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arXiv:quant-ph/0107042 · Quantum Information and Computation

Optimization of coherent attacks in generalizations of the BB84 quantum bit commitment protocol

Robert W. Spekkens, Terry Rudolph

Published Jan 1, 2002• 30 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

It is well known that no quantum bit commitment protocol is unconditionally secure. Nonetheless, there can be non-trivial upper bounds on both Bob's probability of correctly estimating Alice's commitment and Alice's probability of successfully unveiling whatever bit she desires. In this paper, we seek to determine these bounds for generalizations of the BB84 bit commitment protocol. In such protocols, an honest Alice commits to a bit by randomly choosing a state from a specified set and submitting this to Bob, and later unveils the bit to Bob by announcing the chosen state, at which point Bob measures the projector onto the state. Bob's optimal cheating strategy can be easily deduced from well known results in the theory of quantum state estimation. We show how to understand Alice's most general cheating strategy, (which involves her submitting to Bob one half of an entangled state) in terms of a theorem of Hughston, Jozsa and Wootters. We also show how the problem of optimizing Alice's cheating strategy for a fixed submitted state can be mapped onto a problem of state estimation. Finally, using the Bloch ball representation of qubit states, we identify the optimal coherent attack for a class of protocols that can be implemented with just a single qubit. These results provide a tight upper bound on Alice's probability of successfully unveiling whatever bit she desires in the protocol proposed by Aharonov et al., and lead us to identify a qubit protocol with even greater security.

DOI
10.26421/qic2.1-4

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Why Quantum Bit Commitment And Ideal Quantum Coin Tossing Are Impossible

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There had been well known claims of unconditionally secure quantum protocols for bit commitment. However, we, and independently Mayers, showed that all proposed quantum bit commitment schemes are, in principle, insecure because the sender, Alice, can almost always cheat successfully by using an Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) type of attack and delaying her measurements. One might wonder if secure quantum bit commitment protocols exist at all. We answer this question by showing that the same type of attack by Alice will, in principle, break any bit commitment scheme. The cheating strategy generally requires a quantum computer. We emphasize the generality of this ``no-go theorem'': Unconditionally secure bit commitment schemes based on quantum mechanics---fully quantum, classical or quantum but with measurements---are all ruled out by this result. Since bit commitment is a useful primitive for building up more sophisticated protocols such as zero-knowledge proofs, our results cast very serious doubt on the security of quantum cryptography in the so-called ``post-cold-war'' applications. We also show that ideal quantum coin tossing is impossible because of the EPR attack. This no-go theorem for ideal quantum coin tossing may help to shed some lights on the possibility of non-ideal protocols.

•Jan 1, 1998•177 citations
It is well known that no quantum bit commitment protocol is unconditionally secure. Nonetheless, there can be non-trivial upper bounds on both Bob's probability of correctly estimating Alice's commitment and Alice's probability of successfully unveiling whatever bit she desires. In this paper, we seek to determine these bounds for generalizations of the BB84 bit commitment protocol. In such protocols, an honest Alice commits to a bit by randomly choosing a state from a specified set and submitting this to Bob, and later unveils the bit to Bob by announcing the chosen state, at which point Bob measures the projector onto the state. Bob's optimal cheating strategy can be easily deduced from well known results in the theory of quantum state estimation. We show how to understand Alice's most general cheating strategy, (which involves her submitting to Bob one half of an entangled state) in terms of a theorem of Hughston, Jozsa and Wootters. We also show how the problem of optimizing Alice's cheating strategy for a fixed submitted state can be mapped onto a problem of state estimation. Finally, using the Bloch ball representation of qubit states, we identify the optimal coherent attack for a class of protocols that can be implemented with just a single qubit. These results provide a tight upper bound on Alice's probability of successfully unveiling whatever bit she desires in the protocol proposed by Aharonov et al., and lead us to identify a qubit protocol with even greater security.
It is well known that unconditionally secure bit commitment is impossible even in the quantum world. In this paper a weak variant of quantum bit commitment, introduced independently by Aharonov et al. [STOC, 2000] and Hardy and Kent [Phys. Rev. Lett. 92 (2004)] is investigated. In this variant, the parties require some nonzero probability of detecting a cheating, i.e. if Bob, who commits a bit b to Alice, changes his mind during the revealing phase then Alice detects the cheating with a positive probability (we call this property binding); and if Alice gains information about the committed bit before the revealing phase then Bob discovers this with positive probability (sealing). In our paper we give quantum bit commitment scheme that is simultaneously binding and sealing and we show that if a cheating gives epsilon advantage to a malicious Alice then Bob can detect the cheating with a probability Omega(epsilon^2). If Bob cheats then Alice's probability of detecting the cheating is greater than some fixed constant lambda>0. This improves the probabilities of cheating detections shown by Hardy and Kent and the scheme by Aharonov et al. who presented a protocol that is either binding or sealing, but not simultaneously both. To construct a cheat sensitive quantum bit commitment scheme we use a protocol for a weak quantum one-out-of-two oblivious transfer.
Bit commitment is a fundamental cryptographic primitive with numerous applications. Quantum information allows for bit commitment schemes in the information theoretic setting where no dishonest party can perfectly cheat. The previously best-known quantum protocol by Ambainis achieved a cheating probability of at most 3/4. On the other hand, Kitaev showed that no quantum protocol can have cheating probability less than 1/√2 (his lower bound on coin flipping can be easily extended to bit commitment). Closing this gap has since been an important open question. In this paper, we provide the optimal bound for quantum bit commitment. First, we show a lower bound of approximately 0.739, improving Kitaev's lower bound. For this, we present some generic cheating strategies for Alice and Bob and conclude by proving a new relation between the trace distance and fidelity of two quantum states. Second, we present an optimal quantum bit commitment protocol which has cheating probability arbitrarily close to 0.739. More precisely, we show how to use any weak coin flipping protocol with cheating probability 1/2 + ε in order to achieve a quantum bit commitment protocol with cheating probability 0.739 + O(ε). We then use the optimal quantum weak coin flipping protocol described by Mochon. Last, in order to stress the fact that our protocol uses quantum effects beyond the weak coin flip, we show that any classical bit commitment protocol with access to perfect weak (or strong) coin flipping has cheating probability at least 3/4.
Oblivious transfer is a fundamental primitive in cryptography. While perfect information theoretic security is impossible, quantum oblivious transfer protocols can limit the dishonest player's cheating. Finding the optimal security parameters in such protocols is an important open question. In this paper we show that every 1-out-of-2 oblivious transfer protocol allows a dishonest party to cheat with probability bounded below by a constant strictly larger than 1/21/21/2. Alice's cheating is defined as her probability of guessing Bob's index, and Bob's cheating is defined as his probability of guessing both input bits of Alice. In our proof, we relate these cheating probabilities to the cheating probabilities of a bit commitment protocol and conclude by using lower bounds on quantum bit commitment. Then, we present an oblivious transfer protocol with two messages and cheating probabilities at most 3/43/43/4. Last, we extend Kitaev's semidefinite programming formulation to more general primitives, where the security is against a dishonest player trying to force the outcome of the other player, and prove optimal lower and upper bounds for them.
This paper proposes a quantum protocol for a cheat-sensitive commitment of a classical bit. Alice, the receiver of the bit, can examine dishonest Bob, who changes or postpones his choice. Bob, the sender of the bit, can examine dishonest Alice, who violates concealment. For each round-trip case, Alice sends one of two spin states |SSS\ifmmode\pm\else\textpm\fi{}⟩ by choosing basis SSS at random from two conjugate bases XXX and YYY. Bob chooses basis CCC \ensuremath{\in} {XXX,YYY} to perform a measurement and returns a resultant state |CCC\ifmmode\pm\else\textpm\fi{}⟩. Alice then performs a measurement with the other basis RRR (\ensuremath{\ne}SSS) and obtains an outcome |RRR\ifmmode\pm\else\textpm\fi{}⟩. In the opening phase, she can discover dishonest Bob, who unveils a wrong basis with a faked spin state, or Bob can discover dishonest Alice, who infers basis CCC but destroys |CCC\ifmmode\pm\else\textpm\fi{}⟩ by setting RRR to be identical to SSS in the commitment phase. If a classical bit is coded in a block of mmm \ifmmode\times\else\texttimes\fi{} nnn qubit particles, impartial examinations and probabilistic security criteria can be achieved.
We further study the security of the quantum bit commitment (QBC) protocol we previously proposed [Phys. Rev. A 74, 022332 (2006).], by analyzing the reduced density matrix ρ_{b}^{B} which describes the quantum state at Bob's side corresponding to Alice's committed bit b. It is shown that Alice will find ρ_{0}^{B}\perp ρ_{1}^{B} while the protocol remains concealing to Bob. On the contrary, the existing no-go theorem of unconditionally secure QBC is based on the condition ρ_{0}^{B}\simeq ρ_{1}^{B}. Thus the specific cheating strategy proposed in the no-go theorem does not necessarily applies to our protocol.
There had been well known claims of unconditionally secure quantum protocols for bit commitment. However, we, and independently Mayers, showed that all proposed quantum bit commitment schemes are, in principle, insecure because the sender, Alice, can almost always cheat successfully by using an Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) type of attack and delaying her measurements. One might wonder if secure quantum bit commitment protocols exist at all. We answer this question by showing that the same type of attack by Alice will, in principle, break any bit commitment scheme. The cheating strategy generally requires a quantum computer. We emphasize the generality of this ``no-go theorem'': Unconditionally secure bit commitment schemes based on quantum mechanics---fully quantum, classical or quantum but with measurements---are all ruled out by this result. Since bit commitment is a useful primitive for building up more sophisticated protocols such as zero-knowledge proofs, our results cast very serious doubt on the security of quantum cryptography in the so-called ``post-cold-war'' applications. We also show that ideal quantum coin tossing is impossible because of the EPR attack. This no-go theorem for ideal quantum coin tossing may help to shed some lights on the possibility of non-ideal protocols.