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arXiv:quant-ph/0605150

Using quantum oblivious transfer to cheat sensitive quantum bit commitment

Andreas Jakoby, Maciej Liśkiewicz, Aleksander Mądry

Published May 17, 2006• 3 citations
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Abstract

It is well known that unconditionally secure bit commitment is impossible even in the quantum world. In this paper a weak variant of quantum bit commitment, introduced independently by Aharonov et al. [STOC, 2000] and Hardy and Kent [Phys. Rev. Lett. 92 (2004)] is investigated. In this variant, the parties require some nonzero probability of detecting a cheating, i.e. if Bob, who commits a bit b to Alice, changes his mind during the revealing phase then Alice detects the cheating with a positive probability (we call this property binding); and if Alice gains information about the committed bit before the revealing phase then Bob discovers this with positive probability (sealing). In our paper we give quantum bit commitment scheme that is simultaneously binding and sealing and we show that if a cheating gives epsilon advantage to a malicious Alice then Bob can detect the cheating with a probability Omega(epsilon^2). If Bob cheats then Alice's probability of detecting the cheating is greater than some fixed constant lambda>0. This improves the probabilities of cheating detections shown by Hardy and Kent and the scheme by Aharonov et al. who presented a protocol that is either binding or sealing, but not simultaneously both. To construct a cheat sensitive quantum bit commitment scheme we use a protocol for a weak quantum one-out-of-two oblivious transfer.

DOI
10.48550/arxiv.quant-ph/0605150

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It is well known that unconditionally secure bit commitment is impossible even in the quantum world. In this paper a weak variant of quantum bit commitment, introduced independently by Aharonov et al. [STOC, 2000] and Hardy and Kent [Phys. Rev. Lett. 92 (2004)] is investigated. In this variant, the parties require some nonzero probability of detecting a cheating, i.e. if Bob, who commits a bit b to Alice, changes his mind during the revealing phase then Alice detects the cheating with a positive probability (we call this property binding); and if Alice gains information about the committed bit before the revealing phase then Bob discovers this with positive probability (sealing). In our paper we give quantum bit commitment scheme that is simultaneously binding and sealing and we show that if a cheating gives epsilon advantage to a malicious Alice then Bob can detect the cheating with a probability Omega(epsilon^2). If Bob cheats then Alice's probability of detecting the cheating is greater than some fixed constant lambda>0. This improves the probabilities of cheating detections shown by Hardy and Kent and the scheme by Aharonov et al. who presented a protocol that is either binding or sealing, but not simultaneously both. To construct a cheat sensitive quantum bit commitment scheme we use a protocol for a weak quantum one-out-of-two oblivious transfer.
We define (varepsilon,delta)(varepsilon,delta)(varepsilon,delta)-secure quantum computations between two parties that can play dishonestly to maximise advantage deltadeltadelta, however keeping small the probability varepsilonvarepsilonvarepsilon that the computation fails in evaluating correct value. We present a simple quantum protocol for computing one-out-of-two oblivious transfer that is (O(sqrtvarepsilon),varepsilon)(O(sqrt{varepsilon}),varepsilon)(O(sqrtvarepsilon),varepsilon)-secure. Using the protocol as a black box we construct a scheme for cheat sensitive quantum bit commitment which guarantee that a mistrustful party has a nonzero probability of detecting a cheating.
This paper proposes a cheat-sensitive quantum bit commitment scheme based on single photons, in which Alice commits a bit to Bob. Here, Bob's probability of success at cheating as obtains the committed bit before the opening phase becomes close to (just like performing a guess) as the number of single photons used is increased. And if Alice alters her committed bit after the commitment phase, her cheating will be detected with a probability that becomes close to 1 as the number of single photons used is increased. The scheme is easy to realize with present day technology.
Oblivious transfer is a fundamental primitive in cryptography. While perfect information theoretic security is impossible, quantum oblivious transfer protocols can limit the dishonest player's cheating. Finding the optimal security parameters in such protocols is an important open question. In this paper we show that every 1-out-of-2 oblivious transfer protocol allows a dishonest party to cheat with probability bounded below by a constant strictly larger than 1/21/21/2. Alice's cheating is defined as her probability of guessing Bob's index, and Bob's cheating is defined as his probability of guessing both input bits of Alice. In our proof, we relate these cheating probabilities to the cheating probabilities of a bit commitment protocol and conclude by using lower bounds on quantum bit commitment. Then, we present an oblivious transfer protocol with two messages and cheating probabilities at most 3/43/43/4. Last, we extend Kitaev's semidefinite programming formulation to more general primitives, where the security is against a dishonest player trying to force the outcome of the other player, and prove optimal lower and upper bounds for them.
Unconditionally secure nonrelativistic bit commitment is known to be impossible in both the classical and the quantum worlds. But when committing to a string of nnn bits at once, how far can we stretch the quantum limits? In this paper, we introduce a framework for quantum schemes where Alice commits a string of nnn bits to Bob in such a way that she can only cheat on aaa bits and Bob can learn at most bbb bits of information before the reveal phase. Our results are twofold: we show by an explicit construction that in the traditional approach, where the reveal and guess probabilities form the security criteria, no good schemes can exist: a+ba+ba+b is at least nnn. If, however, we use a more liberal criterion of security, the accessible information, we construct schemes where a=4 log2 n+O(1)a=4\text{ }{\text{log}}_{2}\text{ }n+O(1)a=4 log2​ n+O(1) and b=4b=4b=4, which is impossible classically. We furthermore present a cheat-sensitive quantum bit string commitment protocol for which we give an explicit tradeoff between Bob's ability to gain information about the committed string, and the probability of him being detected cheating.
Bit commitment is a fundamental cryptographic primitive with numerous applications. Quantum information allows for bit commitment schemes in the information theoretic setting where no dishonest party can perfectly cheat. The previously best-known quantum protocol by Ambainis achieved a cheating probability of at most 3/4. On the other hand, Kitaev showed that no quantum protocol can have cheating probability less than 1/√2 (his lower bound on coin flipping can be easily extended to bit commitment). Closing this gap has since been an important open question. In this paper, we provide the optimal bound for quantum bit commitment. First, we show a lower bound of approximately 0.739, improving Kitaev's lower bound. For this, we present some generic cheating strategies for Alice and Bob and conclude by proving a new relation between the trace distance and fidelity of two quantum states. Second, we present an optimal quantum bit commitment protocol which has cheating probability arbitrarily close to 0.739. More precisely, we show how to use any weak coin flipping protocol with cheating probability 1/2 + ε in order to achieve a quantum bit commitment protocol with cheating probability 0.739 + O(ε). We then use the optimal quantum weak coin flipping protocol described by Mochon. Last, in order to stress the fact that our protocol uses quantum effects beyond the weak coin flip, we show that any classical bit commitment protocol with access to perfect weak (or strong) coin flipping has cheating probability at least 3/4.