Authenticated garbling (Wang et al., CCS'17) is the leading framework for achieving constant-round maliciously secure 2PC, achieving total communication comparable to protocols in the semi-honest setting. In the semi-honest setting, the one-hot garbling scheme of Heath and Kolesnikov (CCS'21) supports tensor gates x ⊗ y , for x ∈ {0,1} n and y ∈ {0,1} m , in O(n+m)? bits, versus O(nm)? for an AND-gate-based garbling. Extending this improvement to the malicious setting has remained open. We present two authenticated garbling protocols that efficiently handle tensor gates. Our first protocol minimizes garbled circuit size, matching the size of semi-honest one-hot garbling; all additional overhead is confined to preprocessing. We also design a custom preprocessing protocol for efficiently generating random authenticated tensor triples, proved secure assuming only a circular correlation robust hash function and base OTs. Our second protocol minimizes total communication via compressed (PCG-style) preprocessing. We construct an authenticated variant of one-hot garbling where the additional overhead in garbled-circuit size as compared to the semi-honest garbling scales with tensor-gate input length rather than output length. As in the semi-honest case, tensor gates are restricted to inputs of length O(log ?) and arbitrary-length tensor products are handled by tiling multiple short input gates. This yields an O(log ?) factor reduction in communication for general tensor products compared to previous state-of-the-art authenticated garbling protocols, with concrete improvements in communication and runtime for practical workloads such as integer and matrix multiplication within an authenticated garbled circuit.
Authenticated garbling (Wang et al., CCS'17) is the leading framework for achieving constant-round maliciously secure 2PC, achieving total communication comparable to protocols in the semi-honest setting. In the semi-honest setting, the one-hot garbling scheme of Heath and Kolesnikov (CCS'21) supports tensor gates x ⊗ y , for x ∈ {0,1} n and y ∈ {0,1} m , in O(n+m)? bits, versus O(nm)? for an AND-gate-based garbling. Extending this improvement to the malicious setting has remained open. We present two authenticated garbling protocols that efficiently handle tensor gates. Our first protocol minimizes garbled circuit size, matching the size of semi-honest one-hot garbling; all additional overhead is confined to preprocessing. We also design a custom preprocessing protocol for efficiently generating random authenticated tensor triples, proved secure assuming only a circular correlation robust hash function and base OTs. Our second protocol minimizes total communication via compressed (PCG-style) preprocessing. We construct an authenticated variant of one-hot garbling where the additional overhead in garbled-circuit size as compared to the semi-honest garbling scales with tensor-gate input length rather than output length. As in the semi-honest case, tensor gates are restricted to inputs of length O(log ?) and arbitrary-length tensor products are handled by tiling multiple short input gates. This yields an O(log ?) factor reduction in communication for general tensor products compared to previous state-of-the-art authenticated garbling protocols, with concrete improvements in communication and runtime for practical workloads such as integer and matrix multiplication within an authenticated garbled circuit.
Abstract Actively secure two-party computation (2PC) is one of the canonical building blocks in modern cryptography. One main goal for designing actively secure 2PC protocols is to reduce the communication overhead, compared to semi-honest 2PC protocols. In this paper, we make significant progress in closing this gap by proposing two new actively secure constant-round 2PC protocols, one with one-way communication of 2κ+5 2 κ + 5 bits per AND gate (for κ κ -bit computational security and any statistical security) and one with total communication of 2κ+ρ+5 2 κ + ρ + 5 bits per AND gate (for ρ ρ -bit statistical security). In particular, our first protocol essentially matches the one-way communication of semi-honest half-gates protocol. Our optimization is achieved by three new techniques: The recent compression technique by Dittmer et al. (Crypto 13510:57–87, 2022) shows that a relaxed preprocessing is sufficient for authenticated garbling that does not reveal masked wire values to the garbler. We introduce a new form of authenticated bits and propose a new technique of generating authenticated AND triples to reduce the one-way communication of preprocessing from 5ρ+1 5 ρ + 1 bits to 2 bits per AND gate for ρ ρ -bit statistical security. Unfortunately, the above compressing technique is only compatible with a less compact authenticated garbled circuit of size 2κ+3ρ 2 κ + 3 ρ bits per AND gate. We designed a new authenticated garbling that does not use information-theoretic MACs but rather dual execution without leakage to authenticate wire values in the circuit. This allows us to use a more compact half-gates based authenticated garbled circuit of size 2κ+1 2 κ + 1 bits per AND gate, and meanwhile keep compatible with the compression technique. Our new technique can achieve one-way communication of 2κ+5 2 κ + 5 bits per AND gate. In terms of total communication, we notice that the communication overhead of the consistency checking method by Dittmer et al. (Crypto 13510:57–87, 2022) can be optimized by adding one-round of interaction and utilizing the Free-XOR property. This reduces the online communication from 2κ+3ρ 2 κ + 3 ρ bits down to 2κ+ρ+1 2 κ + ρ + 1 bits per AND gate. Combined with our first contribution, this yields total amortized communication of 2κ+ρ+5 2 κ + ρ + 5 bits.
Recent works on distributed garbling have provided highly efficient solutions for constant-round MPC tolerating an arbitrary number of corruptions. In this work, we improve upon state-of-the-art protocols in this paradigm for further performance gain. First, we propose a new protocol for generating authenticated AND triples, which is a key building block in many recent works. \beginitemize \item We propose a new authenticated bit protocol in the two-party and multi-party settings from bare IKNP OT extension, allowing us to reduce the communication by about 24 and eliminate many computation bottlenecks. We further improve the computational efficiency for multi-party authenticated AND triples with cheaper and fewer consistency checks and fewer hash function calls. \item We implemented our triple generation protocol and observe around 4× to 5× improvement compared to the best prior protocol in most settings. For example, in the two-party setting with 10 Gbps network and 8 threads, our protocol can generate more than 4 million authenticated triples per second, while the best prior implementation can only generate 0.8 million triples per second. In the multi-party setting, our protocol can generate more than 37000 triples per second over 80 parties, while the best prior protocol can only generate the same number of triples per second over 16 parties. \enditemize We also improve the state-of-the-art multi-party authenticated garbling protocol. \beginitemize \item We take the first step towards applying half-gates in the multi-party setting, which enables us to reduce the size of garbled tables by 2κ bits per gate per garbler, where κ is the computational security parameter. This optimization is also applicable in the semi-honest multi-party setting. \item We further reduce the communication of circuit authentication from 4ρ bits to 1 bit per gate, using a new multi-party batched circuit authentication, where ρ is the statistical security parameter. Prior solution with similar efficiency is only applicable in the two-party setting. \enditemize For example, in the three-party setting, our techniques can lead to roughly a 35 reduction in the size of a distributed garbled circuit.
Secure Multi-Party Computation (MPC) protocols allow a group of mutually distrusting users to compute a function jointly on their inputs without revealing any information beyond the output. For many years, implementations of MPC protocols have targeted security against semi-honest adversaries, i.e., attackers are assumed to execute the protocol honestly but try to learn private information after the fact. Protocols secure against stronger and more realistic malicious adversaries, who could behave arbitrarily during the protocol execution, were known to exist but were much less efficient. This thesis introduces a new paradigm to construct extremely efficient MPC protocols with malicious security. In particular, this thesis consists of three major contributions. 1. We introduce the authenticated garbling framework, and present an efficient concrete instantiation of the protocol. The resulting protocol partially closes the gap between semi-honest and malicious MPC protocols asymptotically; the implementation of the protocol represents the state-of-the-art system for malicious two-party computation. 2. We discuss how to apply authenticated garbling to the multi-party setting, where all-but-one parties can be corrupted by the adversary. The resulting protocol improves upon the best previous constant-round protocol by orders of magnitude. We also present a system that, for the first time, enables MPC executions among hundreds of parties, distributed globally. 3. We present a series of optimizations to two-party authenticated garbling by interpreting authenticated garbling in a new way. The improved malicious protocol has essentially the same concrete efficiency as the best semi-honest protocol in the preprocessing model. 4. We develop these protocols in EMP-toolkit, a practical and efficient MPC tool that can be used to build new protocols and to develop applications using our existing protocols.
In the setting of secure multiparty computation, a set of parties with private inputs wish to compute some function of their inputs without revealing anything but their output. Over the last decade, the efficiency of secure two-party computation has advanced in leaps and bounds, with speedups of some orders of magnitude, making it fast enough to be of use in practice. In contrast, progress on the case of multiparty computation (with more than two parties) has been much slower, with very little work being done. Currently, the only implemented efficient multiparty protocol has many rounds of communication (linear in the depth of the circuit being computed) and thus is not suited for Internet-like settings where latency is not very low. In this paper, we construct highly efficient constant-round protocols for the setting of multiparty computation for semi-honest adversaries. Our protocols work by constructing a multiparty garbled circuit, as proposed in BMR (Beaver et al., STOC 1990). Our first protocol uses oblivious transfer and constitutes the first concretely-efficient constant-round multiparty protocol for the case of no honest majority. Our second protocol uses BGW, and is significantly more efficient than the FairplayMP protocol (Ben-David et al., CCS 2008) that also uses BGW.
Many deployments of secure multi-party computation (MPC) in practice have used information-theoretic three-party protocols that tolerate a single, semi-honest corrupt party, since these protocols enjoy very high efficiency. We propose a new approach for secure three-party computation (3PC) that improves security while maintaining practical efficiency that is competitive with traditional information-theoretic protocols. Our protocol is based on garbled circuits and provides security against a single, malicious corrupt party. Unlike information-theoretic 3PC protocols, ours uses a constant number of rounds. Our protocol only uses inexpensive symmetric-key cryptography: hash functions, block ciphers, pseudorandom generators (in particular, no oblivious transfers) and has performance that is comparable to that of Yao's (semi-honest) 2PC protocol.
Secure multi-party computation (MPC) provides provable security guarantees for many privacy critical applications. The semi-honest MPC protocols are secure against semi-honest adversaries who can only observe the protocol execution, while the maliciously secure MPC protocols are secure against malicious adversaries who can deviate from the protocol description arbitrarily. Many security sensitive applications tend to use semi-honest MPC protocols because malicious security comes with huge communication and/or computation costs. In this work, we show how to efficiently transform generic semi-honest two-party protocols into maliciously secure multi-party protocol in the server-aided setting. We further propose an optimized constant-round server-aided MPC protocol. The proposed protocols are secure when all but one parties are maliciously corrupted, while the remaining party and the server are corrupted by semi-honest and non-colluding adversaries. We implement and evaluate our constant-round protocol. For the 2-party case, our protocol is only 1.11× slower than thesemi-honestYao's Garbled Circuits protocol, and it is 9.16× faster than the maliciously secure authenticated garbling protocol and 4.96× faster than the state-of-the-art maliciously secure server-aided protocol of Wuet al.For the 8-party case, our protocol is 103.29× faster than the authenticated garbling protocol and 17.03× faster than the protocol of Wuet al.