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A New Paradigm for Practical Maliciously Secure Multi-Party Computation

Xiao Wang

Published Jan 1, 2018• 2 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Secure Multi-Party Computation (MPC) protocols allow a group of mutually distrusting users to compute a function jointly on their inputs without revealing any information beyond the output. For many years, implementations of MPC protocols have targeted security against semi-honest adversaries, i.e., attackers are assumed to execute the protocol honestly but try to learn private information after the fact. Protocols secure against stronger and more realistic malicious adversaries, who could behave arbitrarily during the protocol execution, were known to exist but were much less efficient. This thesis introduces a new paradigm to construct extremely efficient MPC protocols with malicious security. In particular, this thesis consists of three major contributions. 1. We introduce the authenticated garbling framework, and present an efficient concrete instantiation of the protocol. The resulting protocol partially closes the gap between semi-honest and malicious MPC protocols asymptotically; the implementation of the protocol represents the state-of-the-art system for malicious two-party computation. 2. We discuss how to apply authenticated garbling to the multi-party setting, where all-but-one parties can be corrupted by the adversary. The resulting protocol improves upon the best previous constant-round protocol by orders of magnitude. We also present a system that, for the first time, enables MPC executions among hundreds of parties, distributed globally. 3. We present a series of optimizations to two-party authenticated garbling by interpreting authenticated garbling in a new way. The improved malicious protocol has essentially the same concrete efficiency as the best semi-honest protocol in the preprocessing model. 4. We develop these protocols in EMP-toolkit, a practical and efficient MPC tool that can be used to build new protocols and to develop applications using our existing protocols.

DOI
10.13016/m2c53f48z

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Secure Multi-Party Computation (MPC) protocols allow a group of mutually distrusting users to compute a function jointly on their inputs without revealing any information beyond the output. For many years, implementations of MPC protocols have targeted security against semi-honest adversaries, i.e., attackers are assumed to execute the protocol honestly but try to learn private information after the fact. Protocols secure against stronger and more realistic malicious adversaries, who could behave arbitrarily during the protocol execution, were known to exist but were much less efficient. This thesis introduces a new paradigm to construct extremely efficient MPC protocols with malicious security. In particular, this thesis consists of three major contributions. 1. We introduce the authenticated garbling framework, and present an efficient concrete instantiation of the protocol. The resulting protocol partially closes the gap between semi-honest and malicious MPC protocols asymptotically; the implementation of the protocol represents the state-of-the-art system for malicious two-party computation. 2. We discuss how to apply authenticated garbling to the multi-party setting, where all-but-one parties can be corrupted by the adversary. The resulting protocol improves upon the best previous constant-round protocol by orders of magnitude. We also present a system that, for the first time, enables MPC executions among hundreds of parties, distributed globally. 3. We present a series of optimizations to two-party authenticated garbling by interpreting authenticated garbling in a new way. The improved malicious protocol has essentially the same concrete efficiency as the best semi-honest protocol in the preprocessing model. 4. We develop these protocols in EMP-toolkit, a practical and efficient MPC tool that can be used to build new protocols and to develop applications using our existing protocols.
Secure multi-party computation (MPC) provides provable security guarantees for many privacy critical applications. The semi-honest MPC protocols are secure against semi-honest adversaries who can only observe the protocol execution, while the maliciously secure MPC protocols are secure against malicious adversaries who can deviate from the protocol description arbitrarily. Many security sensitive applications tend to use semi-honest MPC protocols because malicious security comes with huge communication and/or computation costs. In this work, we show how to efficiently transform generic semi-honest two-party protocols into maliciously secure multi-party protocol in the server-aided setting. We further propose an optimized constant-round server-aided MPC protocol. The proposed protocols are secure when all but one parties are maliciously corrupted, while the remaining party and the server are corrupted by semi-honest and non-colluding adversaries. We implement and evaluate our constant-round protocol. For the 2-party case, our protocol is only 1.11× slower than thesemi-honestYao's Garbled Circuits protocol, and it is 9.16× faster than the maliciously secure authenticated garbling protocol and 4.96× faster than the state-of-the-art maliciously secure server-aided protocol of Wuet al.For the 8-party case, our protocol is 103.29× faster than the authenticated garbling protocol and 17.03× faster than the protocol of Wuet al.
Secure multiparty computation (MPC) enables a set of parties to securely carry out a joint computation of their private inputs without revealing anything but the output. Protocols for semi-honest adversaries guarantee security as long as the corrupted parties run the specified protocol and ensure that nothing is leaked in the transcript. In contrast, protocols for malicious adversaries guarantee security in the presence of arbitrary adversaries who can run any attack strategy. Security for malicious adversaries is typically what is needed in practice (and is always preferred), but comes at a significant cost. In this paper, we present the first protocol for a two-thirds honest majority that achieves security in the presence of malicious adversariesat essentially the exact same cost as the best known protocols for semi-honest adversaries. Our construction is not a general transformation and thus it is possible that better semi-honest protocols will be constructed which do not support our transformation. Nevertheless, for the current state-of-the-art for many parties (based on Shamir sharing), our protocol invokes the best semi-honest multiplication protocol exactly once per multiplication gate (plus some additional local computation that is negligible to the overall cost). Concretely, the best version of our protocol requires each party to send on average of just 2 2/3 elements per multiplication gate (when the number of multiplication gates is at least the number of parties). This is four times faster than the previous-best protocol of Barak et al. (ACM CCS 2018) for small fields, and twice as fast as the previous-best protocol of Chida et al. (CRYPTO 2018) for large fields.
ulti-Party Computation (MPC) protocols allow a set of mutually distrustful parties to securely compute on their joint private inputs, maintaining the privacy of those.Since its early conception in the eighties, a plethora of research as well as some real world deployments have taken place, demonstrating the relevance of such an interesting mathematical problem.Nevertheless, most of the research and all deployments have focused on scenarios where both the number of parties and network latency are very low.This thesis lays out the first steps towards practical deployments of large-scale MPC, where many parties may be involved and they might only be connected through a high-latency network such as the Internet.Both theoretical and empirical evidence shows that non-constant-round protocols cannot perform well on slow networks for many functions.In order to overcome this issue, all the works in this thesis include concretely efficient constant-round protocols based on multi-party garbled circuits.Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 deal with the very strong setting where an active adversary corrupts all but one parties.The former achieves such goal by using homomorphic encryption for low-depth circuits.The latter, based on subsequent work, improves the theoretical understanding of the problem and utilises oblivious transfer to improve efficiency.In Chapter 5 we provide both constant and non-constant round protocols that can handle large numbers of parties more efficiently.We leverage our performance improvements by relaxing the setting where all but one parties are corrupted to one where a small minority of honest participants can be assumed.Concretely, such change allows to distribute secret key material so that each party only holds a 'short' part of the key.Security is then based on the concatenation of all honest parties' keys rather than on each party's individual key, improving both the communication and computation complexities.iii researcher.They would have not been the same without the support of family, friends and colleagues.I would like to start by thanking Nigel Smart for giving me this opportunity, being my advisor and introducing me to others in the community.Martijn Stam
Many deployments of secure multi-party computation (MPC) in practice have used information-theoretic three-party protocols that tolerate a single, semi-honest corrupt party, since these protocols enjoy very high efficiency. We propose a new approach for secure three-party computation (3PC) that improves security while maintaining practical efficiency that is competitive with traditional information-theoretic protocols. Our protocol is based on garbled circuits and provides security against a single, malicious corrupt party. Unlike information-theoretic 3PC protocols, ours uses a constant number of rounds. Our protocol only uses inexpensive symmetric-key cryptography: hash functions, block ciphers, pseudorandom generators (in particular, no oblivious transfers) and has performance that is comparable to that of Yao's (semi-honest) 2PC protocol.
Secure multi-party computation (MPC) enables distrustful parties to jointly perform computations while guaranteeing both the privacy of their inputs and the correctness of the computation. This thesis explores two aspects of secure multi-party computation: adaptive security and round efficiency. Adaptive security is concerned with an adversary that adaptively determines who and when to corrupt during the course of the computation. Even though this is a very natural and realistic assumption about the adversary, most of the MPC literature addresses security only against a static adversary — an adversary that chooses (and fixes) which parties to corrupt before the protocol starts executing. A protocol is called round-efficient if it runs in a small number of rounds. Constructing such protocols is important since efficiency of a protocol is greatly influenced by its round complexity. The security in this thesis is formulated in the universal composability (UC) framework introduced by Canetti [Can01]. Protocols secure in the UC framework remain secure even when executed concurrently with other arbitrary protocols running in some larger network, and can be used as subroutines of larger protocols in a modular fashion. This property is important considering that nowadays many protocols are executed concurrently with others in the Internet. With the focus on adaptive security and round efficiency, we obtain the following results: (1) We show that with access to an ideal commitment functionality, there exists a protocol that UC realizes any well-formed multi-party functionality against a malicious, adaptive adversary that may corrupt any number of parties, with black-box access to any protocol that UC realizes oblivious transfer against a semi-honest, adaptive adversary. (2) We show that there exists a protocol that UC realizes oblivious transfer against a semi-honest, adaptive adversary, with black-box access to a cryptographic primitive called a trapdoor simulatable cryptosystem, which is a natural relaxation of a simulatable cryptosystem introduced by Damgard and Nielsen [3N00]. We also show that the primitive can be constructed based on hardness of factoring. (3) We present a single-message protocol that UC realizes two-party computing with encrypted data (a variant of secure two-party computation), based on the DDH assumption and non- interactive zero-knowledge arguments. The protocol achieves security against a malicious, static adversary. (4) We present two round-efficient protocols that UC realize multi-party computing with encrypted data (a variant of secure multi-party computation), based on the DDH assumption and non-interactive zero-knowledge arguments. The first (resp. second) protocol requires one round (resp. two rounds) with appropriate preprocessing, which is independent of the exact circuit and actual inputs of the specific instance problem to solve — only the bound on the circuit size is known. Although the first protocol is more round-efficient, the preprocessing of the second is sometimes better under some efficiency considerations. Both protocols achieve security against a malicious, static adversary that may corrupt up to all but one parties.
Many deployments of secure multi-party computation (MPC) in practice have used information-theoretic three-party protocols that tolerate a single, semi-honest corrupt party, since these protocols enjoy very high efficiency. We propose a new approach for secure three-party computation (3PC) that improves security while maintaining practical efficiency that is competitive with traditional information-theoretic protocols. Our protocol is based on garbled circuits and provides security against a single, malicious corrupt party. Unlike information-theoretic 3PC protocols, ours uses a constant number of rounds. Our protocol only uses inexpensive symmetric-key cryptography: hash functions, block ciphers, pseudorandom generators (in particular, no oblivious transfers) and has performance that is comparable to that of Yao’s (semi-honest) 2PC protocol. We demonstrate the practicality of our protocol with an implementation based on the JustGarble framework of Bellare et al. (S&P 2013). The implementation incorporates various optimizations including the most recent techniques for efficient circuit garbling. We perform experiments on several benchmarking circuits, in different setups. Our experiments confirm that, despite providing a more demanding security guarantee, our protocol has performance comparable to existing information-theoretic 3PC. 1