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Cambridge University Press eBooks

Dynamical Autonomy and Locality

Pieter E. Vermaas

Published Feb 5, 2010• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

In this chapter I prove that the transition probabilities, which describe the dynamics of the actually possessed properties of systems, violate the assumption of Dynamical Autonomy for composite systems. And, related to this violation, it is also proved that the dynamics of the actually possessed properties is non-local in a quite explicit way. Introduction When I introduced the assumptions of Instantaneous and Dynamical Autonomy in Section 3.3, I motivated them by making an appeal to locality. In the case of Instantaneous Autonomy, I argued that a state of a system α should codify all the information about the property ascription to that system. For if a state does not codify all the information, it may happen that a change in the state of some distant system σ (I used the example of a far-away asteroid) means that the properties of α change as well. And this would make modal property ascriptions undesirably non-local. In the case of Dynamical Autonomy one can give a similar motivation. The state of a system α, as it evolves during a time interval i , should codify all the information about the simultaneous and sequential correlations between the properties ascribed to α in that interval i . For if the evolving state does not do so, it may happen that a change in a distant system changes the correlations between the properties of α as well. Modal interpretations satisfy a number of the Autonomy assumptions. All modal interpretations satisfy Instantaneous Autonomy by construction. The transition probabilities derived in Section 8.2 prove that the bi and spectral modal interpretations satisfy Dynamical Autonomy for whole systems and that the atomic modal interpretation satisfies Dynamical Autonomy for atomic systems.

DOI
10.1017/cbo9780511608230.011

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In this chapter I prove that the transition probabilities, which describe the dynamics of the actually possessed properties of systems, violate the assumption of Dynamical Autonomy for composite systems. And, related to this violation, it is also proved that the dynamics of the actually possessed properties is non-local in a quite explicit way. Introduction When I introduced the assumptions of Instantaneous and Dynamical Autonomy in Section 3.3, I motivated them by making an appeal to locality. In the case of Instantaneous Autonomy, I argued that a state of a system α should codify all the information about the property ascription to that system. For if a state does not codify all the information, it may happen that a change in the state of some distant system σ (I used the example of a far-away asteroid) means that the properties of α change as well. And this would make modal property ascriptions undesirably non-local. In the case of Dynamical Autonomy one can give a similar motivation. The state of a system α, as it evolves during a time interval i , should codify all the information about the simultaneous and sequential correlations between the properties ascribed to α in that interval i . For if the evolving state does not do so, it may happen that a change in a distant system changes the correlations between the properties of α as well. Modal interpretations satisfy a number of the Autonomy assumptions. All modal interpretations satisfy Instantaneous Autonomy by construction. The transition probabilities derived in Section 8.2 prove that the bi and spectral modal interpretations satisfy Dynamical Autonomy for whole systems and that the atomic modal interpretation satisfies Dynamical Autonomy for atomic systems.
In this chapter I begin the discussion of the question of how the core properties of systems evolve in time. This question breaks up in two separate subquestions. Firstly, there is the question of how the set of all possible core properties of a system evolves. Secondly, one has the question of how, given this dynamics of the set of possible core properties, the actually possessed core property of that system evolves. Here, I consider only the first question of the dynamics of the whole set of core properties. In the next chapter I focus on the evolution of the actually possessed core property. The modal interpretations that I consider ascribe core properties to systems by means of the spectral resolutions of states. The dynamics of the set of core properties is thus determined by the dynamical behaviour of these spectral resolutions. Study of the dynamics of the spectral resolutions now reveals a number of problematic features of the modal property ascription. Firstly, the set of the eigenprojections of a state W α( t ) can evolve discontinuously. Secondly, this set can evolve highly unstably. Finally, the eigenprojections of a state can evolve rather deviantly when compared with the evolution of the state itself. As a result of all this, the evolution of the set of core properties of a system can be discontinuous, unstable and deviant as well. Discontinuities Up to now I have only considered the property ascription to systems at single instants. It is now time to set things in motion.
As a last step towards general conclusions, I collect and assess the more important results obtained in the previous chapters. In the next and final chapter I then consider the question of whether the modal descriptions of reality meet the demands of being well developed, empirically adequate and metaphysically tenable. Indefinite properties and inexact magnitudes The bi, spectral and atomic modal interpretations do manage to interpret quantum mechanics by providing a description of what reality could be like in terms of systems possessing properties. Moreover, if one accepts the full property ascription (5.12) as developed in Section 5.4, this description of reality satisfies a number of desirable conditions. However, these modal interpretations do not simultaneously ascribe all the possible properties to a system. Instead they select at each instant a specific subset of the properties pertaining to a system and ascribe only these. And the properties which are not selected are taken to be indefinite. This possibility that properties of systems are sometimes not definite is in itself not that problematic for in some cases it is perfectly understandable what this means. Consider again the example of a tossing coin. During the toss the properties ‘heads’ and ‘tails’ can be said to be indefinite and this can be understood as meaning that these two properties are applicable only to coins which lie on surfaces. However, in other cases it is less clear what is going on.
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The world of quantum theory is not deterministic; however, the quantum theory of an isolated system describes its state as evolving deterministically.How can these two points be reconciled? The modal interpretation (of which a number of variants have been developed) answers this as follows. An observable may have a value even if the system is not in the corresponding eigenstate of that observable. The state of the system only constrains the possible values the observable can have, and (at least under certain conditions) the probabilities that it has those values. Hence, the eigenvalue–eigenstate link is violated. There is no collapse; the state of an isolated system always evolves in accordance with the Schroedinger equation. Hence the values of observables can change indeterministically, though this stochastic process is constrained by the deterministically evolving quantum state. Terminology varies but in this book the quantum state is then called the dynamical state, and a summary of the values of the observables pertaining to the system is called the value state. Since not all observables are mutually compatible, they will not all have simultaneous sharp values, but for each there is a minimum Borel set of values as its current range. The specific modal interpretation developed here is the Copenhagen Variant of the Modal Interpretation, which places holistic constraints on values of observables pertaining to parts of composite systems.
In quantum mechanics the properties of a composite system can be divided into properties which are reducible to the properties of the subsystems of the composite and properties which are irreducible to those subsystem properties. The irreducible properties are called holistic and emerge when one describes the system as a whole. In this chapter I show that the bi and spectral modal interpretations can ascribe the holistic properties to composites but, in general, fail to reproduce the relations between the reducible properties of a composite and the properties of the subsystems. The atomic modal interpretation, on the other hand, fails to ascribe the holistic properties but is much more successful in reproducing the relations between the reducible properties and the subsystem properties. I discuss whether these failures harm the empirical adequacy and the metaphysical tenability of modal interpretations. Holistic properties of composite systems The basic principle of reductionism, that all the properties of composite systems are amalgamates of the properties of the subsystems of these composites, has triumphed so much in classical physics that I find it difficult to come up with a clear example of a classical property that cannot be taken as a complex of the subsystem properties. So, in order to make a case for the idea that composites can also possess, in addition to reducible properties, so-called holistic properties which cannot be reduced to the properties of the subsystems, one has to move outside physics or to draw upon some counterfactual development of physics.
With an interpretation of quantum mechanics one can not only predict probabilities for outcomes of measurements performed on quantum systems but also ascribe properties to these systems themselves. I consider interpretations (notably modal interpretations) that ascribe at least those properties to a system which are represented by the eigenprojections of the reduced state. Such interpretations solve the measurement problem for ideal measurements. Here, however, I prove that these interpretations cannot define joint property ascriptions to three or more systems.