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arXiv:quant-ph/0112079 · Journal of Optics B Quantum and Semiclassical Optics

Quantum cryptographic ranging

Vittorio Giovannetti, Seth Lloyd, Lorenzo Maccone

Published Aug 1, 2002• 25 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

We present a system to measure the distance between two parties that allows only trusted people to access the result. The security of the protocol is guaranteed by the complementarity principle in quantum mechanics. The protocol can be realized with available technology, at least as a proof of principle experiment.
DOI
10.1088/1464-4266/4/4/330

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