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The Western Ontario series in philosophy of science

Determinism, Determination, and Objectivity in Modern Physics

Gordon G. Brittan

Published Jan 1, 2009• 1 citation
Publisher
DOI
10.1007/978-1-4020-9510-8_9

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Ernst Cassirer's Determinism and Indeterminism in Modern Physics (DI; Cassirer, 1936/1956) constitutes a major but systematically overlooked transformation in the philosophy of quantum mechanics. Against interpretations that treat the text as a late application of his earlier structuralism, this article argues that quantum mechanics forces a fundamental reconstruction of causal order and scientific objectivity. Following the dissolution of Laplacean determinism, causality is no longer directed at ‘things’ in the world, but functions as a regulative demand that experience be rendered intelligible. Accordingly, causal order does not map to a pre-given reality but is progressively constituted from within experience through recursive processes of functional co-ordination (Zuordnung). This reconstruction culminates in a participatory account of objectivity organised through three mutually conditioning levels – measurements, laws, and principles. The upshot is that physical objects emerge as invariant nodes within relational structure; objects are fixed as objective relations. On this basis, the article shows that neither epistemic nor ontic structural realism adequately captures Cassirer's position and develops in response a provisional functional ontology in which a co-ordinating subject and an indeterminate relational domain jointly constitute the transcendental conditions of objectivity. The article concludes by situating DI within a broader participatory tradition in the foundations of physics, arguing that Cassirer's recursive and observer-dependent account of objectivity anticipates key developments in second-order cybernetics and participatory approaches to quantum mechanics.
One of the most fascinating principles in quantum mechanics must be Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle, which can be briefly stated as follows: every physical observation cannot be precisely determined without some degree of error or uncertainty. And it is by no means can one use the principle within the limit of certainty region, as will be shown in this Letter. Two of the most important pillars in modern physics must be Einstein’s relativity theory and Schr dinger’s contribution to quantum mechanics. Yet, there is a profound connection between these discoveries by means of the uncertainty relationship, in which we shown that the observation of a high-speed object is conceivable if the speed of the observer keeps up with object’s speed.