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International Conference on Internet Computing

How To Exchange Secrets By OT.

Yong Ju Yis, Sangchoon Kim, Sang-Ho Lee

Published Jan 1, 2000• 0 citations
OpenAlex

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One-Out-of-q OT Combiners

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In 1-out-of-$q$Oblivious Transfer (OT) protocols, a sender Alice is able to send one of$q\ge 2$messages to a receiver Bob, all while being oblivious to which message was transferred. Moreover, the receiver learns only one of these messages. Oblivious Transfer combiners take$n$instances of OT protocols as input, and produce an OT protocol that is secure if sufficiently many of the$n$original OT instances are secure. We present new 1-out-of-$q$OT combiners that are perfectly secure against active adversaries. Our combiners arise from secret sharing techniques. We show that given an$\mathbb {F}_{q}$-linear secret sharing scheme on a set of$n$participants and adversary structure$\mathcal {A}$, we can construct an$n$-server, 1-out-of-$q$OT combiner that is secure against an adversary corrupting either Alice and a set of servers in$\mathcal {A}$, or Bob and a set of servers$B$with$\bar {B}\notin \mathcal {A}$. If the normalized total share size of the scheme is$\ell $, then the resulting OT combiner requires$\ell $calls to OT protocols, and the total amount of bits exchanged during the protocol is$(q^{2}+q+1)\ell \log q$. We also present a construction based on 1-out-of-2 OT combiners that uses the protocol of Crépeau, Brassard and Robert (FOCS 1986). This construction provides smaller communication costs for certain adversary structures, such as threshold ones: For any prime power$q\geq n$, there are$n$-server, 1-out-of-$q$OT combiners that are perfectly secure against active adversaries corrupting either Alice or Bob, and a minority of the OT candidates, exchanging$O(qn\log q)$bits in total.

IEEE Transactions on Information Theory•Dec 7, 2023•2 citations

Unclonable Secret Sharing

Prabhanjan Ananth, Vipul Goyal, Jiahui Liu +1 more

arXiv:2406.11008•Lecture notes in computer science•Dec 8, 2024•5 citations
Key-exchange protocols have been overlooked as a possible means for implementing oblivious transfer (OT). In this article, we present protocols for mutual exchange of secrets, 1-out-of-2 OT and coin-flipping similar to the Diffie-Hellman protocol using the idea of obliviously exchanging encryption keys. Since the Diffie-Hellman scheme is widely used, our protocol may provide a useful alternative to the conventional methods for implementation of oblivious transfer and a useful primitive in building larger cryptographic schemes.
In 1-out-of-qqqOblivious Transfer (OT) protocols, a sender Alice is able to send one ofq≥2q\ge 2q≥2messages to a receiver Bob, all while being oblivious to which message was transferred. Moreover, the receiver learns only one of these messages. Oblivious Transfer combiners takennninstances of OT protocols as input, and produce an OT protocol that is secure if sufficiently many of thennnoriginal OT instances are secure. We present new 1-out-of-qqqOT combiners that are perfectly secure against active adversaries. Our combiners arise from secret sharing techniques. We show that given anFq\mathbb {F}_{q}Fq​-linear secret sharing scheme on a set ofnnnparticipants and adversary structureA\mathcal {A}A, we can construct annnn-server, 1-out-of-qqqOT combiner that is secure against an adversary corrupting either Alice and a set of servers inA\mathcal {A}A, or Bob and a set of serversBBBwithBˉ∉A\bar {B}\notin \mathcal {A}Bˉ∈/A. If the normalized total share size of the scheme is$\ell ,thentheresultingOTcombinerrequires, then the resulting OT combiner requires,thentheresultingOTcombinerrequires\ell callstoOTprotocols,andthetotalamountofbitsexchangedduringtheprotocoliscalls to OT protocols, and the total amount of bits exchanged during the protocol iscallstoOTprotocols,andthetotalamountofbitsexchangedduringtheprotocolis(q^{2}+q+1)\ell \log q.Wealsopresentaconstructionbasedon1−out−of−2OTcombinersthatusestheprotocolofCreˊpeau,BrassardandRobert(FOCS1986).Thisconstructionprovidessmallercommunicationcostsforcertainadversarystructures,suchasthresholdones:Foranyprimepower. We also present a construction based on 1-out-of-2 OT combiners that uses the protocol of Crépeau, Brassard and Robert (FOCS 1986). This construction provides smaller communication costs for certain adversary structures, such as threshold ones: For any prime power.Wealsopresentaconstructionbasedon1−out−of−2OTcombinersthatusestheprotocolofCreˊpeau,BrassardandRobert(FOCS1986).Thisconstructionprovidessmallercommunicationcostsforcertainadversarystructures,suchasthresholdones:Foranyprimepowerq\geq n,thereare, there are,therearen−server,1−out−of−-server, 1-out-of-−server,1−out−of−qOTcombinersthatareperfectlysecureagainstactiveadversariescorruptingeitherAliceorBob,andaminorityoftheOTcandidates,exchangingOT combiners that are perfectly secure against active adversaries corrupting either Alice or Bob, and a minority of the OT candidates, exchangingOTcombinersthatareperfectlysecureagainstactiveadversariescorruptingeitherAliceorBob,andaminorityoftheOTcandidates,exchangingO(qn\log q)$bits in total.