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arXiv:physics/0702069 · American Journal of Physics

Would Bohr be born if Bohm were born before Born?

Hrvoje Nikolić

Published Jan 12, 2008• 21 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

I discuss a hypothetical historical context in which a Bohm-like deterministic interpretation of the Schrödinger equation is proposed before the Born probabilistic interpretation and argue that in such a context the Copenhagen (Bohr) interpretation would probably have not achieved great popularity among physicists.
DOI
10.1119/1.2805241

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According to the standard view, the so-called ‘Copenhagen interpretation’ of quantum mechanics originated in discussions between Bohr and Heisenberg in 1927, and was defended by Bohr in his classic debate with Einstein. Yet recent scholarship has shown Bohr's views were never widely accepted, let alone properly understood, by his contemporaries, many of whom held divergent views of the ‘Copenhagen orthodoxy’. This paper examines how the ‘myth of the Copenhagen interpretation’ was constructed by situating it in the context of Soviet Marxist critique of quantum mechanics in the 1950s and the response by physicists such as Heisenberg and Rosenfeld.
The assumptions added by Bohr and concerning the Hilbert space (formed by all solutions of Schroedinger equation) changed fundamentally the original physical interpretation of these solutions proposed earlier by Schroedinger. This new alternative was refused by Einstein on the basis of the EPR Gedankenexperiment, but accepted fully for microscopic reality by scientific community. Both the quantum alternatives were discussed, however, again later. Bell tried to find a possibility how to decide between them; he generalized Einstein's Gedankenexperiment assuming that also spins of two detected particles would be measured. He derived then some inequality for a special combination of four coincidence probabilities, and it was commonly assumed that his inequality held for the original Schroedinger interpretation but not in Bohr's Copenhagen quantum mechanics; without any actual proof having been given. Corresponding experiments were proposed and finished in 1982. The violation of Bell's inequality was then interpreted as decisive victory of Bohr's theory. However, it will be shown that Bell's inequality has been interpreted mistakenly. It has been based always on some assumption that does not hold in any probabilistic theory (i.e., in the given spin experiment) but only in deterministic classical theory. There is not any argument for preferring the Copenhagen quantum mechanics and against Einstein's critical standpoint. Some other consequences will be mentioned, too.
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