Key-exchange protocols have been overlooked as a possible means for implementing oblivious transfer (OT). In this article, we present protocols for mutual exchange of secrets, 1-out-of-2 OT and coin-flipping similar to the Diffie-Hellman protocol using the idea of obliviously exchanging encryption keys. Since the Diffie-Hellman scheme is widely used, our protocol may provide a useful alternative to the conventional methods for implementation of oblivious transfer and a useful primitive in building larger cryptographic schemes.
In 1-out-of-
qOblivious Transfer (OT) protocols, a sender Alice is able to send one of
q≥2messages to a receiver Bob, all while being oblivious to which message was transferred. Moreover, the receiver learns only one of these messages. Oblivious Transfer combiners take
ninstances of OT protocols as input, and produce an OT protocol that is secure if sufficiently many of the
noriginal OT instances are secure. We present new 1-out-of-
qOT combiners that are perfectly secure against active adversaries. Our combiners arise from secret sharing techniques. We show that given an
Fq-linear secret sharing scheme on a set of
nparticipants and adversary structure
A, we can construct an
n-server, 1-out-of-
qOT combiner that is secure against an adversary corrupting either Alice and a set of servers in
A, or Bob and a set of servers
Bwith
Bˉ∈/A. If the normalized total share size of the scheme is$\ell
,thentheresultingOTcombinerrequires\ell
callstoOTprotocols,andthetotalamountofbitsexchangedduringtheprotocolis(q^{2}+q+1)\ell \log q
.Wealsopresentaconstructionbasedon1−out−of−2OTcombinersthatusestheprotocolofCreˊpeau,BrassardandRobert(FOCS1986).Thisconstructionprovidessmallercommunicationcostsforcertainadversarystructures,suchasthresholdones:Foranyprimepowerq\geq n
,therearen
−server,1−out−of−q
OTcombinersthatareperfectlysecureagainstactiveadversariescorruptingeitherAliceorBob,andaminorityoftheOTcandidates,exchangingO(qn\log q)$bits in total.
Oblivious Transfer (OT) has been regarded as one of the most significant cryptography tools in recent decades.Since the mechanism of OT is widely used in many applications such as e-commerce, secret information exchange, and games, various OT schemes have been proposed to improve its functionality and efficiency.In 2001, Naor and Pinkas proposed a secure 1-out-of-n OT protocol, in which the sender has n messages and the chooser can get one of these n messages in each protocol run.What is more, the sender cannot find which message has been chosen by the chooser and the chooser knows only the correct message.In 2004, Wakaha and Ryota proposed a secure t-out-of-n OT protocol, which is an extension of the 1-out-of-n OT protocol proposed by Naor and Pinkas.Wakaha and Ryota's tout-of-n OT protocol allows the chooser to get t messages from the sender simultaneously in each protocol run.Besides, the sender cannot know what the chooser has chosen and the chooser can only know the exact t messages.However, getting deep understanding of Wakaha and Ryota's protocol, it could be concluded that it still lacks efficiency such that it is hard to be applied in real-world applications.In this article, a secure and efficient t-out-of-n OT protocol based on the Generalized Chinese Remainder Theorem is proposed, in which the chooser can securely get t messages from the sender simultaneously in each protocol run.The efficiency of the proposed t-out-of-n OT protocol is higher than that of Wakaha and Ryota's protocol in terms of practical application.