Abstract Ontic structural realism (OSR) has been suggested as a metaphysics for quantum field theory (QFT). A common objection to OSR highlights the presence of fundamental intrinsic properties in physical theories (such as QFT) as undermining OSR. As there are purported examples of fundamental intrinsic properties possessed by fields in QFT, OSR is purportedly refuted in QFT (Berghofer, 2018). This article defends OSR from this argument. There are two possible strategies for responding to this argument: (1) denying that Berghofer’s counterexamples to OSR are intrinsic properties, and (2) finding a means of accommodating intrinsic properties in OSR. I consider the first strategy and discuss several possible arguments why the purported cases of fundamental intrinsic properties in QFT are non-intrinsic. Additionally, as there are a number of means available for OSR to accommodate intrinsic properties, the second strategy also succeeds.
Abstract Ontic structural realism (OSR) has been suggested as a metaphysics for quantum field theory (QFT). A common objection to OSR highlights the presence of fundamental intrinsic properties in physical theories (such as QFT) as undermining OSR. As there are purported examples of fundamental intrinsic properties possessed by fields in QFT, OSR is purportedly refuted in QFT (Berghofer, 2018). This article defends OSR from this argument. There are two possible strategies for responding to this argument: (1) denying that Berghofer’s counterexamples to OSR are intrinsic properties, and (2) finding a means of accommodating intrinsic properties in OSR. I consider the first strategy and discuss several possible arguments why the purported cases of fundamental intrinsic properties in QFT are non-intrinsic. Additionally, as there are a number of means available for OSR to accommodate intrinsic properties, the second strategy also succeeds.
Abstract Lam and Esfeld have argued that, within Bohmian mechanics, the wave function can be interpreted as a physical structure instantiated by the fundamental particles posited by the theory. Further, to characterize the nature of this structure, they appeal to the framework of Ontic Structural Realism (OSR), thereby proposing a structuralist interpretation of Bohmian mechanics. However, I shall point out that OSR denotes a family of distinct views, each of which maintains a different account about the relation between structures and objects, and entails a different kind of ontology. Thus, in this paper I will show how to articulate the structuralist approach to Bohmian Mechanics accordingly to the different standard versions of OSR, and I will evaluate these alternatives. Moreover, I will propose a novel and sui generis kind of structuralist interpretation of Bohmian Mechanics, based on the framework of metaphysical coherentism.
Abstract Ontic structuralism or ontic structural realism in the philosophy of physics can be broadly considered as an interpretative strategy providing a set of conceptual and metaphysical tools—or, more ambitiously, an ontological framework—in order to account for central features of current fundamental physics. This article aims to review the main structuralist interpretative moves in the context of our two best fundamental physical theories of matter and spacetime, namely, quantum theory (quantum mechanics and quantum field theory) and general relativity. We highlight in particular the structuralist understanding of permutation invariance, entanglement and nonlocality in quantum theory, and of the dynamical features of spacetime, (gauge‐theoretic) diffeomorphism invariance and background independence in general relativity.
Radical-Ontic Structural Realism and Moderate-Ontic Structural Realism are usually distinguished by the specific way of how they address the question of the primacy between objects and relations. However, I will argue that the difference between Radical-Ontic Structural Realism and Moderate-Ontic Structural Realism runs deeper; it rests on the different programmatic assessments of the relationship between science and metaphysics. In this sense, at least at its roots, the distinction between Radical-Ontic Structural Realism and Moderate-Ontic Structural Realism lies in the divergence between Radical Naturalistic Metaphysics and Esfeld’s account of Natural Philosophy (based on the Primitive Ontology approach). From the above distinctions, I will argue: i) even that Quantum Mechanics offers us good arguments in favor of Ontic Structural Realism, both main Ontic Structural Realism’s proposals seem to struggle with QM’s challenges; ii) Ontic Structural Realism’s failure is not due to itself but to this metametaphysics proposals. That is, maybe some assumptions made by both NM and PO, like micro-physicalism, monism or metaphysical fundamentalism, should be reviewed or even dismissed from Ontic Structural Realism proposals.
The aim of this work is to study the ontological thesis defended by Ontic Structural Realism, which, in general, states that the ontological commitments should be focused in the relations and not on objects. This would be a more coherent realist stance towards modern physical theories. In first place we will study the ontological conception defended by the Ontic Structural Realism, which, broadly speaking, postulates that the ontological focus should be placed on relations rather than on objects. This, in turn, would constitute a realistic interpretation of the current physical theories. Secondly, as a possible defense to the position stated by Ontic Structural Realism, the concept of non-supervenient relations will be studied and it will be argued that it is this type of relations that acquires a fundamental character in Quantum Mechanics, as, for example, in phenomena such as the so-called quantum entanglement.
The ‘underdetermination of metaphysics by the physics’ is the thesis that our best scientific theories do not uniquely determine their ontologies. Non-relativistic quantum mechanics is famously thought to exemplify this kind of underdetermination: it may be seen as compatible with both an ontology of individual objects and with an ontology of non-individual objects. A possible way out of the dilema thus created consists in adopting some version of Ontic Structural Realism (OSR), a view according to which the metaphysically relevant aspect of the theory is its structure, not the nature of the objects dealt with. According to OSR, particular objects may be dispensed with (eliminated or re-conceptualized) in favor of the structure of the theory. In this paper we shall argue that the underdetermination of metaphysics by the physics is a consequence of a too strict naturalism in ontology. As a result, when a mitigated ontological naturalism is taken into account, underdetermination does not appear to have such dark consequences for object-oriented ontologies in quantum mechanics.
Standard quantum mechanics poses serious challenges to some principles deeply entrenched in traditional metaphysics. In particular, the theory defies the ontological category of individual object through three of its features: contextuality, non-separability, and indistinguishability. The difficulties have prompted the development of non-traditional ontological frameworks intended to account for the quantum domain. Some approaches advocate replacing the classical conception of a realm of objects endowed with properties by an ontology that either dispenses with the category of object altogether or treats it as a derivative notion. The Modal-Hamiltonian Interpretation (MHI) of quantum mechanics and Ontic Structural Realism (OSR) exemplify this position. MHI proposes an ontology in which quantum systems are non-objectual bundles of properties linked by definite physical relations. The OSR defends the ontological primacy of structures, within which objects are construed as nodes of relations. The aim of this article is to compare these two ontological approaches, highlighting both their points of convergence and their divergences, particularly in light of the ontological challenges posed by quantum mechanics. With this aim, the article is structured as follows. Section 2 outlines the ontology of MHI, introducing the distinction between type-properties and case-properties, characterizing quantum systems as non-objectual bundles, and analyzing the role of symmetry groups in providing physical content to the theory and governing actualization. Section 3 turns to OSR, examining its motivations, its distinction between physical and mathematical structures, and the modal character of structures. Section 4 offers a systematic comparison of the two approaches, considering their respective motivations and scope, their shared commitment to an object-free ontology, the role played by symmetry groups within each framework, and their contrasting interpretations of modality. Finally, Section 5 presents some concluding remarks.