An evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) is a strategy that, once adopted by a population, cannot be invaded by any sufficiently rare alternative (mutant) strategy. We analyse evolutionary stability in an Eisert--Wilkens--Lewenstein (EWL) quantization of a symmetric
2×2 coordination game, whose classical mixed equilibrium
p∗=1/2 is not an ESS. In the restricted two-parameter EWL strategy space, the corresponding quantum strategy is a strict symmetric Nash equilibrium and an ESS for every entanglement strength
γ>0. In the full
SU(2) strategy space it remains a Nash equilibrium, but in the unreduced game, in which every unitary is a distinct strategy, exact payoff duplicates preclude strictness and ESS for every pure strategy. For the agreement-payoff class, the payoff factors through a Bloch map; identifying payoff-equivalent unitaries gives the reduced space
U(1)\SU(2)≅S2, where strictness and ESS are restored for
γ>0. An arbitrarily small perturbation outside this class that preserves
p∗=1/2 yields a profitable deviation, so the reduced-space result is not generic.
We quantize the Hawk–Dove game by using the most general form of a pure initial state to investigate the existence of pure and mixed evolutionarily stable strategies (ESS). An example is considered to draw a comparison between the classical and quantum version of the game. Our choice of the most general initial quantum state enables us to make the game symmetric or asymmetric. We show that for a particular set of game parameters where there exists only mixed ESS in the classical version of the game, quantization allows even a pure strategy to be an ESS for the symmetric game in addition to mixed ESS. On the other hand only pure strategy ESS can exist for the asymmetric quantum version of the Hawk–Dove game.