. \nAfter briefly presenting two possible metaphysical characterizations of the particles, I dedicate the bulk of this work to investigating the status of the wave-function. In particular, I analyse the realist view (which regards the wave-function as a multi-dimensional field) and the nomological view (which considers the wave-function as a law-like entity). My investigation touches upon different levels of inquiry. First, I show that these two ontological interpretations depend on contrasting formulations of the law that dictates the particle motion. Second, I argue that both views defend very problematic ontologies that not only violate familiar metaphysical criteria but also fail to provide a satisfactory explanation of the relation between the particles and the wave-function. Third, I spell out the implicit methodologies that underlie the two views, arguing that they conflate three important categories that should rather be kept separate: the informationally-complete representation of the system, the ontologically-complete representation of the system, and the ontology itself. \nFinally, I present and advocate structural realism as the metaphysical framework for investigating and understanding the Bohmian ontology. According to the structuralist interpretation, the wave-function represents a network of modal relations whose relata are the particles. I argue that this third view provides the best account of the Bohmian system for three reasons. First of all, it offers a parsimonious ontology that does not create any issue of metaphysical underdetermination. Secondly, it supplies an explanatorily powerful ontology. Thirdly, it relies on a sound methodological program. I conclude with an interesting insight: this structuralist interpretation can be regarded as reconciling the realist view and the nomological view given that it takes on aspects of both views and is compatible with both formulations of the law of motion for the particles. \n

•Jan 1, 2017•1 citation

Can Bohmian Mechanics be a good candidate for Ontic Structural Realism

Vera Matarese

•Jan 1, 2014•0 citations

6 Bohmian Mechanics and Ontic Structural Realism

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De Gruyter eBooks•Apr 24, 2023•0 citations

ONTIC STRUCTRAL REALISM AND QUANTUM MECHANICS

João L. Cordovil

Radical-Ontic Structural Realism and Moderate-Ontic Structural Realism are usually distinguished by the specific way of how they address the question of the primacy between objects and relations. However, I will argue that the difference between Radical-Ontic Structural Realism and Moderate-Ontic Structural Realism runs deeper; it rests on the different programmatic assessments of the relationship between science and metaphysics. In this sense, at least at its roots, the distinction between Radical-Ontic Structural Realism and Moderate-Ontic Structural Realism lies in the divergence between Radical Naturalistic Metaphysics and Esfeld’s account of Natural Philosophy (based on the Primitive Ontology approach). From the above distinctions, I will argue: i) even that Quantum Mechanics offers us good arguments in favor of Ontic Structural Realism, both main Ontic Structural Realism’s proposals seem to struggle with QM’s challenges; ii) Ontic Structural Realism’s failure is not due to itself but to this metametaphysics proposals. That is, maybe some assumptions made by both NM and PO, like micro-physicalism, monism or metaphysical fundamentalism, should be reviewed or even dismissed from Ontic Structural Realism proposals.

•Nov 20, 2018•1 citation
Structural Realism endorses a notion of continuity of structure across different theories that needs clarification (Worrall 1989). In light of this, my contribution aims to provide an example of such continuity. More specifically, my talk concerns Newtonian and Bohmian Mechanics and will raise the question of whether it is possible to see a continuity of structure between the two theories in case we endorse Ontic Structural Realism.
Structural Realism (SR) endorses a notion of continuity of structure across different theories that needs clarification (Worrall 1989). In light of this, my contribution aims to provide an example of such continuity. More specifically, my talk concerns Newtonian and Bohmian Mechanics and raises the question of whether it is possible to see a continuity of structure between the two theories in case we endorse Ontic Structural Realism (OSR). In the first part, I present SR and OSR. In a nutshell, while SR claims that there is continuity of structure and not of content (Worrall 1989) between shifts of different Scientific Theories, OSR advances the bolder claim that all that really exists is structure (Ladyman 1998) and that, for this reason, we have to re-conceptualize objects in terms of the relations they entertain (French and Ladyman 2003). These relations are spelled out by the laws of the theory through mathematical equations. In light of this, two theories present a continuity of structure when the laws remain invariant. However, this is hardly ever the case, since often the equations of one theory reappear as limiting cases of another one. In this case the continuity of structure is only approximate. In the second part,I present the case of the shift between Newtonian and Bohmian Mechanics. Bohmian Mechanics seems to be the most suitable quantum theory that can account for a continuity from Newtonian Mechanics to the quantum domain, since both theories share a primitive ontology that consists of particles in motions. However, if we re-conceptualize the ontology according to OSR, in order to detect a continuity between the two theories, we need a continuity of structure. Hence, the question is whether or not the two theories rely on the same structure. Both theories present a non-local dynamics according to which each particle position depends simultaneously on all the other particles’ positions of the system. Hence, it seems that both ontologies present the same underlying structure. However, contrary to Esfeld (forthcoming), I claim that it is not the case. Indeed, I show that the structure relating all the particles of the system is reducible to many one-to-one relations in Newtonian Mechanics, but not separable in Bohmian Mechanics (Hubert forthcoming). Hence, I argue that while for the Newtonian case the structure is simply non-local, in the Bohmian case it is holistic, since in the latter the whole is prior to the parts. My final question is whether it is still possible to recover a continuity of structure between the two theories. I claim that the answer is up to the physicists working in the classical limit of Bohmian mechanics. In case it is possible to regard the Newtonian laws as limiting cases of the Bohmian laws when some quantity goes to zero (for example Q or ћ as was suggested in the literature (Allori et al. 2002, Holland 1993)), then we can still talk of a continuity. However, this continuity is only approximate, since the two theories do not share the same dynamical structure.
Abstract Lam and Esfeld have argued that, within Bohmian mechanics, the wave function can be interpreted as a physical structure instantiated by the fundamental particles posited by the theory. Further, to characterize the nature of this structure, they appeal to the framework of Ontic Structural Realism (OSR), thereby proposing a structuralist interpretation of Bohmian mechanics. However, I shall point out that OSR denotes a family of distinct views, each of which maintains a different account about the relation between structures and objects, and entails a different kind of ontology. Thus, in this paper I will show how to articulate the structuralist approach to Bohmian Mechanics accordingly to the different standard versions of OSR, and I will evaluate these alternatives. Moreover, I will propose a novel and sui generis kind of structuralist interpretation of Bohmian Mechanics, based on the framework of metaphysical coherentism.
This thesis aims to contribute to the discussion of how to interpret the Bohmian ontology. Bohmian Mechanics is a quantum theory that describes the motion of particles, whose trajectories are determined by the quantum wave-function. This theory faces two key questions. The former concerns the metaphysical characterization of the particles; the latter relates to the ontological status of the wave-function. \nAfter briefly presenting two possible metaphysical characterizations of the particles, I dedicate the bulk of this work to investigating the status of the wave-function. In particular, I analyse the realist view (which regards the wave-function as a multi-dimensional field) and the nomological view (which considers the wave-function as a law-like entity). My investigation touches upon different levels of inquiry. First, I show that these two ontological interpretations depend on contrasting formulations of the law that dictates the particle motion. Second, I argue that both views defend very problematic ontologies that not only violate familiar metaphysical criteria but also fail to provide a satisfactory explanation of the relation between the particles and the wave-function. Third, I spell out the implicit methodologies that underlie the two views, arguing that they conflate three important categories that should rather be kept separate: the informationally-complete representation of the system, the ontologically-complete representation of the system, and the ontology itself. \nFinally, I present and advocate structural realism as the metaphysical framework for investigating and understanding the Bohmian ontology. According to the structuralist interpretation, the wave-function represents a network of modal relations whose relata are the particles. I argue that this third view provides the best account of the Bohmian system for three reasons. First of all, it offers a parsimonious ontology that does not create any issue of metaphysical underdetermination. Secondly, it supplies an explanatorily powerful ontology. Thirdly, it relies on a sound methodological program. I conclude with an interesting insight: this structuralist interpretation can be regarded as reconciling the realist view and the nomological view given that it takes on aspects of both views and is compatible with both formulations of the law of motion for the particles. \n
Radical-Ontic Structural Realism and Moderate-Ontic Structural Realism are usually distinguished by the specific way of how they address the question of the primacy between objects and relations. However, I will argue that the difference between Radical-Ontic Structural Realism and Moderate-Ontic Structural Realism runs deeper; it rests on the different programmatic assessments of the relationship between science and metaphysics. In this sense, at least at its roots, the distinction between Radical-Ontic Structural Realism and Moderate-Ontic Structural Realism lies in the divergence between Radical Naturalistic Metaphysics and Esfeld’s account of Natural Philosophy (based on the Primitive Ontology approach). From the above distinctions, I will argue: i) even that Quantum Mechanics offers us good arguments in favor of Ontic Structural Realism, both main Ontic Structural Realism’s proposals seem to struggle with QM’s challenges; ii) Ontic Structural Realism’s failure is not due to itself but to this metametaphysics proposals. That is, maybe some assumptions made by both NM and PO, like micro-physicalism, monism or metaphysical fundamentalism, should be reviewed or even dismissed from Ontic Structural Realism proposals.