In previous chapters we argued that the empirically successful formalism of quantum mechanics supports equally well two mutually incompatible general ontologies: the inherently indeterministic and generally accepted Copenhagen interpretation and Bohm's completely deterministic one. This underdetermination of the interpretation by the formalism is not simply an apparent one of two equivalent theories since there is no way to translate the terms of one of these ontologies into those of the other. This case could be seen as presenting a challenge to the scientific realist who seeks from successful scientific theories a true representation of the world. Furthermore, we suggest that the actual historical competition between these theories and the selection of Copenhagen over Bohm illustrate that such an historically contingent process is not meaningfully distinct from the rational reconstruction and logical judgment of the victorious theory. What is deemed successful and put on offer by the scientific community for the philosopher of science to justify after the fact is itself a contingent and nonunique product.
In previous chapters we argued that the empirically successful formalism of quantum mechanics supports equally well two mutually incompatible general ontologies: the inherently indeterministic and generally accepted Copenhagen interpretation and Bohm's completely deterministic one. This underdetermination of the interpretation by the formalism is not simply an apparent one of two equivalent theories since there is no way to translate the terms of one of these ontologies into those of the other. This case could be seen as presenting a challenge to the scientific realist who seeks from successful scientific theories a true representation of the world. Furthermore, we suggest that the actual historical competition between these theories and the selection of Copenhagen over Bohm illustrate that such an historically contingent process is not meaningfully distinct from the rational reconstruction and logical judgment of the victorious theory. What is deemed successful and put on offer by the scientific community for the philosopher of science to justify after the fact is itself a contingent and nonunique product.
Earlier in this century, the physics community was wracked with a great debate between the determinists and the indeterminists over the status of quantum theory. Determinists like Einstein and Bohm argued that quantum theory would eventually be superseded by a deterministic theory having new state variables. Indeterminists like Heisenberg and Schrodinger, speaking for the Copenhagen School, disagreed. They maintained that the indeterminism in quantum theory was not merely a temporary setback, an epistemological problem to be overcome by means of a better scientific theory, but an accurate ontological representation of the matter.
According to the Everett interpretation of quantum mechanics, the apparent paradoxes of quantum theory require no change either in our philosophical attitude toward scientific theories or in the formalism of quantum mechanics itself. Rather, the unaltered theory can be understood as a literal description of physical reality. But the physical reality thus described is one of many noninteracting, approximately classical worlds. These worlds enter the theory not at the fundamental level—they are nowhere to be found in the basic formalism—but at a higher, emergent level; in this sense they are (ontologically speaking) on a par with the ontology of the special sciences.
A brief account of the world view of classical physics is given first. We then recapitulate as to why the Copenhagen interpretation of the quantum mechanics had to renounce most of the attractive features of the clasical world view such as a causal description, locality, scientific realism and introduce a fundamental distinction between system and apparatus. The crucial role is played in this by the Bohr's insistence on the wavefunction providing the most complete description possible for an even individual system. The alternative of introducing extra dynamical variables, called hidden variables, in addition to the wavefunction of the system so as to be able to retain at least some of the desirable features of classical physics, is then explored. The first such successful attempt was that of Bohm in 1952 who showed that a realistic interpretation of the quantum mechanics can be given which maintains a causal description as well as does not treat systems and measuring appeartus differently. We begin with the construction of the Bohm's theory. He introduces particle positions as the hidden variables. The particle positions play a special role in Bohm theory. The particle trajectories are guided by the wavefunction. The Bohm theory is deterministic. The probability enters through a special assumption, ``quantum equilibrium'' hypothesis, for the initial conditions on the ensemble of particle trajectories. The ``wave or particle'' dilemma is resolved by a ``wave and particle'' resolution. The measurements in Bohm theory can be described without mysticism. Bohm's theory is however nonlocal.
Abstract Quantum mechanics is our most successful and versatile account of the basic constituents of matter, of their interaction and of their compounds. We introduce the theory via a sketch of its history and lay out its mathematical structure in some detail. Before this background we address the important and controversial question of how to interpret that structure. We contextualise our own position, which is linked to our account of ontological emergence as detailed in Chap. 2 , and which is mathematically best expressed in the Heisenberg picture of quantum dynamics. Indeterminism and irreversible processes are fundamental for our approach. We discuss the dialectics of the deterministic challenge to our position and argue that indeterminism in the form of quantum randomness has turned from a philosophical riddle to a technological resource. This claim is supported by a discussion of quantum information science, including some of its basic protocols. Towards the end of the chapter we argue that agency and quantum mechanics come as a package deal. For one, quantum mechanics describes the world as offering open possibilities for the future at a fundamental physical level, which is needed for real higher-order organisation, including agency. Of course, this does not in any way show that the actual existence of agents in our world is guaranteed. But it does show that general agency scepticism has no basis in physics. Second, we show that quantum mechanics is best understood as a theory that describes our agential interactions with nature, and not as a theory that represents nature from the point of view of an inert, detached observer.
Scientific realism has traditionally maintained that our best scientific theories can be regarded as more or less true and as representing the world as it is (more or less). However, one of our very best current theories—quantum mechanics—has famously resisted such a realist construal, threatening to undermine the realist stance altogether. The chapters in this volume carefully examine this tension and the reasons behind it, including the underdetermination generated by the multiplicity of formulations and interpretations of quantum physics, each presenting a different way the world could be. Authors in this volume offer a range of alternative ways forward: some suggest new articulations of realism, limiting our commitments in one way or another; others attempt to articulate a ‘third way’ between traditional forms of realism and antirealism, or are critical of such attempts. Still others argue that quantum theory itself should be reconceptualised, or at least alternative formulations should be considered in the hope of evading the problems faced by realism. And some examine the nature of these issues when moving beyond quantum mechanics to quantum field theory. Taken together they offer an exciting new set of perspectives on one of the most fundamental questions in the philosophy of modern physics: how can one be a realist about quantum theory, and what does this realism amount to?
When we are presented with apparently bizarre properties of microsystems governed by quantum mechanics (as in our discussion of the double-slit experiment in the previous chapter), we naturally ask whether it might be possible to find another theory, or at least another story to go with the equations, that would make more sense to us. We might seek a theory and a view of fundamental physical processes that would accord more with our classically based, everyday common sense. This typically takes the form of the question of the possibility of the existence of a more detailed description of atomic processes than that afforded by the wave function (that is, by the Copenhagen interpretation of the previous chapter). In this chapter we discuss some of the central interpretive problems of the Copenhagen version of quantum mechanics. Then, in the next two chapters, we look at the severe, general restrictions that are placed on any such completion of quantum mechanics and at one particular extension of quantum mechanics. First, though, we begin here with the struggle that ensued over the status of causality in quantum theory.